From that giving to each State a member for every 30,000 in that State results the single inconvenience that there may be large portions unrepresented, but it being a mere hazard on which State this will fall, hazard will equalize it in the long run. From the others result exactly the same inconvenience. A thousand cases may be imagined to prove it. Take one. Suppose eight of the States had 45,000 inhabitants each, and the other seven 44,999 each, that is to say each one less than each of the others. The aggregate would be 674,993, and the number of representatives at one for 30,000 of the aggregate, would be 22. Then, after giving one member to each State, distribute the seven residuary members among the seven highest fractions, and though the difference of population be only an unit, the representation would be the double.
| Fractions. | |||
| 1st. | 45,000 | 2 | 15,000 |
| 2d. | 45,000 | 2 | 15,000 |
| 3d. | 45,000 | 2 | 15,000 |
| 4th. | 45,000 | 2 | 15,000 |
| 5th. | 45,000 | 2 | 15,000 |
| 6th. | 45,000 | 2 | 15,000 |
| 7th. | 45,000 | 2 | 15,000 |
| 8th. | 45,000 | 1 | 15,000 |
| 9th. | 44,999 | 1 | 14,999 |
| 10th. | 44,999 | 1 | 14,999 |
| 11th. | 44,999 | 1 | 14,999 |
| 12th. | 44,999 | 1 | 14,999 |
| 13th. | 44,999 | 1 | 14,999 |
| 14th. | 44,999 | 1 | 14,999 |
| 15th. | 14,999 | ||
| 674,993 | 22 |
Here a single inhabitant the more would count as 30,000. Nor is this case imaginable, only it will resemble the real one whenever the fractions happen to be pretty equal through the whole States. The numbers of our census happen by accident to give the fractions all very small, or very great, so as to produce the strongest case of inequality that could possibly have occurred, and which may never occur again. The probability is that the fractions will generally descend gradually from 29,999 to 1. The inconvenience then of large unrepresented fractions attends both constructions; and while the most obvious construction is liable to no other, that of the bill incurs many and grievous ones.
1. If you permit the large fraction in one State to choose a representative for one of the small fractions in another State, you take from the latter its election, which constitutes real representation, and substitute a virtual representation of the disfranchised fractions, and the tendency of the doctrine of virtual representation has been too well discussed and appreciated by reasoning and resistance on a former great occasion to need development now.
2. The bill does not say that it has given the residuary representatives to the greatest fraction; though in fact it has done so. It seems to have avoided establishing that into a rule, lest it might not suit on another occasion. Perhaps it may be found the next time more convenient to distribute them among the smaller States; at another time among the larger States; at other times according to any other crotchet which ingenuity may invent, and the combinations of the day give strength to carry; or they may do it arbitrarily by open bargains and cabal. In short this construction introduces into Congress a scramble, or a vendue for the surplus members. It generates waste of time, hot blood, and may at some time, when the passions are high, extend a disagreement between the two Houses, to the perpetual loss of the thing, as happens now in the Pennsylvania assembly; whereas the other construction reduces the apportionment always to an arithmetical operation, about which no two men can ever possibly differ.
3. It leaves in full force the violation of the precept which declares that representatives shall be apportioned among the States according to their numbers, i. e., by some common ratio.
Viewing this bill either as a violation of the constitution, or as giving an inconvenient exposition of its words, is it a case wherein the President ought to interpose his negative? I think it is.
1. The non-user of his negative begins already to excite a belief that no President will ever venture to use it; and has, consequently, begotten a desire to raise up barriers in the State legislatures against Congress, throwing off the control of the constitution.
2. It can never be used more pleasingly to the public, than in the protection of the constitution.
3. No invasions of the constitution are fundamentally so dangerous as the tricks played on their own numbers, apportionment, and other circumstances respecting themselves, and affecting their legal qualifications to legislate for the union.