The Treaty of Waitangi; or, how New Zealand became a British Colony

by Thomas Lindsay Buick

The magnitude of the property at stake naturally excited Mr. Wentworth to his most eloquent effort, and in an address of considerable length and subtlety he argued that before the proclamations issued by Sir George Gipps and Captain Hobson, nullifying all titles to land not derived from the Queen, could be binding upon British subjects, they must be founded upon some law previously existing; and if they were so founded then it was the duty of those who had issued them to satisfy the Council what that law was. The principle contained in the preamble of the Bill—that no chiefs, or other individuals of tribes of uncivilised savages had any right to dispose of the lands occupied by them—was, he contended, at variance with British law and with the Law of Nations. Numerous authorities were marshalled in support of this view, and also to prove that it mattered nothing whether the New Zealanders were an independent nation or only a few errant tribes scattered over the country; they still possessed the demesne of the soil to do with as they pleased. This being so, those who purchased land from them were only acting in accordance with the natural rights of the natives and in compliance with the Law of Nations. According to Vattel—one of the world's most eminent authorities upon the relation of one nation to another—individuals landing in an uninhabited country might not only establish colonies, but also erect a government and an empire, and he argued that if such a proceeding was permissible in an uninhabited country, it resulted a fortiori, that it might be done in a country that was peopled, provided the natives of that country gave their consent thereto. The story of the first New England Settlement under Davenport and others, in 1620, was urged as conclusive proof that British subjects, unsupported by a Royal Charter, might form colonies and erect governments, as had been done in Connecticut, where the government so established had lasted for over two centuries. He denied that there was any merit in the official assumption that the Crown had derived sovereignty over the Islands of New Zealand by right of discovery. Discovery gave no right of occupation in an inhabited country, nor would the Law of Nations acknowledge the property and sovereignty of any nation unless its possession were real, unless its settlements were actual, or it had in some way made practical use of the soil. The Bill rested upon the principle that the native was incompetent to sell his own land, and the British subject was incompetent to buy—a principle which he thought he had clearly disproved. Confiscation was the key-note of the measure. It was a Bill designed to take away property, annul grants, and to forfeit all landed possessions acquired by British subjects in New Zealand. He condemned the Bill absolutely, because he claimed to have established on incontestable grounds, and by the aid of indisputable authorities, the right of British subjects to buy land from the New Zealanders, a right which could not be taken away until the Council passed an Act to restrain it. Under these circumstances it was highly illegal to proceed to divest parties of their possessions without adequate compensation, such as was given in England when land was required for public purposes. The compensation to be given in such cases must always be awarded by a jury; therefore the proposed Bill was clearly repugnant to the laws of England. Only a few days previously the Council had passed an Ordinance, making all the laws of England and of the colony of New South Wales applicable to New Zealand. Amongst these was the right of trial by jury of which the proposed Bill was completely subversive; it took away the right of trial by jury; and therefore, declared Mr. Wentworth, the Council could not pass it, or if they did, the Judges could not certify to it.

These arguments were reiterated and amplified by the two barristers, Messrs. A'Beckett and Darvell, and on July 9 their official refutation was placed before the Council by Sir George Gipps, who on that day delivered in reply a speech remarkable for its broad grasp of constitutional history, as well as for its fearless declaration of the attitude adopted by the Crown. It was during the development of this smashing rebuttal that the objectors were enlightened as to the three great principles of law upon which the second clause of the treaty was founded; "principles, which, until I heard them here controverted," said Sir George, "I thought were fully admitted, and indeed received as political maxims." Briefly these were:

1. That the uncivilised inhabitants of any country have but a qualified domain over it, or a right of occupancy only; and that, until they establish amongst themselves a settled form of government, and subjudicate the ground to their own uses by the cultivation of it, they cannot grant to individuals, not of their own tribe, any portion of it, for the simple reason that they have not themselves any individual property in it.

