When all are strictly proper in every relation of life, I cannot believe that anything more would be wanting to make the human family as happy as it can be here. What, let us ask, would the orthodox declare was amissing? The reply is, to my mind, awful: There would be, first, the want of hatred and malice; then would be added the want of Hell-to which enemies could be sent, and of a Heaven, in which the faithful could feed their malignancy by watching the tortures of those whom they detested on earth.
In fine, I beg to express my own deliberate opinion, which has been growing stronger monthly since I first began to collect materials for this work, that those who can find nerve to sweep from their minds the trammels which have been woven around them by hundreds of generations of hierarchs, and adopt the simple faith which I have above indicated, will be far happier and better than ever they were before. No man will stand between them and God, and they will find Him infinitely more good and merciful than any of those who profess to be His agents.
There is yet another way by which the subject of "faith and reason" may be approached, and their antagonism tested. This is by considering how far the former is essentially human, and the latter divine—by which we mean, superior to the propensity which all mankind has in common. We recognize the importance of the inquiry, when we find Mr Gladstone, a Prime Minister of England, discouraging the action resulting from philosophical thought, because a man named Paul, some 1800 years ago, recommended his friends to hold fast that which he, and they, under his teaching, believed to be good. The speech of the Premier, which was delivered at a large Liverpool School, and was written with unusual care, held up, to a lot of schoolboys, the propositions of Strauss as something which were so bad, that the enunciation of them carried with it their refutation. Yet, at the same time, the speaker allowed that the German thinker was conspicuous for intellectual attainments, powers of thought beyond the ordinary run of mortals, sobriety in mental culture, and boldness in the enunciation of the conclusions to which his reason compelled him. In Mr Gladstone's opinion, such a man's doctrines deserved to be withered; not because they were opposed to reason, to logic, to the stern reality of facts, but because they opposed the prejudices of certain persons educated in a different style of faith.
If we inquire in what way the German philosopher and the English bigot differ, we can come to no other conclusion than that the one has used his intellect upon the dogmas which have been presented to his mind, from his infancy upwards, until they have been mistaken for fundamental truths, whilst the other has exercised his mental powers upon something beyond the doctrinal grounds on which his early education has been framed. The then English Premier, who had to direct the state, allowed himself to be guided by defunct men, precisely in the same way as Pyrrhus, Croesus, and others, were governed by the pretended oracles at Delphi, Dodona, and elsewhere. The man, in other words, who once wielded the might of England, and is conspicuous for his classical acquirements, is as much the slave of superstition as any ancient Egyptian or Grecian monarch, only his oracles are not the same as theirs.
It is clear, that when the speech, to which reference has been made, was composed, Mr Gladstone was under the influence of the belief, that what he had been taught, and had adopted, must necessarily be the only truth which can be relied on, at least, in its fundamental points. It is this very presumption, this lazy habit of mind, that was long ago pointed out by Bacon as being the most fertile cause of the retardation of science, and it is remarkable that Oxford, as an University, and most of its alumni, are still victims to the weakness referred to. It naturally follows in the train of what is called classical learning, when the mind is taught to remember rather than to think; and one easily believes that he can recognize in the late Premier the gradual development of thought, and can tell the epochs when cherished idols have been thrown aside, with the energy of one who is suddenly roused to exercise a powerful mind in an independent manner.
It would be useless to copy all the aphorisms by which Lord Bacon attempted to destroy the old philosophy, which, in his time, was most universally adopted, and to build up a new state of things, in which science should advance, but a few of them are of such value that they deserve recording. In Novum Organum, aph. 23 we read—"There is no small difference between the fancies [—Greek—] of the human mind and the ideas of the divine mind—that is, between certain notions that please us, and the real stamp and impression made by created objects as they are found in nature." That is to say, man commonly imagines things to be what he fancies they ought to be, and neglects what they really are. The learned aphorist then points out certain peculiarities of men, by which they are induced to cleave to the bad, and neglect the good.
Aph. 46—-"The human understanding, when any proposition has once been laid down (either from general admission and belief, or from the pleasure which it affords), forces everything to add to it support and confirmation. But this evil insinuates itself still more craftily in philosophy and in the sciences, in which a settled maxim vitiates and governs every other circumstance, although the latter be much more worthy of confidence." Aph. 47—"The human understanding is most excited by that which strikes and enters the mind at once and suddenly, and by which the imagination is immediately filled and inflated. It then begins, almost imperceptibly, to conceive and suppose that everything is similar to the few objects which have taken possession of the mind, whilst it is very slow and unfit for the transition to the remote and heterogeneous instances by which axioms are tried, as by fire, unless the office be imposed upon it by severe regulations, and a powerful authority."
We may paraphrase the preceding axiom thus:—Those who, from personal preaching, or by parental influence, have adopted a certain belief in the truth of that which has been taught to them as a "revelation," no matter who the individuals are, or may have been, who propound it, are loth, ever, to inquire into the real nature of the matter. Hence it is that "clairvoyance" and "spiritualism" have so many staunch adherents.
Aph. 56—"Some dispositions evince an unbounded admiration of antiquity, others eagerly embrace novelty, and but few can preserve the just medium, so as neither to bear up what the ancients have correctly laid down, nor to despise the just innovations of the moderns. This is very prejudicial to the sciences and philosophy, and, instead of a correct judgment, we have but the factions of the ancients and the moderns."
There are other aphorisms following, which point out the mischief of following certain theories, simply because they have been long accepted, and are generally supposed to be correct.