Amsterdam, March 29, 1788.
Dear Sir,—I have received from you three letters of March the 9th, 14th, and 17th, and written you two of the 10th and 13th. In the last, I mentioned to you that I should leave this place the 13th, but I have been drawn on from day to day by the hope of seeing the business on which I came settled, on the basis of positive engagement, and the great object of the month of June appeared so sure, that we were about proceeding to immediate payment of Mr. Grand, the State of Virginia, and all smaller claims, when a letter of the 20th February, from the Commissioners of the Treasury, arrived, forbidding the application of money to any object except the diplomatic expenses, till the cash for the June interest was actually in hand. No room was left for the bankers to execute their discretion. The consequence is a delay of all other objects for some weeks, which probably might have been effected instantly, without danger to the great one. Indeed, I had obtained a positive engagement on that ground. Be so good as to communicate this much to Mr. Grand.
A letter from Mr. Van Berkel, at New York, confirms the arrival of the Count de Moustier there on the 18th of January, and removes all suspense and anxiety on that subject. You know we received a similar account the day before I left Paris, which I communicated to M. de Montmorin. It is with infinite affliction that I recollect, in the hurry of my departure, to have omitted to have notified the same to M. Dupont, who had a son embarked in the same bottom. I am haunted with this recollection, and would beg either yourself or Mr. Grand, whichever sees M. Dupont first, to let him know that it was neither want of attention nor attachment to him which occasioned it to escape me, but the confusion which attended the setting out on such a journey on so short notice.
I set out to-morrow for Utrecht, Nimeguen, &c., and shall pursue the course of the Rhine as far as the roads will permit me, not exceeding Strasburg. Whenever they become impassable, or too difficult, if they do become so, I shall turn off to Paris. So also if anything of importance should call for me at Paris sooner, you will be so good as to address to me at Frankfort and Strasburg. I will call at the post office there, and be happy to find news from you relative to yourself, my daughters, and America. I shall be at Frankfort about the 8th of April, and at Strasburg about the 15th. You shall hear from me on the road. * * * * * * *
[TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.]
Paris, May 2, 1788.
Dear Sir,—I am honored with your Excellency's letter by the last packet, and thank you for the information it contains on the communication between the Cayahoga and Big Beaver. I have ever considered the opening a canal between those two water courses as the most important work in that line which the State of Virginia could undertake. It will infallibly turn through the Potomac all the commerce of Lake Erie, and the country west of that, except what may pass down the Mississippi; and it is important that it be soon done, lest that commerce should, in the meantime, get established in another channel. Having, in the spring of the last year, taken a journey through the southern parts of France, and particularly examined the canal of Languedoc, through its whole course, I take the liberty of sending you the notes I made on the spot, as you may find in them something, perhaps, which may be turned to account, some time or other, in the prosecution of the Potomac canal. Being merely a copy from my travelling notes, they are undigested and imperfect, but may still perhaps give hints capable of improvement in your mind.
The affairs of Europe are in such a state still, that it is impossible to say what form they will take ultimately. France and Prussia, viewing the Emperor as their most dangerous and common enemy, had heretofore seen their common safety as depending on a strict connection with one another. This had naturally inclined the Emperor to the scale of England, and the Empress also, as having views in common with the Emperor, against the Turks. But these two powers would, at any time, have gladly quitted England, to coalesce with France, as being the power which they met everywhere, opposed as a barrier to all their schemes of aggrandisement. When, therefore, the present King of Prussia took the eccentric measure of bidding defiance to France, by placing his brother in law on the throne of Holland, the two empires immediately seized the occasion of soliciting an alliance with France. The motives for this appeared so plausible, that it was believed the latter would have entered into this alliance, and that thus, the whole political system of Europe would have taken a new form. What has prevented this court from coming into it, we know not. The unmeasurable ambition of the Emperor, and his total want of moral principle and honor, are suspected. A great share of Turkey, the recovery of Silesia, the consolidation of his dominions by the Bavarian exchange, the liberties of the Germanic body, all occupy his mind together, and his head is not well enough organized, to pursue so much only of all this as is practicable. Still, it was thought that France might safely have coalesced with these powers, because Russia and herself holding close together, as their interests would naturally dictate, the Emperor could never stir but with their permission. France seems, however, to have taken the worst of all parties, that is, none at all. She folds her arms, lets the two empires go to work to cut up Turkey as they can, and holds Prussia aloof, neither as a friend nor foe. This is withdrawing her opposition from the two empires, without the benefit of any condition whatever. In the meantime, England has clearly overreached herself. She excited the war between the Russians and Turks, in hopes that France, still supporting the Turks, would be embarrassed with the two empires. She did not foresee the event which has taken place, of France abandoning the Turks, and that which may take place, of her union with the two empires. She allied herself with Holland, but cannot obtain the alliance of Prussia. This latter power would be very glad to close again the breach with France, and, therefore, while there remains an opening for this, holds off from England, whose fleets could not enter into Silesia, to protect that from the Emperor. Thus, you see, that the old system is unhinged, and no new one hung in its place. Probabilities are rather in favor of a connection between the two empires, France and Spain. Several symptoms show themselves, of friendly dispositions between Russia and France, unfriendly ones between Russia and England, and such as are barely short of hostility between England and France. But into real hostilities, this country would with difficulty be drawn. Her finances are too deranged, her internal union too much dissolved, to hazard a war. The nation is pressing on fast to a fixed constitution. Such a revolution in the public opinion has taken place, that the crown already feels its powers bounded, and is obliged, by its measures, to acknowledge limits. A States General will be called at some epoch not distant; they will probably establish a civil list, and leave the government to temporary provisions of money, so as to render frequent assemblies of the national representative necessary. How that representative will be organized is yet uncertain. Among a thousand projects, the best seems to me, that of dividing them into two Houses, of Commons and Nobles; the Commons to be chosen by the Provincial Assemblies, who are chosen themselves by the people, and the Nobles by the body of Noblesse, as in Scotland. But there is no reason to conjecture that this is the particular scheme which will be preferred.
The war between the Russians and Turks, has made an opening for our Commodore Paul Jones. The Empress has invited him into her service. She insures to him the rank of rear admiral; will give him a separate command, and, it is understood, that he is never to be commanded. I think she means to oppose him to the Captain Pacha, on the Black Sea. He is by this time, probably, at St. Petersburg. The circumstances did not permit his awaiting the permission of Congress, because the season was close at hand for opening the campaign. But he has made it a condition, that he shall be free at all times to return to the orders of Congress, whenever they shall please to call for him; and also, that he shall not in any case be expected to bear arms against France. I believe Congress had it in contemplation, to give him the grade of admiral, from the date of his taking the Serapis. Such a measure now would greatly gratify him, second the efforts of fortune in his favor, and better the opportunities of improving him for our service, whenever the moment shall come in which we may want him.