“The King, finding by these experiences in the South, how tough the business was likely to prove, sent me some time before into the North to the Earl of Newcastle. My commission was, (for I had but three or four words under the King’s hand, written on a piece of white sarsanet to give me credit with him) to try what he meant to do with his army; and whether he would (when the season was) march up Southerly and in a distinct body keep at some distance from the King, to give a check unto the Southern army. But I found him very averse to this, and perceived that he apprehended nothing more than to be joined to the King’s army, or to serve under Prince Rupert; for he designed himself to be the man that should turn the scale, and to be a self-subsisting and distinct army, wherever he was, which, when I perceived fixed in him, being left to discretion, I thought it more reasonable to wave it, than press him to the contrary.... He told me that, when he could quit Yorkshire, and leave it in a condition to defend itself against the aforementioned enemies in it, he would march through Lincolnshire and recruit himself there, and so over the Washes into Norfolk and Suffolk and the associated counties; which had been a noble design.” After mentioning a disaster which later on befell Newcastle and the prospects of King Charles, Warwick adds: “which if he had pursued that design of marching into their associated counties, it had prevented; so as he had a natural foresight, from whence his danger should arise; but not a good angel or genius to divert it”.
[78] Memoires of the Reigne of King Charles, by Sir Philip Warwick. London: Ri. Chiswell, 1701.
It was all very well for Newcastle to talk about his projects when he should be able to quit Yorkshire and leave it in a condition to defend itself; but very soon he was not in a position to do either.
On 10 October, Manchester, Fairfax, and Cromwell defeated a force which Newcastle had collected in Lincolnshire. According to Whitelock,[79] “The Earl of Manchester took in Lincoln upon surrender, and therein 2500 armes, 30 colours, 3 pieces of cannon”. The same authority states that: “The Lord Fairfax beat from about Hull part of the King’s,” i.e. Newcastle’s, “forces, took from them 9 pieces of cannon, of which one was a demy-culverin, one of those which they called ‘the Queen’s Gods,’ and 100 arms.... Colonel Cromwell routed 7 troops of the King’s horse in Lincolnshire under Colonel Hastings.” Newcastle was then obliged to raise the siege of Hull, much to the disappointment and alarm of the “nobility and gentlemen of Yorkshire”; and he marched back to York.
[79] Memorials, p. 72.
Of the state of the war after this event Clarendon says:[80] “Albeit the Marquis of Newcastle had been forced to rise as unfortunately from Hull, as the King had been from Gloucester, yet he had still a full power over Yorkshire, and a greater in Nottinghamshire and Lincolnshire than the Parliament had”. The latter part of this statement is rather surprising when we consider the recent defeat of Newcastle’s forces in Lincolnshire.
[80] Hist., vol. II, part I. book vii.
In ending this chapter we will notice a letter from the Queen to Newcastle, written on 7 October, just before he raised the siege of Hull, in which the old matter of the Governorship of the Prince crops up again.[81]