Paris, October 11, 1785.
Sir,—In my letter of August the 14th, I had the honor of expressing to you the uneasiness I felt, at the delay of the instructions on the subject of the Barbary treaties, of which Mr. Lambe was the bearer, and of informing you that I had proposed to Mr. Adams, that if he did not arrive either in the French or English packets, then expected, we should send some person to negotiate these treaties. As he did not arrive in those packets, and I found Mr. Barclay was willing to undertake the negotiations, I wrote to Mr. Adams (who had concurred in the proposition made him), informing him that Mr. Barclay would go, and proposing papers for our immediate signature. The day before the return of the courier, Mr. Lambe arrived with our instructions, the letters of credence, &c., enclosed in yours of March the 11th, 1785. Just about the same time, came to hand the letter No. 1, informing me, that two American vessels were actually taken and carried into Algiers, and leaving no further doubt that that power was exercising hostilities against us, in the Atlantic. The conduct of the Emperor of Morocco had been such, as forbade us to postpone his treaty to that with Algiers. But the commencement of hostilities by the latter, and their own activity, pressed the necessity of immediate propositions to them. It was therefore thought best, while Mr. Barclay should be proceeding with the Emperor of Morocco, that some other agent should go to Algiers. We had few subjects to choose out of. Mr. Lambe's knowledge of the country, of its inhabitants, of their manner of transacting business, the recommendations from his State to Congress of his fitness for this employment, and other information founding a presumption that he would be approved, occasioned our concluding to send him to Algiers. The giving him proper authorities, and new ones to Mr. Barclay conformable to our own powers, was the subject of a new courier between Mr. Adams and myself. He returned last night, and I had the honor of enclosing you copies of all the papers we furnish those gentlemen with; which will possess Congress fully of our proceedings herein. They are numbered from two to ten inclusive. The supplementary instruction to Mr. Lambe, No. 5, must rest for justification on the emergency of the case. The motives which led to it must be found in the feelings of the human heart, in a partiality for those sufferers who are of our own country, and in the obligations of every government to yield protection to their citizens, as the consideration of their obedience. It will be a comfort to know that Congress does not disapprove this step.
Considering the treaty with Portugal among the most interesting to the United States, I some time ago took occasion at Versailles, to ask of the Portuguese ambassador if he had yet received from his court an answer to our letter. He told me he had not; but that he would make it the subject of another letter. Two days ago, his secretaire d'ambassade called on me, with a letter from his minister to the ambassador, in which was the following paragraph, as he translated it to me; and I committed it to writing from his mouth. "Your Excellency has communicated to us the substance of your conversation with the American minister. That power ought to have been already persuaded, by the manner in which its vessels have been received here; and consequently that his Majesty would have much satisfaction, in maintaining perfect harmony and good understanding with the same United States. But it would be proper to begin with the reciprocal nomination, on both sides, of persons, who, at least with the character of agents, might reciprocally inform their constituents of what might conduce to a knowledge of the interests of the two nations, without prejudice to either. This first step appears necessary to lead to the proposed object."
By this, it would seem, that this power is more disposed to pursue a track of negotiation, similar to that which Spain has done. I consider this answer as definitive of all further measures, under our commission to Portugal. That to Spain was superseded by proceedings in another line. That to Prussia is concluded by actual treaty; to Tuscany will probably be so; and perhaps to Denmark; and these, I believe, will be the sum of the effects of our commissions for making treaties of alliance. England shows no disposition to treat. France, should her ministers be able to keep the ground of the Arret of August 1784 against the clamors of her merchants, and should they be disposed, hereafter, to give us more, very probably will not bind herself to it by treaty, but keep her regulations dependent on her own will. Sweden will establish a free port at St. Bartholemew's, which, perhaps, will render any new engagement, on our part, unnecessary. Holland is so immovable in her system of colony administration, that, as propositions to her, on that subject, would be desperate, they had better not be made. You will perceive by the letter No. 11, from the Marquis de La Fayette, that there is a possibility of an overture from the Emperor. A hint from the chargé des affaires of Naples, lately, has induced me to suppose something of the same kind from thence. But the advanced period of our commissions now offers good cause for avoiding to begin what probably cannot be terminated during their continuance; and with respect to these two, and all other powers not before mentioned, I doubt whether the advantages to be derived from treaties with them will countervail the additional embarrassments they may impose on the States, when they shall proceed to make those commercial arrangements necessary to counteract the designs of the British cabinet. I repeat it, therefore, that the conclusion of the treaty with Prussia, and the probability of others with Denmark, Tuscany, and the Barbary States, may be expected to wind up the proceedings of the general commissions. I think that, in possible events, it may be advantageous to us, by treaties with Prussia, Denmark, and Tuscany, to have secured ports in Northern and Mediterranean seas. I have the honor to be, with sentiments of the highest respect and esteem, Sir, your most obedient, and most humble servant.
TO MR. ADAMS.
Paris, October 11, 1785.
Dear Sir,—Colonel Franks and Mr. Randolph arrived last night. This enables me to send copies of all the Barbary papers to Congress by the Mr. Fitzhughs, together with the Prussian treaty. They wait till to-morrow for that purpose. Considering the treaty with Portugal as among the most important to the United States, I, some time ago, took occasion at Versailles to ask the Portuguese Ambassador if he had not received an answer from his court on the subject of our treaty. He said not, but that he would write again. His secretaire de ambassade called on me two days ago, and translated into French, as follows, a paragraph of a letter from his minister to the ambassador: "Relativement à ce que V. E. nous a fait part de ce qu'elle avoit parlé avec le ministre de l'Amerique, cette puissance doit être déjà persuadée par d'effets la manière dont ses vaisseaux ont été accueillis ici; et par conséquence sa majesté auroit beaucoup de satisfaction à entretenir une parfaite harmonie et bon correspondence entre les mêmes Etats Unis. Mais il seroit à propos de commencer par la nomination réciproque des deux parties des personnes, qui, au moins avec la caractère d'agens, informeroient réciproquement leurs constituents de ce qui pourroit conduire à la connoisance des intérêts des deux nations sans préjudice de l'un ou de l'autre. C'est le premier pas qu'il paroit convenable de donner pour conduire à la fin proposée." By this, I suppose, they will prefer proceeding as Spain has done, and that we may consider it as definitive of our commission to them. I communicate it to Congress that they may take such other measures for leading on a negotiation as they may think proper.
You know that the 3d article of instructions of October 29, 1783, to the ministers for negotiating peace, directed them to negotiate the claim for the prizes taken by the alliance and sent into Bergen, but delivered up by the Court of Denmark; you recollect, also, that this has been deferred in order to be taken up with the general negotiation for an alliance. Captain Jones, desiring to go to America, proposed to me that he should leave the solicitation of this matter in the hands of Doctor Bancroft, and to ask you to negotiate it, through the minister of Denmark at London. The delay of Baron Waltersdorf is one reason for this. Your better acquaintance with the subject is a second. The Danish minister here being absent, is a third. And a fourth and more conclusive one is that, having never acted as one of the commissioners for negotiating the peace, I feel an impropriety in meddling with it at all, and much more to become the principal agent. I therefore told Captain Jones I would solicit your care of this business. I believe he writes to you on the subject.
Mr. Barclay sets out in two or three days. Lambe will follow as soon as the papers can be got from this ministry. Having no news, I shall only add assurances of the esteem with which I am, dear Sir, your friend and servant.