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I enclose you a letter from a Mr. Ithomel to the Secretary of the Navy. I know not who he is, perhaps an officer of the navy. This is the second letter he has written, expressing his belief that there is ground to apprehend insurgency in Massachusetts. Neither do I know his politics, which might also be a key to his apprehensions. That the federalists may attempt insurrection is possible, and also that the governor would sink before it. But the republican part of the State, and that portion of the federalists who approve the embargo in their judgments, and at any rate would not court mob-law, would crush it in embryo. I have some time ago written to General Dearborne to be on the alert on such an occasion, and to take direction of the public authority on the spot. Such an incident will rally the whole body of republicans of every shade to a single point,—that of supporting the public authority. Be so good as to return the letter to Mr. Smith. He informs me he has left to yourself and Commander Rogers to order whatever gun-boats you think can be spared from New York to aid the embargo law. If enough be left there or near there, to preserve order in the harbor, or to drive out a single ship of force, it would be sufficient in the present tranquil state of things.
The principle of our indulgence of vessels to foreign ministers was, that it was fair to let them send away all their subjects caught here by the embargo, and who had no other means of getting away.
General Turreau says there are fifteen hundred French sailors,—deserters, here, many of whom wish to go home. I have desired Mr. Madison to inform him that the tonnage permitted must be proportioned to the numbers, according to the rules in transport service. On this ground, I do not know that we can do wrong. We have nothing yet from Pinckney or Armstrong. But the first letter from the former must be so. I salute you with affection and respect.
TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.
Monticello, August 20, 1808.
Dear Sir,—I enclose you a letter of July 1st, from Governor Lewis, received from the War Office by the last post. It presents a full, and not a pleasant, view of our Indian affairs west of the Mississippi. As the punishment of the Osages has been thought necessary, the means employed appear judicious. First, to draw off the friendly part of the nation, and then, withdrawing the protection of the United States, leave the other tribes free to take their own satisfaction of them for their own wrongs. I think we may go further, without actually joining in the attack. The greatest obstacle to the Indians acting in large bodies, being the difficulty of getting provisions, we might supply them, and ammunition also, if necessary. I hope the Governor will be able to settle with the Sacs and Foxes without war, to which, however, he seems too much committed. If we had gone to war for every hunter or trader killed, and murderer refused, we should have had general and constant war. The process to be followed, in my opinion, when a murder has been committed, is first to demand the murderer, and not regarding a first refusal to deliver, give time and press it. If perseveringly refused, recall all traders, and interdict commerce with them, until he be delivered. I believe this would rarely fail in producing the effect desired; and we have seen that, by steadily following this line, the tribes become satisfied of our moderation, justice, and friendship to them, and become firmly attached to us. The want of time to produce these dispositions in the Indians west of the Mississippi, has been the cause of the Kanzas, the Republican, the Great and the Wolf Panis, the Matas, and Poncaras, adhering to the Spanish interest against us. But if we use forbearance, and open commerce for them, they will come to, and give us time to attach them to us. In the meantime, to secure our frontiers against their hostility, I would allow Governor Lewis the three companies of spies, and military stores he desires. We are so distant, and he so well acquainted with the business, that it is safest for our citizens there and for ourselves, after enjoining him to pursue our principles, to permit him to select the means. The factories proposed on the Missouri and Mississippi, as soon as they can be in activity, will have more effect than as many armies. It is on their interests we must rely for their friendship, and not on their fears. With the establishment of these factories, we must prohibit the British from appearing westward of the Mississippi, and southward of logarithm degree; we must break up all their factories on this side the Mississippi, west of Lake Michigan; not permit them to send out individual traders to the Indian towns, but require all their commerce to be carried on at their factories,—putting our own commerce under the same regulations, which will take away all ground of complaint. In like manner, I think well of Governor Lewis' proposition to carry on all our commerce west of the Mississippi, at fixed points; licensing none but stationary traders residing at these points; and obliging the Indians to come to the commerce, instead of sending it to them. Having taken this general view of the subject, which I know is nearly conformable to your own, I leave to yourself the detailed answer to Governor Lewis, and salute you with constant affection and respect.
