I enclose you some communications from the Mediterranean. They show Barron's understanding in a very favorable view. When you shall have perused them, be so good as to enclose them to the Secretary of the Navy. Accept my fervent wishes for the speedy recovery of Mrs. Madison, and your speedy visit to this quarter.
TO MR. MADISON.
Monticello, August 25, 1805.
Dear Sir,—I confess that the enclosed letter from General Turreau excites in me both jealousy and offence in undertaking, and without apology, to say in what manner to receive and treat Moreau within our own country. Had Turreau been here longer he would have known that the national authority pays honors to no foreigners. That the State authorities, municipalities and individuals, are free to render whatever they please, voluntarily, and free from restraint, by us; and he ought to know that no part of the criminal sentence of another country can have any effect here. The style of that government in the Spanish business, was calculated to excite indignation; but it was a case in which that might have done injury. But the present is a case which would justify some notice in order to let them understand we are not of those powers who will receive and execute mandates. I think the answer should show independence as well as friendship. I am anxious to receive the opinions of our brethren after their review and consideration of the Spanish papers. I am strongly impressed with a belief of hostile and treacherous intentions against us on the part of France, and that we should lose no time in securing something more than a mutual friendship with England.
Not having heard from you for some posts, I have had a hope you were on the road, and consequently that Mrs. Madison was re-established. We are now in want of rain, having had none in the last ten days. In your quarter I am afraid they have been much longer without it. We hear great complaints from F. Walker's, Lindsay's, Maury's, &c., of drought. Accept affectionate salutations, and assurances of constant friendship.
P. S. I suppose Kuhn, at Genoa, should have new credentials.
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
Monticello, August 27, 1805.
Dear Sir,—Yours of the 20th has been received, and in that a letter from Casinore, and another from Mrs. Ciracchi; but those from Turreau and to Upryo were not enclosed. Probably the former was what came to me by the preceding post, respecting Moreau; if so, you have my opinion on it in my last. Considering the character of Bonaparte, I think it material at once to let him see that we are not of the powers who will receive his orders.
I think you have misconceived the nature of the treaty I thought we should propose to England. I have no idea of committing ourselves immediately or independently of our further will to the war. The treaty should be provisional only, to come into force on the event of our being engaged in war with either France or Spain during the present war in Europe. In that event we should make common cause, and England should stipulate not to make peace without our obtaining the objects for which we go to war, to wit, the acknowledgment by Spain of the rightful boundaries of Louisiana (which we should reduce to our minimum by a secret article) and 2, indemnification for spoliations, for which purpose we should be allowed to make reprisal on the Floridas and retain them as an indemnification. Our co-operation in the war (if we should actually enter into it) would be sufficient consideration for Great Britain to engage for its object; and it being generally known to France and Spain that we had entered into treaty with England, would probably ensure us a peaceable and immediate settlement of both points. But another motive much more powerful would indubitably induce England to go much further. Whatever ill-humor may at times have been expressed against us by individuals of that country, the first wish of every Englishman's heart is to see us once more fighting by their sides against France; nor could the king or his ministers do an act so popular as to enter into an alliance with us. The nation would not weigh the consideration by grains and scruples. They would consider it as the price and pledge of an indissoluble friendship. I think it possible that for such a provisional treaty their general guarantee of Louisiana and the Floridas. At any rate we might try them. A failure would not make our situation worse. If such a one could be obtained we might await our own convenience for calling up the casus fœderis. I think it important that England should receive an overture as early as possible, as it might prevent her listening to terms of peace. If I recollect rightly, we had instructed Moreau, when he went to Paris, to settle the deposit; if he failed in that object to propose a treaty to England immediately. We could not be more engaged to secure the deposit then than we are the country now, after paying fifteen millions for it. I do expect, therefore, that, considering the present state of things as analogous to that, and virtually within his instructions, he will very likely make the proposition to England. I write my thoughts freely, wishing the same from the other gentlemen, that seeing and considering the ground of each others opinions we may come as soon as possible to a result. I propose to be in Washington by the 2d of October. By that time I hope we shall be ripe for some conclusion.