The other States not named here, are probably indebted in the same proportion to their abilities. If so, and we estimate their abilities by the rule of quotaing them those eight States will owe about fourteen millions, and consequently the particular debts of all the States will amount to twenty-five or twenty-six millions of dollars.
5. A particular answer to this question would lead to very minute details: one general idea, however, may be applied to all the States. Each having their separate debt, and a determinate proportion of the Federal debt, they endeavor to lay taxes sufficient to pay the interest of both of these, and to support their own and the Federal Government. These taxes are generally about one or one and a-half per cent. on the value of property; and from two and a-half to five per cent. on foreign merchandise imported. But the payment of this interest regularly, is not accomplished in many of the States. The people are as yet not recovered from the depredations of the war. When that ended their houses were in ruin, their farms waste, themselves distressed for clothing and necessaries for their households. They cannot as yet, therefore, bear heavy taxes. For the payment of the principal no final measures are yet taken. Some States will have land for sale, the produce of which may pay the principal debt. Some will endeavor to have an exceeding of their taxes to be applied as a sinking fund; and all of them look forward to the increase of population, and of course an increase of productions in their present taxes, to enable them to be sinking their debt. This is a general view. Some of the States have not yet made even just efforts for satisfying either the principal or interest of their public debt.
6. By the close of the year 1785 there had probably passed over about 50,000 emigrants. Most of these were Irish. The greatest number of the residue were Germans. Philadelphia receives most of them, and next to that, Baltimore and New York.
7. Nothing is decided as to Vermont. The four northernmost States wish it to be received into the Union. The Middle and Southern States are rather opposed to it. But the great difficulty arises with New York, which claims that territory. In the beginning every individual revolted at the idea of giving them up. Congress therefore only interfered from time to time, to prevent the two parties from coming to an open rupture. In the meanwhile the minds of the New Yorkers have been familiarizing to the idea of a separation, and I think it will not be long before they will consent to it. In that case, the Southern and Middle States will doubtless acquiesce, and Vermont will be received into the Union.
8. LeMaine, a part of the government of Massachusetts, but detached from it, (the State of New Hampshire lying between,) begins to desire to be separated. They are very weak in numbers as yet: but whenever they shall attain a certain degree of population, there are circumstances which render it highly probable they will be allowed to become a separate member of the Union.
9. It is believed that the State of Virginia has by this time made a second cession of lands to Congress, comprehending all those between the meridian of the mouth of the Great Kanhaway, the Ohio, Mississippi, and Carolina boundary. Within this lies Kentucky. I believe that their numbers are sufficient already to entitle them to come into Congress. And their reception there will only increase the delay necessary for taking the consent of the several Assemblies. There is no other new State as yet approaching the time of its reception.
10. The number of Royalists which left New York, South Carolina and Georgia, when they were evacuated by the British army was considerable, but I am absolutely unable to conjecture their numbers. From all the other States, I suppose perhaps two thousand may have gone.
11. The Confederation is a wonderfully perfect instrument, considering the circumstances under which it was formed. There are, however, some alterations which experience proves to be wanting. These are principally three. 1. To establish a general rule for the admission of new States into the Union. By the confederation no new States, except Canada, can be permitted to have a vote in Congress without first obtaining the consent of all the thirteen legislatures. It becomes necessary to agree what districts may be established into separate States, and at what period of their population they may come into Congress. The act of Congress of April 23, 1784, has pointed out what ought to be agreed on, to say also what number of votes must concur when the number of voters shall be thus enlarged. 2. The Confederation, in its eighth article, decides that the quota of money to be contributed by the several States shall be proportioned to the value of the landed property in the State. Experience has shown it impracticable to come at this value. Congress have therefore recommended to the States to agree that their quotas shall be in proportion to the number of their inhabitants, counting five slaves, however, but as equal to three free inhabitants. I believe all the States have agreed to this alteration except Rhode Island. 