2. That if a settlement be made in any such country by a civilised power, the right of pre-emption to the soil, or in other words, the right of extinguishing the native title, is exclusively in the Government of that power, and cannot be enjoyed by individuals without the consent of the Government.

3. That neither individuals nor bodies of men belonging to any nation can form colonies, except with the consent and under the direction and control of their own Government, and that from any settlement which they may form without the consent of their Government they may be ousted. That is, so far as British subjects are concerned, they cannot form colonies without the consent of the Crown.

It is not necessary to closely analyse the first of these declarations, as whatever may be said of it as a principle of law it was not in any sense applicable to New Zealand. Logicians may amuse themselves discussing why a people who are capable of granting titles to individuals of their own tribes are yet incapable of granting similar rights or concessions to individuals of other nations; or how the Government of another nation can acquire from those natives a title to land which it has already declared the natives do not possess and have no power to give. In other words, it may form sport to the mental speculator to discover how a Government can extinguish a native title which that Government has affirmed does not exist, for that is what this declaration of principle means if it is to be invested with any meaning at all.

Such reasoning is at this juncture foreign to our purpose, because, however true it may be that the native lands of New Zealand being held in common, it was not competent for individual natives to grant titles to Europeans, seeing that no individual interests had been ascertained, the right of the tribes of New Zealand to dispose of their lands as they pleased was incontestable. As has already been pointed out, they were by no means in such an uncivilised state as to be devoid of a form of government adequate in all respects for their primitive purposes. Especially was their occupancy and ownership of land highly systematised. It may be true that they had not "subjudicated the ground to their own uses by the cultivation of it," as the term cultivation is freely understood by us, but the waste spaces were just as valuable, just as necessary to them as the garden patches. Their forests, their open plains, their wild mountain sides were as much the sources of their food-supply as were their kumara fields, the streams, or the open sea, and so definitely was this understood amongst them that every hill and valley was known, named, and owned under one of their various tenures. There was, in fact, no side of his tribal life about which the Maori held such clear conceptions, or was so fixed and determined as the occupancy and ownership of the soil, for which in olden days, as in Pakeha days, he was ever ready to fight and, if necessary, to die.

If then Sir George Gipps desired to convey to his Council the impression that the New Zealanders were incompetent to deal with their own lands, he was setting up an entirely false hypothesis, an error into which he was no doubt led through not being clearly seized of all that Maori land tenure implied, the full meaning of which was afterwards to be debated on many a hard-fought field.

That the right of extinguishing the native title rested solely with the Crown was a sounder contention, based upon principles deep set in constitutional law, and supported by the practice of all colonising nations. It was the endeavour of Mr. Wentworth, and those associated with him, to depreciate the principle of pre-emption by casting at it the cheap sneer that it was "American law," and so it was. But it was British law before it was American law, and has only been heard of in American courts more frequently than in English tribunals, because questions incidental to the settlement of the New World have called it more frequently into prominence there. Broadly put the principle rests upon the assumption, dating from feudal times, that the King was the original proprietor of all the land in the kingdom, and the true and only source of title. Therefore all valid individual titles must be derived from the Crown. With the development of constitutional government the personality of the King has disappeared, but still no nation will suffer either its own subjects or the subjects of another nation to set up a title superior to its own. It has thus become a right exclusively belonging to the Government in its sovereign capacity, to extinguish the native title to a country which it may be colonising, "to perfect its own domain over the soil, and to dispose of it at its own good pleasure."

Once admitting that the natives of New Zealand had a valid title to the soil of the country, and were competent to deal with that title, the prerogative of the Crown in exercising the pre-emptive right to extinguish it under the terms of an equitable treaty was not difficult to maintain. But the buttress[173] behind the attitude which the Government adopted towards the New Zealand land purchasers was to be found in the third declaration of principle enunciated by Sir George Gipps. Here it was laid down "that neither individuals nor bodies of men belonging to any nation can form colonies, except with the consent, and under the direction and control of their own Government."