Maitland opened the conference with a plausible speech. He set forth the benefits which they had enjoyed under her Majesty’s government, and dwelt on the liberty which she had granted them in religious matters; he urged the great importance of the ministers of the church cultivating her friendship by every good office in their power, and endeavouring to inspire the people with a favourable opinion ofher person and administration; and pointed out the hurtful effects of their being observed to disagree in their form of prayer for her, and in their doctrine concerning the duty of subjects. Addressing himself particularly to Knox, he told him, with much politeness and address, that it was the earnest wish of the council that he should study greater caution, when he had occasion to speak of her majesty from the pulpit: not that they were afraid of his saying any thing very improper, but because the liberty which he used would be taken by persons less modest and prudent. Knox replied to the secretary’s speech. He drew a very different picture of the state of affairs since the queen came to the country; stated the grievances under which the church laboured, and which were daily increasing, instead of being redressed; and added, that, in these circumstances, the courtiers ought not to be surprised at the complaints of the ministers, and the liberties which they took in rebuking sins, which were openly committed, and persisted in notwithstanding all due admonition. At the same time, he professed his readiness to account for any part of his own conduct which had given offence, and to listen to the objections which might be urged against it.
Maitland specified the mode in which the Reformer usually prayed for her majesty, as one thing which gave offence to him and his colleagues. Prayers and tears, it has often been alleged, are the only arms which Christians ought to employ against injuries. But those who have deprived them of otherweapons, have usually envied them the use of these also; and if their prayers have not been smoothed down to the temper of their adversaries, so as to become mere compliments to princes under colour of an address to the Almighty, they have often been pronounced to be seditious and treasonable.[128] Knox repeated his common form of prayer for the queen, and requested to be informed in what respects it was deserving of reprehension. “Ye pray for the queen’s majesty with a condition,” replied Maitland, “saying, ‘Illuminate her heart, if thy good pleasure be.’ Where have ye example of such prayer?”—“Wherever the examples are,” rejoined Knox, “I am assured of the rule, ‘If we shall ask any thing according to his will, he will hear us;’ and Christ commanded us to pray, ‘Thy will be done.’”—“But in so doing ye put a doubt in the people’s head of her conversion,” said Maitland.—“Not I, my lord; but her own obstinate rebellion causes more than me to doubt of her conversion.”—“Wherein rebels she against God?”—“In all the actions of her life, but in these two heads especially: that she will not hear the preaching of the blessed evangel of Jesus Christ, and that she maintains that idol the mass.”—“She thinks not that rebellion, but good religion.”—“Sothought they who offered their children to Moloch, and yet the spirit of God affirms, that they offered them unto devils, and not unto God.”—“But yet ye can produce the example of none that has so prayed before you,” said the secretary, pressing his former objection. “Well then,” said Knox; “Peter said these words to Simon Magus, ‘Repent of this thy wickedness, and pray to God, that, if it be possible, the thought of thine heart may be forgiven thee.’ And think ye not, my lord secretary, that the same doubt may touch my heart as touching the queen’s conversion, that then touched the heart of the apostle?”—“I would never hear you or any other call that in doubt,” replied Maitland.—“But your will is no assurance to my conscience.”—“Why say ye that she refuses admonitions?” said Maitland; “she will gladly hear any man.”—“But what obedience ensues? Or, when shall she be seen to give her presence to the public preaching?”—“I think never, so long as she is thus entreated,” replied the secretary. “And so long,” rejoined the Reformer, “ye and all others must be content that I pray so as I may be assured to be heard of my God, either in making her comfortable to his church, or, if he has appointed her to be a scourge to the same, that we may have patience, and she may be bridled.”
“Well then,” said the secretary, “let us come to the second head. Where find ye that the scripture calls any ‘the bond slaves of Satan?’ or, that the prophets spake so irreverently of kings and princes?”—“If the sharpness of the term offend you,” repliedthe Reformer, “I have not invented that phrase of speaking, but have learned it out of God’s scriptures; for these words I find spoken unto Paul, ‘Behold, I send thee unto the Gentiles, to open their eyes, that they may turn from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God.’ Mark thir words, my lord, and stur not at the speaking of the Holy Ghost.”
The secretary, who, during the greater part of the dispute, had leaned on the master of Maxwell’s breast, said that he was fatigued, and desired some other person to reason with Knox on the point which remained to be discussed, respecting the authority of magistrates and the duty of subjects. Chancellor Morton ordered George Hay to perform this part. Knox was aware, that the object of the court was, if possible, to divide the ministers, and that they would improve any appearance of diversity of opinion among them, to the prejudice of the common cause. He therefore told Hay, that he had no objections to reason with him, knowing him to be a man of learning and modesty; but he should be sorry to think that they opposed each other, like two scholars of Pythagoras, to show the quickness of their parts by supporting either side of a question; and as he, for his own part, protested that he durst no more support a proposition which he knew to be untrue, than he durst teach false doctrine in the pulpit, so he hoped that his brother would, on the present occasion, advance or maintain nothing but what he was persuaded of in his conscience. This caution had the desired effect, and Hay declared, before thewhole assembly, that his judgment exactly coincided with Knox’s on the subject proposed for discussion. “Marry,” said the disappointed secretary, “ye are the well worst of the two; for I remember our reasoning when the queen was in Carrick.”