TO GOVERNOR LEWIS.
Monticello, August 21, 1808.
Dear Sir,—Your letter to General Dearborne, of July 1st, was not received at the War Office till a few days ago, was forwarded to me, and after perusal sent on to General Dearborne, at present in Maine. As his official answer will be late in getting to you, I have thought it best, in the meantime, to communicate to yourself, directly, ideas in conformity with those I have expressed to him, and with the principles on which we have conducted Indian affairs. I regret that it has been found necessary to come to open rupture with the Osages, but, being so, I approve of the course you have pursued,—that of drawing off the friendly part of the nation,—withdrawing from the rest the protection of the United States, and permitting the other nations to take their own satisfaction for the wrongs they complain of. I have stated to General Dearborne that I think we may go further, and as the principal obstacle to the Indians acting in large bodies, is the want of provisions, we might supply that want, and ammunition also, if they need it. With the Sacs and Foxes I hope you will be able to settle amicably, as nothing ought more to be avoided than the embarking ourselves in a system of military coercion on the Indians. If we do this, we shall have general and perpetual war. When a murder has been committed on one of our stragglers, the murderer should be demanded. If not delivered, give time, and still press the demand. We find it difficult, with our regular government, to take and punish a murderer of an Indian. Indeed, I believe we have never been able to do it in a single instance. They have their difficulties also, and require time. In fact, it is a case where indulgence on both sides is just and necessary, to prevent the two nations from being perpetually committed in war, by the acts of the most vagabond and ungovernable of their members. When the refusal to deliver the murderer is permanent, and proceeds from the want of will, and not of ability, we should then interdict all trade and intercourse with them till they give us complete satisfaction. Commerce is the great engine by which we are to coerce them, and not war. I know this will be less effectual on this side the Mississippi, where they can have recourse to the British; but this will not be a long-lived evil. By this forbearing conduct towards the Mississippian Indians for seven years past, they are become satisfied of our justice and moderation towards them, that we have no desire of injuring them, but, on the contrary, of doing them all the good offices we can, and they are become sincerely attached to us; and this disposition, beginning with the nearest, has spread and is spreading itself to the more remote, as fast as they have opportunities of understanding our conduct. The Sacs and Foxes, being distant, have not yet come over to us. But they are on the balance. Those on this side the Mississippi, will soon be entirely with us, if we pursue our course steadily. The Osages, Kanzas, the Republican, Great and Wolf Panis, Matas, Poncaras, &c., who are inclined to the Spaniards, have not yet had time to know our dispositions. But if we use forbearance, and open commerce with them, they will come to, and give us time to attach them to us. In the meantime, to secure our frontiers, I have expressed myself to General Dearborne in favor of the three companies of spies, and the military supplies you ask for. So, also, in the having established factories, at which all the traders shall be stationary, allowing none to be itinerant, further than indispensable circumstances shall require. As soon as our factories on the Missouri and Mississippi can be in activity, they will have more powerful effects than so many armies. With respect to the British, we shall take effectual steps to put an immediate stop to their crossing the Mississippi, by the severest measures. And I have proposed to General Dearborne to break up all their factories within our limits on this side the Mississippi, to let them have them only at fixed points, and suppress all itinerant traders of theirs, as well as our own. They have, by treaty, only an equal right of commerce with ourselves, the regulations of which on our side of the line belongs to us, as that on their side belongs to them. All that can be required is that these regulations be equal. These are the general views which, on the occasion of your letter, I have expressed to General Dearborne. I reserve myself for consultation with him, and shall be very glad to receive your sentiments also on the several parts of them, after which we may decide on the modifications which may be approved. In the meantime you will probably receive from him an answer to your letter, till which this communication of my sentiments may be of some aid in determining your own course of proceeding.