I received your favor of the 23rd of September two days ago. That of the 28th and 29th was put in my hands this morning. I immediately waited on the ambassadors, ordinary and extraordinary, of the United Netherlands, and also on the envoy of Prussia, and asked their good offices to have an efficacious protection extended to your person, your family, and your effects, observing, that the United States know no party, but are the friends and allies of the United Netherlands as a nation, and would expect from their friendship, that the person who is charged with their affairs, until the arrival of a minister, should be covered from all insult and injury, which might be offered him by a lawless mob; well assured that their minister, residing with Congress, would on all occasions receive the same. They have been so good as to promise me, each, that he will in his first despatches press this matter on the proper power, and give me reason to hope that it will be efficacious for your safety. I will transmit your letter to Mr. Jay by the Count de Moustier, who sets out within a week for New York, as Minister Plenipotentiary for France, in that country. I sincerely sympathize in your sufferings, and wish that what I have done may effect an end to them; being with much respect and esteem, Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant,
Th: Jefferson.
LETTER CII.—TO JOHN JAY, October 8, 1787
TO JOHN JAY.
Paris, October 8, 1787.
Sir,
I had the honor of writing you on the 19th of September, twice on the 22nd, and again on the 24th. The two first went by the packet, the third by a vessel bound to Philadelphia. I have not yet learned by what occasion the last went. In these several letters, I communicated to you the occurrences of Europe, as far as they were then known. Notwithstanding the advantage which the Emperor seemed to have gained over his subjects of Brabant, by the military arrangements he had been permitted to make under false pretexts, he has not obtained his ends. He certainly wished to enforce his new regulations; but he wished more to be cleared of all domestic difficulties, that he might be free to act in the great scenes which are preparing for the theatre of Europe. He seems, therefore, to have instructed his Governor General of the Netherlands to insist on compliance as far as could be insisted, without producing resistance by arms; but at the same time, to have furnished him with a sufficiently complete recantation, to prevent the effects of insurrection. The Governor pressed; the people were firm; a small act of force was then attempted, which produced a decided resistance, in which the people killed several of the military: the last resource was then used, which was the act of recantation; this produced immediate tranquillity, and every thing there is now finally settled, by the Emperor’s relinquishment of his plans.
My letter of the evening of September the 22nd informed you that the Prussian troops had entered Holland, and that of the 24th, that England had announced to this court that she was arming generally. These two events being simultaneous, proved that the two sovereigns acted in concert. Immediately after, the court of London announced to the other courts of Europe, that if France entered Holland with armed force, she would consider it as an act of hostility, and declare war against her; sending Mr. Grenville here, at the same time, to make what she called a conciliatory proposition. This proposition was received as a new insult, Mr. Grenville very coolly treated, and he has now gone back. It is said, he has carried the ultimatum of France. What it is, particularly, has not transpired; it is only supposed, in general, to be very firm. You will see, in one of the Leyden gazettes, one of the letters written by the ministers of England to the courts of their respective residence, communicating the declaration before mentioned. In the mean time, Holland has been sooner reduced by the Prussian troops, than could have been expected. The abandonment of Utrecht by the Rhingrave of Salm, seems to have thrown the people under a general panic, during which every place submitted, except Amsterdam. That had opened conferences with the Duke of Brunswick; but as late as the 2nd instant, no capitulation was yet concluded. The King of Prussia, on his first move, demanded categorically of the King of Poland, what part he intended to act in the event of war. The latter answered, he should act as events should dictate; and is, in consequence of this species of menace from Prussia, arming himself. He can bring into the field about seventy thousand good cavalry. In the mean time, though nothing transpires publicly of the confederation between France and the two empires, mentioned in my letter of September the 19th, it is not the less sure that it is on the carpet, and will take place. To the circumstances before mentioned, may be added, as further indications of war, the naming as Generalissimo of their marine on the Atlantic, Monsieur de Suffrein, on the Mediterranean, Monsieur Albert de Rioms, the recalling Monsieur de St. Priest, their ambassador, from Antwerp, before he had reached the Hague, and the activity of their armies by sea. On the other hand, the little movement by land would make one suppose they expected to put the King of Prussia into other hands. They too, like the Emperor, are arranging matters at home. The rigorous levy of the deux vingtiemes is enregistered, the stamp act and impot territorial are revoked, the parliament recalled, the nation soothed by these acts, and inspired by the insults of the British court. The part of the Council still leaning towards peace are become unpopular, and perhaps may feel the effects of it. No change in the administration has taken place since my last, unless we may consider as such, Monsieur Cabarrus’s refusal to stand in the lines. Thinking he should be forced to follow, too seriously, plans formed by others, he has declined serving.
Should this war take place, as is quite probable, and should it be as general as it threatens to be, our neutrality must be attended with great advantages. Whether of a nature to improve our morals or our happiness, is another question. But is it sure that Great Britain, by her searches, her seizures, and other measures for harassing us, will permit us to preserve our neutrality? I know it may be argued, that the land-war, which she would superadd to her sea-war, by provoking us to join her enemies, should rationally hold her to her good behavior with us. But since the accession of the present monarch, has it not been passion, and not reason, which, nine times out of ten, has dictated her measures? Has there been a better rule of prognosticating what he would do, than to examine what he ought not to do? When I review his dispositions and review his conduct, I have little hope of his permitting our neutrality. He will find subjects of provocation in various articles of our treaty with France, which will now come into view, in all their consequences, and in consequences very advantageous to the one, and injurious to the other country. I suggest these doubts, on a supposition that our magazines are not prepared for war, and in the opinion that provisions for that event should be thought of.