In February, 1787, I wrote to Congress to ask leave to employ the Mathurins of France in ransoming our captives; and on the 19th of September, I received their orders to do so, and to call for the money from our bankers at Amsterdam, as soon as it could be furnished. It was long before they could furnish the money, and as soon as they notified that they could, the business was put into train by the General of the Mathurins, not with the appearance of acting for the United States, or with their knowledge, but merely on the usual ground of charity. This expedient was rendered abortive by the revolution of France, the derangement of ecclesiastical orders there and the revocation of church property, before any proposition, perhaps, had been made in form by the Mathurins to the Dey of Algiers. I have some reason to believe that Mr. Eustace, while in Spain, endeavored to engage the court of Spain to employ their Mathurins in this business; but whether they actually moved in it or not, I have never learned.

We have also been told, that a Mr. Simpson of Gibraltar, by the direction of the Messrs. Bulkeleys of Lisbon, contracted for the ransom of our prisoners (then reduced by death and ransom to fourteen) at thirty-four thousand seven hundred and ninety-two dollars. By whose orders they did it, we could never learn. I have suspected it was some association in London, which, finding the prices far above their conception, did not go through with their purpose, which probably had been merely a philanthropic one. Be this as it may, it was without our authority or knowledge.

Again, Mr. Cathalan, our consul at Marseilles, without any instruction from the government, and actuated merely, as we presume, by willingness to do something agreeable, set on foot another negotiation for their redemption; which ended in nothing.

These several volunteer interferences, though undertaken with good intentions, run directly counter to our plan; which was, to avoid the appearance of any purpose on our part ever to ransom our captives, and by that semblance of neglect, to reduce the demands of the Algerines to such a price, as might make it hereafter less their interest to pursue our citizens than any others. On the contrary, they have supposed all these propositions directly or indirectly came from us; they inferred from thence the greatest anxiety on our part, where we had been endeavoring to make them suppose there was none; kept up their demands for our captives at the highest prices ever paid by any nation; and thus these charitable, though unauthorized interpositions, have had the double effect of strengthening the chains they were meant to break, and making us at last set a much higher rate of ransom for our citizens, present and future, than we probably should have obtained, if we had been left alone to do our own work in our own way. Thus stands this business then at present. A formal bargain, as I am informed, being registered in the books of the former Dey, on the part of the Bulkeleys of Lisbon, which they suppose to be obligatory on us, but which is to be utterly disavowed, as having never been authorized by us, nor its source even known to us.

In 1790, this subject was laid before Congress fully, and at the late session, moneys have been provided, and authority given to proceed to the ransom of our captive citizens at Algiers, provided it shall not exceed a given sum, and provided also, a peace shall be previously negotiated within certain limits of expense. And in consequence of these proceedings, your mission has been decided on by the President.

Since, then, no ransom is to take place without a peace, you will of course take up first the negotiation of peace; or, if you find it better that peace and ransom should be treated of together, you will take care that no agreement for the latter be concluded, unless the former be established before or in the same instant.

As to the conditions, it is understood that no peace can be made with that government, but for a larger sum of money to be paid at once for the whole time of its duration, or for a smaller one to be annually paid. The former plan we entirely refuse, and adopt the latter. We have also understood that peace might be bought cheaper with naval stores than with money; but we will not furnish them with naval stores, because we think it not right to furnish them means which we know they will employ to do wrong, and because there might be no economy in it as to ourselves, in the end, as it would increase the expenses of that coercion which we may in future be obliged to practise towards them. The only question then, is, what sum of money will we agree to pay them annually, for peace? By a letter from Captain O'Bryan, a copy of which you will receive herewith, we have his opinion that a peace could be purchased with money, for sixty thousand pounds sterling, or with naval stores, for one hundred thousand dollars. An annual payment equivalent to the first, would be three thousand pounds sterling, or thirteen thousand and five hundred dollars, the interest of the sum in gross. If we could obtain it for as small a sum as the second, in money, the annual payment equivalent to it would be five thousand dollars. In another part of the same letter, Captain O'Bryan says, "if maritime stores and two light cruisers be given, and a tribute paid in maritime stores every two years, amounting to twelve thousand dollars in America," a peace can be had. The gift of stores and cruisers here supposed, converted into an annual equivalent, may be stated at nine thousand dollars, and adding to it half the biennial sum, would make fifteen thousand dollars, to be annually paid. You will, of course, use your best endeavors to get it at the lowest sum practicable; whereupon I shall only say, that we should be pleased with ten thousand dollars, contented with fifteen thousand, think twenty thousand a very hard bargain, yet go as far as twenty-five thousand, if it be impossible to get it for less; but not a copper further, this being fixed by law as the utmost limit. These are meant as annual sums. If you can put off the first annual payment to the end of the first year, you may employ any sum not exceeding that, in presents to be paid down; but if the first payment is to be made in hand, that and the presents cannot by law exceed twenty-five thousand dollars.

And here we meet a difficulty, arising from the small degree of information we have respecting the Barbary States. Tunis is said to be tributary to Algiers. But whether the effect of this be, that peace being made with Algiers, is of course with the Tunisians without separate treaty, or separate price, is what we know not. If it be possible to have it placed on this footing, so much the better. In any event, it will be necessary to stipulate with Algiers, that her influence be interposed as strongly as possible with Tunis, whenever we shall proceed to treat with the latter; which cannot be till information of the event of your negotiation, and another session of Congress.

As to the articles and form of the treaty in general, our treaty with Morocco was so well digested that I enclose you a copy of that, to be the model with Algiers, as nearly as it can be obtained, only inserting the clause with respect to Tunis.

The ransom of the captives is next to be considered. They are now thirteen in number; to wit, Richard O'Bryan and Isaac Stevens, captains, Andrew Montgomery and Alexander Forsyth, mates, Jacob Tessanier, a French passenger, William Patterson, Philip Sloan, Peleg Lorin, James Hall, James Cathcart, George Smith, John Gregory, James Hermit, seamen. It has been a fixed principle with Congress, to establish the rate of ransom of American captives with the Barbary States at as low a point as possible, that it may not be the interest of those States to go in quest of our citizens in preference to those of other countries. Had it not been for the danger it would have brought on the residue of our seamen, by exciting the cupidity of those rovers against them, our citizens now in Algiers would have been long ago redeemed, without regard to price. The mere money for this particular redemption neither has been, nor is, an object with anybody here. It is from the same regard to the safety of our seamen at large, that they have now restrained us from any ransom unaccompanied with peace. This being secured, we are led to consent to terms of ransom, to which, otherwise, our government never would have consented; that is to say, to the terms stated by Captain O'Bryan in the following passage of the same letter: "By giving the minister of the marine (the present Dey's favorite) the sum of one thousand sequins, I would stake my life that we would be ransomed for thirteen thousand sequins, and all expenses included." Extravagant as this sum is, we will, under the security of peace in future, go so far; not doubting, at the same time, that you will obtain it as much lower as possible, and not indeed without a hope that a lower ransom will be practicable, from the assurances given us in other letters from Captain O'Bryan, that prices are likely to be abated by the present Dey, and particularly with us, towards whom he has been represented as well disposed. You will consider this sum, therefore, say twenty-seven thousand dollars, as your ultimate limit, including ransom, duties, and gratifications of every kind.