Perhaps it might have been better, when they were forming the federal constitution, to have assimilated it, as much as possible, to the particular constitutions of the States. All of these have distributed the legislative, executive and judiciary powers, into different departments. In the federal constitution, the judiciary powers are separated from the others; but the legislative and executive are both exercised by Congress. A means of amending this defect has been thought of. Congress having a power to establish what committees of their own body they please, and to arrange among them the distribution of their business, they might, on the first day of their annual meeting, appoint an executive committee, consisting of a member from each State, and refer to them all executive business which should occur during their session; confining themselves to what is of a legislative nature, that is to say, to the heads described in the ninth article, as of the competence of nine States only, and to such other questions as should lead to the establishment of general rules. The journal of this committee, of the preceding day, might be read the next morning in Congress, and considered as approved, unless a vote was demanded on a particular article, and that article changed. The sessions of Congress would then be short, and when they separated, the Confederation authorizes the appointment of a committee of the States, which would naturally succeed to the business of the executive committee. The legislative business would be better done, because the attention of the members would not be interrupted by the details of execution; and the executive business would be better done, because, business of this nature is better adapted to small, than great bodies. A monarchical head should confide the execution of its will to departments, consisting, each, of a plurality of hands, who would warp that will, as much as possible, towards wisdom and moderation, the two qualities it generally wants. But, a republican head, founding its decrees, originally, in these two qualities, should commit them to a single hand for execution, giving them, thereby, a promptitude which republican proceedings generally want. Congress could not, indeed, confide their executive business to a smaller number than a committee consisting of a member from each State. This is necessary to insure the confidence of the Union. But it would be gaining a great deal, to reduce the executive head to thirteen, and to relieve themselves of those details. This, however, has as yet been the subject of private conversations only.

3. A succinct account of paper money in America?

Previous to the Revolution, most of the States were in the habit, whenever they had occasion for more money than could be raised immediately by taxes, to issue paper notes or bills, in the name of the State, wherein they promised to pay to the bearer the sum named in the note or bill. In some of the States no time of payment was fixed, nor tax laid to enable payment. In these, the bills depreciated. But others of the States named in the bill the day when it should be paid, laid taxes to bring in money enough for that purpose, and paid the bills punctually, on or before the day named. In these States, paper money was in as high estimation as gold and silver. On the commencement of the late Revolution, Congress had no money. The external commerce of the States being suppressed, the farmer could not sell his produce, and, of course, could not pay a tax. Congress had no resource then but in paper money. Not being able to lay a tax for its redemption, they could only promise that taxes should be laid for that purpose, so as to redeem the bills by a certain day. They did not foresee the long continuance of the war, the almost total suppression of their exports, and other events, which rendered the performance of their engagement impossible. The paper money continued for a twelvemonth equal to gold and silver. But the quantities which they were obliged to emit for the purpose of the war, exceeded what had been the usual quantity of the circulating medium. It began, therefore, to become cheaper, or, as we expressed it, it depreciated, as gold and silver would have done, had they been thrown into circulation in equal quantities. But not having, like them, an intrinsic value, its depreciation was more rapid and greater than could ever have happened with them. In two years, it had fallen to two dollars of paper money for one of silver; in three years, to four for one; in nine months more, it fell to ten for one; and in the six months following, that is to say, by September, 1779, it had fallen to twenty for one.

Congress, alarmed at the consequences which were to be apprehended, should they lose this resource altogether, thought it necessary to make a vigorous effort to stop its further depreciation. They therefore determined, in the first place, that their emissions should not exceed two hundred millions of dollars, to which term they were then nearly arrived; and though they knew that twenty dollars of what they were then issuing, would buy no more for their army than one silver dollar would buy, yet they thought it would be worth while to submit to the sacrifice of nineteen out of twenty dollars, if they could thereby stop further depreciation. They, therefore, published an address to their constituents, in which they renewed their original declarations, that this paper money should be redeemed at dollar for dollar. They proved the ability of the States to do this, and that their liberty would be cheaply bought at that price. The declaration was ineffectual. No man received the money at a better rate; on the contrary, in six months more, that is, by March, 1780, it had fallen to forty for one. Congress then tried an experiment of a different kind. Considering their former offers to redeem this money at par, as relinquished by the general refusal to take it, but in progressive depreciation, they required the whole to be brought in, declared it should be redeemed at its present value, of forty for one, and that they would give to the holders new bills, reduced in their denomination to the sum of gold or silver, which was actually to be paid for them. This would reduce the nominal sum of the mass in circulation to the present worth of that mass, which was five millions; a sum not too great for the circulation of the States, and which, they therefore hoped, would not depreciate further, as they continued firm in their purpose of emitting no more. This effort was as unavailing as the former. Very little of the money was brought in. It continued to circulate and to depreciate, till the end of 1780, when it had fallen to seventy-five for one, and the money circulated from the French army, being, by that time, sensible in all the States north of the Potomac, the paper ceased its circulation altogether in those States. In Virginia and North Carolina it continued a year longer, within which time it fell to one thousand for one, and then expired, as it had done in the other States, without a single groan. Not a murmur was heard on this occasion, among the people. On the contrary, universal congratulations took place on their seeing this gigantic mass, whose dissolution had threatened convulsions which should shake their infant confederacy to its centre, quietly interred in its grave. Foreigners, indeed, who do not, like the natives, feel indulgence for its memory, as of a being which has vindicated their liberties, and fallen in the moment of victory, have been loud, and still are loud in their complaints. A few of them have reason; but the most noisy are not the best of them. They are persons who have become bankrupt by unskilful attempts at commerce with America. That they may have some pretext to offer to their creditors, they have bought up great masses of this dead money in America, where it is to be had at five thousand for one, and they show the certificates of their paper possessions, as if they had all died in their hands, and had been the cause of their bankruptcy. Justice will be done to all, by paying to all persons what this money actually cost them, with an interest of six per cent. from the time they received it. If difficulties present themselves in the ascertaining the epoch of the receipt, it has been thought better that the State should lose, by admitting easy proofs, than that individuals, and especially foreigners, should, by being held to such as would be difficult, perhaps impossible.

