No one can doubt that man has as strong a propensity to unite with woman, as bulls and stags have with the females of their kind. He has, even in civilized societies, a propensity to fight with one or more of his fellows for a female of surpassing beauty. Men will combat about a disputed field or country as fiercely as dogs over a bone, or hermit crabs over a shell. As a rule, man detests to be taught, quite as much as does the whelp; yet, when he has gained an art, he is as proud of it as a highly trained spaniel. Men are gregarious as horses in a field, and quite as intolerant as they, of an interloper. Like the wild wolves, men will unite together to capture and prey upon creatures of each of whom individually he stands in fear. Like a set of wild bulls or buffaloes, men will, for a time, agree to obey a leader, and, when the object is gained, break loose. Like a cat, man will steal, when he can, his neighbours' goods, like a crow, he will pay no attention to his parents, nor to a Sunday.
Without entering into farther particulars, we may affirm that some highly trained elephants, dogs, and horses, are superior to many human beings in every point upon which an impartial judge can determine.
It is my belief that, for a man to obey an instinct which is implanted in his nature, is not "a sin" against God.
To see this in a fair light, let us assume, as we have a right to do, that it is an instinct in the nature of all known creatures, to increase and multiply their like. To avoid doing so intentionally, is a contravention of one of the Creator's laws. If this be so, then celibacy is a sin, as great, indeed, as if one were to refrain from food of all kinds; and no one can be considered as worthy of the name of good, who remains unpaired without just cause. In like manner, it is not an offence against the laws of God for any man and woman to unite, for it is as much a law of nature that they shall do so, as that they must eat and drink. The plea of "religion" cannot make that wrong, which is by nature right.
In like manner, if in a limited community—say upon an island, the number of men exceeds that of the women, I believe that a fight amongst the males for the possession of mates, would not be "sin" against the Omnipotent even though many combatants died during the contest.
Nay, so common upon many points is the agreement; amongst even the most orthodox, that none would say that a man commits a crime when he steals the store of honey laid up by bees, kills animals for food or for their fur, or covets and appropriates the prairies hitherto occupied by herds of deer and bison. Even the commandments said to be delivered by God Himself are held not to be literally binding upon man, except in relation to his friends. He may, for example, by the laws of war, murder his enemies, fornicate with their wives, steal their property, and deceive them in every way. Abraham, the so-called friend of God, murdered many Orientals, and plundered them; not because he had any quarrel with them, but simply because they had murdered and plundered some of his friends. David again, a man after God's own heart, with his dying breath, gave his son instructions to put individuals to death in cold blood, superseding the law of Sinai, by a heritage of hate. When, therefore, common consent takes certain actions out of the list of crimes or sins, provided that the deeds are done against enemies, we have to seek for the origin of those ideas which make murder, theft, robbery, rape, and false-witness crimes in the abstract.
To understand this point, we have really to start from the bestial basis, and aver that what is not sin in them, is not sin in savage man. No one of any intelligence would say that a Briton would be justified in shooting an Ashantee because the latter had killed and eaten an enemy, or an aged parent; nor would any one of us sentence a Hindoo to death because he had killed a dozen Thugs. Even in comparatively civilized American backwoods, a person who has killed a bully has been thought a public benefactor. Again, when we cast our eyes upon Australia, and learn the brutal way in which the black native virgins are violently carried away from their relatives and married, and how again they are repeatedly carried off as wives by other men, we feel ourselves justified in leaving the ravishers without punishment, for there is no violation of law, or, if there be, Englishmen have no right to interfere.
But what we tolerate in uncivilized lands, even where we are ostensibly rulers, we will not suffer in our own. The reason of this is, that we have banded ourselves into a society in which "the laws," once settled and determined by the majority, supersede, in certain cases, individual action.
To make our meaning clear, let us imagine that amongst some nation or people there is one man more astute and powerful than his fellows; still further, we assume that he has fought, or is desirous to fight, a neighbour of nearly equal force. It is clear that if his people murder each other from any cause he will lose warriors; consequently, he will let his tribe understand that he will punish homicide, on a plan which he thinks will be deterrent. Still further, as he requires soldiers of strong limbs and sturdy constitution, he declares that no woman shall many without his consent, so that he may prevent any one selling herself, or being sold, to a weak or old man for mere pelf. As, in a savage state, most possessions are those which are useful in war, he would prohibit theft. As a consequence, he, and all who respected his power to punish, would regard murder, theft, rape, and unauthorized wife-selling as crimes—offences, that is to say, against the ruler of the state, and not against the Creator of mankind.
It signifies little to my argument, whether society is governed, as the early Aryans were, by warriors, or, as the later ones were, by Brahmans. In either case the leaders make laws, and declare a violation of them to be punishable.