3. The Confederation forbids the States individually to enter into treaties of commerce, or of any other nature, with foreign nations: and it authorizes Congress to establish such treaties, with two reservations however, viz., that they shall agree to no treaty which would, 1. restrain the legislatures from imposing such duties on foreigners as natives are subject to; or 2., from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of commodities. Congress may therefore be said to have a power to regulate commerce so far as it can be effected by conventions with other nations, and by conventions which do not infringe the two fundamental reservations before mentioned. But this is too imperfect. Because, till a convention be made with any particular nation, the commerce of any one of our States with that nation may be regulated by the State itself, and even when a convention is made, the regulation of the commerce is taken out of the hands of the several States only so far as it is covered or provided for by that convention or treaty. But treaties are made in such general terms, that the greater part of the regulations would still result to the legislatures. Let us illustrate these observations by observing how far the commerce of France and England can be affected by the State Legislatures. As to England, any one of the legislatures may impose on her goods double the duties which are paid other nations; may prohibit their goods altogether; may refuse them the usual facilities for recovering their debts or withdrawing their property; may refuse to receive their Consuls or to give those Consuls any jurisdiction. But with France, whose commerce is protected by a treaty, no State can give any molestation to that commerce which is defended by the treaty. Thus, though a State may exclude the importation of all wines (because one of the reservations aforesaid is that they may prohibit the importation of any species of commodities), yet they cannot prohibit the importation of French wines, particularly while they allow wines to be brought in from other countries. They cannot impose heavier duties on French commodities than on those of other nations. They cannot throw peculiar obstacles in the way of their recovery of debts due to them, &c., &c., because those things are provided for by treaty. Treaties, however, are very imperfect machines for regulating commerce in the detail. The principal objects in the regulation of our commerce would be: 1. to lay such duties, restrictions, or prohibitions on the goods of any particular nation, as might oblige that nation to concur in just and equal arrangements of commerce. 2. To lay such uniform duties on the articles of commerce throughout all the States, as may avail them of that fund for assisting to bear the burthen of public expenses. Now, this cannot be done by the States separately, because they will not separately pursue the same plan. New Hampshire cannot lay a given duty on a particular article unless Massachusetts will do the same, because it will turn the importation of that article from her ports into those of Massachusetts, from whence they will be smuggled into New Hampshire by land. But though Massachusetts were willing to concur with New Hampshire in laying the same duty, yet she cannot do it for the same reason, unless Rhode Island will also, nor can Rhode Island without Connecticut, nor Connecticut without New York, nor New York without New Jersey, and so on quite to Georgia. It is visible, therefore, that the commerce of the States cannot be regulated to the best advantage but by a single body, and no body so proper as Congress. Many of the States have agreed to add an article to the Confederation for allowing to Congress the regulation of their commerce, only providing that the revenues to be raised on it shall belong to the States in which they are levied. Yet it is believed that Rhode Island will prevent this also. An everlasting recurrence to this same obstacle will occasion a question to be asked. How happens it that Rhode Island is opposed to every useful proposition? Her geography accounts for it, with the aid of one or two observations. The cultivators of the earth are the most virtuous citizens, and possess most of the amor patriæ. Merchants are the least virtuous, and possess the least of the amor patriæ. The latter reside principally in the seaport towns, the former in the interior country. Now, it happened that of the territory constituting Rhode Island and Connecticut, the part containing the seaports was erected into a State by itself, called Rhode Island, and that containing the interior country was erected into another State called Connecticut. For though it has a little sea-coast, there are no good ports in it. Hence it happens that there is scarcely one merchant in the whole State of Connecticut, while there is not a single man in Rhode Island who is not a merchant of some sort. Their whole territory is but a thousand square miles, and what of that is in use is laid out in grass farms almost entirely. Hence they have scarcely any body employed in agriculture. All exercise some species of commerce. This circumstance has decided the characters of these two States. The remedies to this evil are hazardous. One would be to consolidate the two States into one. Another would be to banish Rhode Island from the Union. A third, to compel her submission to the will of the other twelve. A fourth, for the other twelve to govern themselves according to the new propositions, and to let Rhode Island go on by herself according to the ancient articles. But the dangers and difficulties attending all these remedies are obvious.
These are the only alterations proposed to the confederation, and the last of them is the only additional power which Congress is thought to need.
12. Congress have not yet ultimately decided at what rates they will redeem the paper money in the hands of the holders. But a resolution of 1784 has established the principle, so that there can be little doubt but that the holders of paper money will receive as much real money as the paper was actually worth at the time they received it, and an interest of six per cent. from the time they received it. Its worth will be found in the depreciation table of the State wherein it was received; these depreciation tables having been formed according to the market price of the paper money at different epochs.