Page 16. "Tant de confiance," &c. Their main confidence was in their own resources. They considered foreign aid as probable and desirable, but not essential. I believe myself, from the whole of what I have seen of our resources and perseverance, that had we never received any foreign aid, we should not have obtained our independence. But that we should have made a peace with Great Britain on any terms we pleased short of that, which would have been a subjection to the same king, a union of force in war, &c. 2. That had France supplied us plentifully with money, suppose about four millions of guineas a year, without entering into the war herself at all, we should have established our independence, but it would have cost more time and blood, but less money. 3. That France, aiding us as she did, with money and forces, shortened much the time, lessened the expense of blood, but at a greater expense of money to her than would have otherwise been requisite.
Page 18. "L'extremité septentrional," &c. I think the word "cotè" would be better adapted than "extremité" to the form of the island.
Page 21. "3000 hommes," inquire of Colonel Blackden.
Perhaps the propositions of Congress to the Hessians may be worth mentioning. See their journals, 1776, Aug. 14.
I will make a general observation here on the events of Long Island, New York, &c., at this time. The maxim laid down by Congress to their generals was, that not a foot of territory was to be ceded to their enemies where there was a possibility of defending it. In consequence of these views, and against his own judgment, General Washington was obliged to fortify and attempt to defend the city of New York. But that could not be defended without occupying the heights on Long Island which commanded the city of New York. He was therefore obliged to establish a strong detachment in Long Island to defend those heights. The moment that detachment was routed, which he had much expected, his first object was to withdraw them, and his second to evacuate New York. He did this, therefore, immediately, and without waiting any movement of the enemy. He brought off his whole baggage, stores and other implements, without leaving a single article except the very heaviest of his cannon and things of little value. I well remember his letter to Congress, wherein he expressed his wonder that the enemy had given him this leisure, as, from the heights they had got possession of, they might have compelled him to a very precipitate retreat. This was one of the instances where our commanding officers were obliged to conform to popular views, though they foresaw certain loss from it. Had he proposed at first to abandon New York, he might have been abandoned himself. An obedience to popular will cost us an army in Charleston in the year 1779.
Page 30. "Une fuite precipiteé." It was a leisurely retreat as I have before observed.
Page 41. "Que je n'ai prie obtener que d'un anglais." Colonel Blackden can probably give M. Soulés good intelligence on this affair. I think I recollect the slaughter on Kniphauser's side to have been very great.
Volume 3. "Si dans son institution," &c.
This is a luminous idea, and worthy of being a little more developed. It places the question between Great Britain and America in the simplest form possible. No Englishman will pretend that a right to participate in government can be derived from any other source than a personal right, or a right of property. The conclusion is inevitable that he, who had neither his person nor property in America, could rightfully assume a participation in its government.
Page 17. The seeds of the war are here traced to their true source. The tory education of the King was the first preparation for that change in the British government which that party never ceases to wish. This naturally ensured tory administrations during his life. At the moment he came to the throne and cleared his hands of his enemies by the peace of Paris, the assumptions of unwarrantable right over America commenced. They were so signal, and followed one another so close, as to prove they were part of a system, either to reduce it under absolute subjection, and thereby make it an instrument for attempts on Britain itself, or to sever it from Britain, so that it might not be a weight in the whig scale. This latter alternative, however, was not considered as the one which would take place. They knew so little of America, that they thought it unable to encounter the little finger of Great Britain. M. de Soulés has well developed this subject. He is best judge whether anything more need be said on this subject.