4. Virginia certainly owed two millions sterling to Great Britain at the conclusion of the war. Some have conjectured the debt as high as three millions. I think that State owed near as much as all the rest put together. This is to be ascribed to peculiarities in the tobacco trade. The advantages made by the British merchants, on the tobaccos consigned to them, were so enormous, that they spared no means of increasing those consignments. A powerful engine for this purpose, was the giving good prices and credit to the planter, till they got him more immersed in debt than he could pay, without selling his lands or slaves. They then reduced the prices given for his tobacco, so that let his shipments be ever so great, and his demand of necessaries ever so economical, they never permitted him to clear off his debt, These debts had become hereditary from father to son, for many generations, so that the planters were a species of property, annexed to certain mercantile houses in London.

5. The members of Congress are differently paid by different States. Some are on fixed allowances, from four to eight dollars a day. Others have their expenses paid, and a surplus for their time. This surplus is of two, three, or four dollars a day.

6. I do not believe there has ever been a moment, when a single whig, in any one State, would not have shuddered at the very idea of a separation of their State from the confederacy. The tories would, at all times, have been glad to see the confederacy dissolved, even by particles at a time, in hopes of their attaching themselves again to Great Britain.

7. The 11th article of Confederation admits Canada to accede to the Confederation at its own will, but adds, "no other colony shall be admitted to the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States." When the plan of April, 1784, for establishing new States was on the carpet, the committee who framed the report of that plan, had inserted this clause, "provided nine States agree to such admission, according to the reservation of the 11th of the articles of Confederation." It was objected, 1. That the words of the confederation, "no other colony," could refer only to the residuary possessions of Great Britain, as the two Floridas, Nova Scotia, &c., not being already parts of the Union; that the law for "admitting" a new member into the Union, could not be applied to a territory which was already in the Union, as making part of a State which was a member of it. 2. That it would be improper to allow "nine" States to receive a new member, because the same reasons which rendered that number proper now, would render a greater one proper, when the number composing the Union should be increased. They therefore struck out this paragraph and inserted a proviso, that "the consent of so many States, in Congress, shall be first obtained, as may, at the time, be competent;" thus leaving the question, whether the 11th article applies to the admission of new States, to be decided when that admission shall be asked. See the Journal of Congress of April 20, 1784. Another doubt was started in this debate, viz.: whether the agreement of the nine States, required by the Confederation, was to be made by their legislatures, or by their delegates in Congress? The expression adopted, viz.: "so many States, in Congress, is first obtained," show what was their sense of this matter. If it be agreed that the 11th article of the Confederation is not to be applied to the admission of these new States, then it is contended that their admission comes within the 13th article, which forbids "any alteration, unless agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State." The independence of the new States of Kentucky and Franklin, will soon bring on the ultimate decision of all these questions.

8. Particular instances whereby the General Assembly of Virginia have shown that they considered the ordinance called their constitution, as every other ordinance, or act of the legislature, subject to be altered by the legislature for the time being.

1. The convention which formed that constitution, declared themselves to be the House of Delegates, during the term for which they were originally elected, and in the autumn of the year met the Senate, elected under the new constitution, and did legislative business with them. At this time, there were malefactors in the public jail, and there was as yet no court established for their trial. They passed a law, appointing certain members by name, who were then members of the Executive Council, to be a court for the trial of these malefactors, though the constitution had said, in express words, that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of the three departments, legislative, executive and judiciary at the same time. This proves that the very men who had made that constitution understood that it would be alterable by the General Assembly. This court was only for that occasion. When the next General Assembly met, after the election of the ensuing year, there was a new set of malefactors in the jail, and no court to try them. This Assembly passed a similar law to the former, appointing certain members of the Executive Council to be an occasional court for this particular case. Not having the journals of Assembly by me, I am unable to say whether this measure was repealed afterwards. However, they are instances of executive and judiciary powers exercised by the same persons, under the authority of a law, made in contradiction to the constitution.