A Philadelphia Lawyer in the London Courts

by Thomas Leaming

Such, briefly, is the English arrangement of courts for the disposal of civil as distinguished from criminal business.

The judges of all courts are appointed—not elected—and their terms of office are for life with provisions for retirement and pension. Judicial salaries are much higher in England than in America. Ordinary judges of the High Court get £5,000, the Lords of Appeal, £6,000, the Chief Justice, £8,000, and the Lord Chancellor, £10,000. The appointing power—nominally the crown—is really the Lord Chancellor, who, unlike the Lord Chief Justice and all the other judges of England, is a political incumbent changing with the Government. It might be supposed from this fact that the Lord Chancellor would yield to a natural temptation in making judicial appointments and that his selections would constitute a distribution of political patronage. There appears to be nothing in the law to prevent this, and formerly judges were largely appointed for political considerations or by reason of personal or social influences.

At present, however, the least observation will convince any one that the great majority of judicial appointments in England are made solely out of consideration for character and professional attainments. With few exceptions the judges appointed in modern times—no matter what party may have been in power—have been selected from amongst the leading barristers of the day, and a person who has been in the habit for years of frequenting the courts at intervals, is almost sure, when he misses an eminent barrister from the front row, to find him on the bench, if alive. While this is the general rule, it is true that in rare and exceptional cases one hears of the appointment of a judge who is regarded by the profession as not being well qualified and his selection is attributed to influence. The just admiration which Americans entertain for the English judiciary as a body will in such instances not be reflected by the views of the English Bar, with opportunities for observation at closer range. Barristers will remark that a given judge is not a lawyer at all, but merely had the gift of gaining cases before juries, and that the political influence he acquired induced the government to give him an office for which he is ill equipped. And one may even hear the statement made concerning some judge, "I can not say he is venal; I can not say he can be bought for money; but he has naturally a dishonest mind and can not perceive the truth."

A stranger is left to speculate how far such views may reflect some past grudge and he will probably come to the conclusion that the high standing of the English judiciary, in the opinion of all the world, is fully deserved, but that there are some few exceptions to this general excellence.

Costs play an important part in all English litigation. The tendency since the time of the Stuarts has been constantly to increase them. By costs—as understood in England—is not meant the official fees payable to the court officers, but a sum which the unsuccessful party is condemned to pay to the successful party, the aim being to indemnify the side whom the event proves to have been in the right. If a litigant has incurred expense to obtain a judgment for a sum of money, then he must be reimbursed by the other side who occasioned his outlay by refusal to pay. On the other hand, if an unjust claim has been made against him, the claimant must repay his expenses in resisting it.

Part of these costs are taxed as the case proceeds. Thus, if one party summon another before a Master prior to trial, to obtain an order for the production of some document, the Master imposes costs—say £2. 10s. 0d.—upon the party who refused to produce, or upon the party who, the Master finds, has unwarrantably demanded the production. The theory here is to discourage unnecessary and harassing interlocutory proceedings.

But the principal costs "await the event"—follow the course of the final judgment. They include an allowance for counsel fees, which, however, is not always as much as the amount paid by the litigants. For, if a litigant has indulged in the luxury of an unusual array of counsel, he must do so at his own expense, and the Master allows only what he should have laid out in fees. Thus, in a petty action, caused by some personal pique, the plaintiff may have insisted that his solicitor retain a K. C. at fifty guineas and a junior at thirty-five guineas, involving a total expense, with three guineas for the consultation, of eighty-eight guineas. The defendant, however, has been content with a junior at "3 & 1." If the plaintiff succeeds, the Master will not allow him the eighty-eight guineas, but will decide that the more modest armament of the defendant would have been sufficient.

Costs are, upon the whole, very high. In an ordinary action to recover a moderate sum—say £200—the costs will generally amount to £50. In a recent action to recover £60, the balance of the purchase price of a motor car, costs were claimed of over £400, and actually allowed in a sum over £200. Though this was exceptional, owing to the unreasonable stubbornness with which a just claim was resisted, and is by no means typical, yet it illustrates the possibilities of the system.

In theory it seems reasonable that the party in the wrong should reimburse the party in the right for having vexatiously put him to expense in obtaining his due. In practice, however, the prospect of large costs may stimulate unjust suits by impecunious plaintiffs—unable themselves to respond in costs if defeated—against richer defendants vulnerable for whatever the chances of war may have in store for them. To this criticism English lawyers can only answer that if the plaintiff is unable to give security for costs, he may, in actions of tort, at least, be remitted to the County Courts, where the costs are much lighter. This, however, is merely a mitigation of the evil.

The general opinion seems to be that high costs discourage litigation. This may be true, but if they tend as well to obstruct the assertion of just rights and to stimulate fictitious claims, they are not to be desired by the profession or by the laity.