In such a choice of objects, Great Britain may not single out Louisiana and the Floridas. She may fail in her attempt on them. France and Spain may recover them.
If all these chances fail, we should have to re-take them. The difference between re-taking and preventing, overbalanced by the benefits of delay. Delay enables us to be better prepared to obtain from the allies a price for our assistance.
Suppose these our ultimate views, what is to be done at this time?
- 1. As to Spain:—
- If she be as sensible as we are, that she cannot save Louisiana and the Floridas, might she not prefer their independence to their subjection to Great Britain? Does not the proposition of the Count d'Estaing furnish us an opening to communicate our ideas on this subject to the court of France, and through them to that of Madrid? and our readiness to join them in guaranteeing the independence of those countries? This might save us from a war, if Great Britain respected our weight in a war; and if she does not, the object would place the war on popular ground with us.
- 2. As to England?—say to Beckwith,—
- That as to a treaty of commerce, we would prefer amicable to adversary arrangements, though the latter would be infallible, and in our own power: that our ideas are, that such a treaty should be founded in perfect reciprocity, and would, therefore, be its own price: that as to an alliance, we can say nothing till its object be shown, and that it is not to be inconsistent with existing engagements: that in the event of a war between Great Britain and Spain, we are disposed to be strictly neutral: that, however, we should view with extreme uneasiness any attempts of either power to seize the possessions of the other on our frontier, as we consider our own safety interested in a due balance between our neighbors. [It might be deemed advantageous to express this latter sentiment, because, if there be any difference of opinion in their councils, whether to bend their force against North or South America, or the islands (and certainly there is room for difference), and if these opinions be nearly balanced, that balance ought to be determined by the prospect of having an enemy the more or less, according to the object they should select.]
XVII.
Heads of consideration on the Navigation of the Mississippi, for Mr. Carmichael, Aug. 22d, 1790.
We have a right to the navigation of the Mississippi—1, by Nature; 2, by Treaty.
It is necessary to us. More than half the territory of the United States is on the waters of that river. Two hundred thousand of our citizens are settled on them, of whom forty thousand bear arms. These have no other outlet for their tobacco, rice, corn, hemp, lumber, house timber, ship timber.
We have hitherto respected the indecision of Spain, because we wish peace;—because our western citizens have had vent at home for their productions.
A surplus of production begins now to demand foreign markets. Whenever they shall say, "We cannot, we will not, be longer shut up," the United States will be reduced to the following dilemma: 1. To force them to acquiescence. 2. To separate from them, rather than take part in a war against Spain. 3. Or to preserve them in our Union, by joining them in the war.