The case of the sale of city lots under a decree of the Chancellor of Maryland.
The deed of the original owners of the site of the city of Washington to certain trustees, after making provisions for streets, public squares, &c., declares that the residue of the ground, laid off in building lots, shall one moiety belong to the original proprietors, and the other moiety shall be sold on such terms and conditions as the President of the United States shall direct, the proceeds, after certain specified payments, to be paid to the President as a grant of money, and to be applied for the purposes, and according to the Act of Congress; which Act of Congress (1790, c. 28) had authorized the President to accept grants of money, to purchase or to accept land for the use of the United States, to provide suitable buildings, &c. Of these residuary building lots, one thousand were sold by the Commissioner to Greenleaf for $80,000, who transferred them to Morris and Nicholson, with an express lien on them for the purchase money due to the city. Under this lien the Chancellor of Maryland has decreed that they shall be sold immediately for whatever they will bring; that the proceeds shall be applied first to the costs of suit and sale, and the balance towards paying the original purchase money. The sale has now proceeded, for some days, at very low prices, and must proceed till the costs of suit and sale are raised. It is well understood that under no circumstances of sale, however favorable, can they pay five in the pound of the original debt; and that if the whole are now forced into sale, at what they will bring, they will not pay one in the pound; and being the only fund from which a single dollar of the debt can ever be recovered, (on account of the bankruptcy of all the purchasers,) of $25,000 which the lots may bring if offered for sale from time to time pari passu with the growing demand, $20,000 will be lost by a forced sale. To save this sum is desirable. And the interest in it being ultimately that of the United States, I have consulted with the Secretary of the Treasury and Comptroller, and after due consideration, I am of opinion it is for the public interest, and within the powers of the President, under the deed of trust and laws, to repurchase under the decree, at the lowest prices obtainable, such of these lots as no other purchaser shall offer to take at what the Superintendent shall deem their real value, that is to say, what they will in his judgment sell for hereafter, if only offered from time to time as purchasers shall want them. The sums so to be allowed for them by the Superintendent to be passed to the credit of Greenleaf, and retaining a right to the unsatisfied balance as damages due for non-compliance with his contract; a matter of form only, as not a cent of it is expected ever to be obtained. I consider the reconveyance of these lots at the price which the Superintendent shall nominally allow for them, as replacing them in our hands, in statu quo prices, as if the title had never been passed out of us; and that thereafter they will be in the condition of all other lots, sold, but neither conveyed nor paid for; that is to say, liable to be resold for the benefit of the city; as has been invariably practised in all other cases. The Superintendent is instructed to proceed accordingly.
TO MR. GALLATIN.
December 7, 1808.
1. D. W. Coxe and the ship Comet. The application to send another vessel to the Havanna, to bring home the proceeds of the cargo of the Comet, charged with a breach of embargo, must be rejected for three reasons, each insuperable. 1st. The property was not shipped from the United States prior to December 22d, 1807, and therefore is not within the description of cases in which a permission by the executive is authorized by law. 2d. The limitation of time for permissions has been long expired. 3d. Although in an action on the bond of the Comet, the fabricated testimony of distress may embarrass judges and juries, tramelled by legal rules of evidence, yet it ought to have no weight with us to whom the law has referred to decide according to our discretion, well knowing that it was impossible to build up fraud by general rules. We know that the fabrication of proofs of leaky ships, stress of weather, cargoes sold under duress, are a regular part of the system of infractions of the embargo, with the manufacture of which every foreign port is provided, and that their oaths and forgeries are a regular merchandise in every port. We must therefore consider them as nothing, and that the act of entering a foreign port and selling the cargo is decisive evidence of an intentional breach of embargo, not to be countervailed by the letters of all the Charles Dixeys in the world; for every vessel is provided with a Charles Dixey.
My opinion is therefore that no permission ought ever to be granted for any vessel to leave our ports (while the embargo continues) in which any person is concerned either in interest or in navigating her, who has ever been concerned in interest, or in the navigation of a vessel which has at any time before entered a foreign port contrary to the views of the embargo laws, and under any pretended distress or duress whatever. This rule will not lead us wrong once in a hundred times.
2. I send you the case of Mr. Mitchell and the ship Neutrality, merely as a matter of form; for I presume it must be rejected on the ground of limitation. These petitioners are getting into the habit of calling on me personally in the first instance. These personal solicitations being very embarrassing, I am obliged to tell them I will refer the case to you, and they will receive a written answer. But I hope, in your amendments to the law, you will propose a repeal of the power to give permissions to go for property.
TO MR. GALLATIN.
December 8, 1808.
The idea of regulating the coasting trade (to New Orleans for instance) by the quantity of tonnage sufficient for each port, is new to me, and presents difficulties through which I cannot see my way. To determine how much tonnage will suffice for the coasting trade of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and the other ports great and small, and to divide this tonnage impartially among the competitors of each place, would embarrass us infinitely, and lead to unavoidable errors and irregularities. Is it not better to let it regulate itself as to all innocent articles, and to continue our attentions and regulations to the articles of provisions and lumber? If the rule of the one-eighth carries too much to New Orleans, and I am sure it does, why not confine it to the ports between St. Mary's and Passamaquoddy, (excluding these two,) and trust for New Orleans to the western supplies and Governor Claiborne's permits? I suppose them sufficient, because Governor Claiborne has assured us that the Western supplies are sufficient for the consumption of New Orleans, and we see that New Orleans has exported flour the last six months, and that too to the West Indies, whither will go also whatever flour the rule of the one-eighth carries there, or its equivalent in Western flour. These ideas on the subject are of the first impression; and I keep the decision open for any further light which can be thrown on it.