"The Russians, as has been expected for some time, have taken Ismailow. They stormed it, and put the whole garrison to the sword on the 22d of December. This was probably to strike terror into the Turks, in order to aid the separate negotiation which it is known Prince Potemkin is endeavoring to effect with the Grand Visier. The object is to engage the Porte to accept peace without the mediation of other powers. On the other hand, Prussia is active both in negotiation and military demonstration to counteract this project. Preparations are making for sending a large army into Livonia in the spring, which has induced the Empress to call off some of the heavy troops from those employed against the Turks. England, also, keeps an augmented navy in commission. It seems not doubted that the design is to send a fleet into the Baltic as soon as the season will permit it. It is said, also, that the three mediating powers are negotiating with Denmark, to engage that country to be at least indifferent as to the entrance of this fleet; and that there are grounds for hopes of success. Some think, also, that there are indications which render it probable that Spain will join in the mediation for obtaining peace for the Turks. I have no reason to suppose it other than that arising from the desire which Spain must naturally have to see peace restored to that power. It is supposed if she joins in the mediation it will be merely for that object, and not from any disposition to favor generally the system of the mediating powers. Where so many and such opposite principles enter into account, it would be temerity to conjecture the particular results, without being behind the curtain; and even there probably the schemes are not yet fully ascertained. Every day must necessarily throw new lights on this complicated state of affairs, in proportion as the state of negotiation is more advanced.
"I think it probable myself, that peace will be effected one way or another in the course of the year. The present favorable situation of the Russian army, the dispersed and disheartened situation of the Ottoman, the succor promised by Prussia, so long deferred, the little hope of immediate relief from the geographical position of that power, the ardent desire of Russia to effect a peace without mediation, and the sacrifices she is disposed to make to effect it; all induce me to believe that it will be brought about in that way. If, however, the Porte, from a well-founded confidence in the active interference of the mediating powers, should decide still to hold out, then it seems that the Empress will be induced to come to terms rather than enter the lists with new and powerful enemies, from whom she would have much to fear, particularly by sea. Still I find several who think, from the character of the Empress, that she will resist, and try the event of a campaign rather than sacrifice so much success and so much glory in having a peace dictated to her. Her resources at home are without end from her mode of calling them into action, and her credit, even here, stands high; certainly much higher than it should do. It is supposed, also, that in this extremity she would be seconded by the Emperor, notwithstanding his pacific turn. He would be authorized by treaty to do this, and his present situation would enable him; the disturbances in the various parts of his dominions having been all settled. In Brabant, particularly, his authority is more firmly settled than if he had come to it by inheritance only, since he enjoys it also by a kind of conquest.
"It is the system of the English Cabinet which is considered here as the most unaccountable. The commerce of that country is at present in the most prosperous situation, since the balance is in their favor with every part of Europe. They have more to gain by peace and more to apprehend from war, than any other power, and yet they seem determined to risk it. The advantages of their commerce in the Baltic, are certain: those in the Levant, eventual; still they seem determined to sacrifice one, at least for a time, in order to grasp at the other. On the whole, it is regarded as one of those sacrifices of commerce to politics, which France has so often given examples of. Time will show whether Mr. Pitt, or those who condemn him, are in the right."
TO WILLIAM CARMICHAEL.
Philadelphia, April 11, 1791.
Sir,—I wrote you on the 12th of March, and again on the 17th of the same month; since which, I have received your favor of January the 24th, wherein you refer to copies of two letters, also to a paper No. 1, supposed to be enclosed in that letter; but there was nothing enclosed. You speak particularly of several other letters formerly forwarded, but not a single one was ever received of later date than May the 6th, 1789; and this of January 24th, is all we possess from you since that date. I enclose you a list of letters addressed to you on various subjects, and to which answers were and are naturally expected; and send you again copies of the papers in the case of the Dover Cutter, which has been the subject of so many of those letters, and is the subject of the constant solicitation of the parties here. A final decision on that application, therefore, is earnestly desired. When you consider the repeated references of matters to you from hence, and the total suppression of whatever you have written in answer, you will not be surprised if it had excited a great degree of uneasiness. We had inquired whether private conveyances did not occur, from time to time, from Madrid to Cadiz, where we have vessels almost constantly, and we were assured that such conveyances were frequent. On the whole, Sir, you will be sensible, that under the jealous government with which you reside, the conveyance of intelligence requires as much management as the obtaining it; and I am in hopes that in future, you will be on your guard against those infidelities in that line, under which you and we have so much suffered.
The President is absent on a journey through the southern States, from which he will not return till the end of June; consequently, I could not sooner notify him of your desire to return; but even then, I will take the liberty of saying nothing to him on the subject till I hear further from you. The suppression of your correspondence has, in a considerable degree, withdrawn you from the public sight. I sincerely wish that before your return, you could do something to attract their attention and favor, and render your return pleasing to yourself and profitable to them, by introducing you to new proofs of their confidence. My two last letters to you furnish occasions; that of a co-operation against the British navigation act and the arrangement of our affairs on the Mississippi. The former, if it can be effected, will form a remarkable and memorable epoch in the history and freedom of the ocean. Mr. Short will press it at Paris, and Colonel Humphreys at Lisbon. The latter will show most at first; and as to it, be so good as to observe always, that the right of navigating the Mississippi is considered as so palpable, that the recovery of it will produce no other sensation than that of a gross injustice removed. The extent and freedom of the port for facilitating the use of it, is what will excite the attention and gratification of the public. Colonel Humphreys writes me, that all Mr. Gardoqui's communications, while here, tended to impress the court of Madrid with the idea, that the navigation of the Mississippi was only demanded on our part to quiet our western settlers, and that it was not sincerely desired by the maritime States. This is a most fatal error, and must be completely eradicated and speedily, or Mr. Gardoqui will prove to have been a bad peacemaker. It is true, there were characters whose stations entitled them to credit, and who, from geographical prejudices, did not themselves wish the navigation of the Mississippi to be restored to us, and who believe, perhaps, as is common with mankind, that their opinion was the general opinion. But the sentiments of the great mass of the Union were decidedly otherwise then, and the very persons to whom Mr. Gardoqui alluded, have now come over to the opinion heartily, that the navigation of the Mississippi, in full and unrestrained freedom, is indispensably necessary, and must be obtained by any means it may call for. It will be most unfortunate, indeed, if we cannot convince Spain that we make this demand in earnest, but by acts which will render that conviction too late to prevent evil.
Not knowing how better to convey to you the laws and the gazettes, than by committing them to the patronage of Colonel Humphreys, I now send through that channel the laws of the second and third sessions of Congress, and the newspapers.
I have the honor to be, with great esteem, Sir, your most obedient, and most humble servant.