Perceiving that none of the company was disposed to enter the lists with the Reformer, Maitland again returned to the charge, and engaged to defend the uncontrollable authority of rulers. “Well,” said he, “I am somewhat better provided in this last head, than I was in the other two. Mr Knox, yesterday we heard your judgment upon the 13th to the Romans; we heard the mind of the apostle well opened; we heard the causes why God has established powers upon earth; we heard the necessity that mankind has of the same; and we heard the duty of magistrates sufficiently declared. But in two things I was offended, and I think some more of my lords that then were present: The one was, ye made difference betwixt the ordinance of God, and the persons that are placed in authority; and ye affirmed, that men might resist the persons, and yet not offend God’s ordinance: The other was, that subjects were not bound to obey their princes if they commanded unlawful things, but that they might resist their princes, and were not ever bound to suffer.” Knox said that the secretary had given a correct statement of his sentiments. “How will you prove your division and difference,” said Maitland, “and that the person placed in authority may be resisted, and God’s ordinance not transgressed, seeing that theapostle says, ‘He that resists the power, resists the ordinance of God?’” Knox replied, that the difference was evident from the words of the apostle, and that his affirmative was supported by approved examples. For the apostle asserts, that the powers ordained of God are for the preservation of quiet and peaceable men, and for the punishment of malefactors; whence it is plain, that God’s ordinance is wholly intended for the preservation of mankind, the punishment of vice, and the maintenance of virtue; but the persons placed in authority are often corrupt, unjust, and oppressive. Having referred to the conduct of the people of Israel in rescuing Jonathan from the hands of Saul, which is recorded with approbation, and to the conduct of Doeg, in putting to death the priests at the command of that monarch, which is recorded with disapprobation in scripture, he proceeded thus: “And now, my lord, in answer to the place of the apostle, I say, that ‘the power’ in that place is not to be understood of the unjust commandment of men, but of the just power wherewith God has armed his magistrates to punish sin and to maintain virtue. As if any man should enterprise to take from the hands of a lawful judge a murderer, an adulterer, or any other malefactor that by God’s law deserved the death, this same man resisted God’s ordinance, and procured to himself vengeance and damnation, because that he stayeth God’s sword to strike. But so it is not, if that men, in the fear of God, oppose themselves to the fury and blind rage of princes; for so they resist not God, but the devil, who abusesthe sword and authority of God.”—“I understand sufficiently,” said Maitland, “what you mean; and unto the one part I will not oppose myself, but I doubt of the other. For if the queen would command me to slay John Knox, because she is offended at him, I would not obey her; but if she would command others to do it, or yet by a colour of justice take his life from him, I cannot tell if I be bound to defend him against the queen, and against her officers.”—“Under protestation,” replied the Reformer, “that the auditory think not that I speak in favour of myself, I say, my lord, that if ye be persuaded of my innocence, and if God hath given you such power or credit as might deliver me, and yet ye suffer me to perish, that in so doing ye should be criminal, and guilty of my blood.”—“Prove that, and win the plea,” said Maitland. “Well, my lord,” answered Knox, “remember your promise, and I shall be short in my probation.” He then produced the example of Jeremiah, who, when accused by the priests and false prophets, said to the princes, “Know ye for certain, that if ye put me to death, ye shall surely bring innocent blood upon yourselves, and upon this city, and upon the inhabitants thereof.”—“The cases are not like,” said Maitland. “And I would learn,” said Knox, “wherein the dissimilitude stands.”—“First,” replied Maitland, “the king had not condemned him to death. And next, the false prophets, the priests, and the people, accused him without a cause, and therefore they could not but be guilty of his blood.”—“Neither of these fights with my argument,” saidKnox; “for, albeit neither the king was present, nor yet had condemned him, yet were the princes and chief counsellors there sitting in judgment, who represented the king’s person and authority. And if ye think that they should all have been criminal only because they all accused him, the plain text witnesses the contrary; for the princes defended him, and so, no doubt, did a great part of the people, and yet he boldly affirms that they should be all guilty of his blood, if that he should be put to death.”—“Then will ye,” said the secretary, “make subjects to control their princes and rulers?”—“And what harm,” asked the Reformer, “should the commonwealth receive, if the corrupt affections of ignorant rulers were moderated, and so bridled, by the wisdom and discretion of godly subjects, that they should do wrong or violence to no man?”
The secretary, finding himself hard pushed, said that they had wandered from the argument; and he professed that if the queen should become a persecutor, he would be as ready as any within the realm to adopt the doctrine of the Reformer. “But our question,” said he, “is, whether that we may, and ought, suppress the queen’s mass. Or, whether that her idolatry should be laid to our charge.”—“Idolatry ought not only to be suppressed,” said Knox, “but the idolater ought to die the death.”—“I know,” answered Maitland, “that the idolater ought to die the death; but by whom?”—“By the people,” rejoined the Reformer; “for the commandment was made to Israel, as ye may read, ‘Hear, O Israel,saith the Lord, the statutes and commandments of the Lord thy God.’”—“But there is no commandment given to the people to punish their king, if he be an idolater.”—“I find no privilege granted unto kings,” said Knox, “more than unto the people, to offend God’s majesty.”—“I grant,” said the secretary; “but yet the people may not be judge unto their king, to punish him, albeit he be an idolater. The people may not execute God’s judgment, but must leave it unto himself, who will either punish it by death, by war, by imprisonment, or by some other kind of plagues.”—“I know,” replied Knox, “the last part of your reason to be true; but for the first I am assured ye have no other warrant except your own imagination, and the opinion of such as more fear to offend princes than God.”
“Why say you so?” said Maitland. “I have the judgments of the most famous men within Europe, and of such as ye yourself will confess both godly and learned.” Upon which he produced a bundle of papers, and read extracts from the writings of the principal reformed divines against resistance to rulers; adding, that he had bestowed more labour on the collection of these authorities than on the reading of commentaries for seven years. Knox replied, that it was a pity he had given himself so much labour, for none of the extracts which he had read bore upon the question under discussion; some of them being directed against the anabaptists, who denied that Christians should be subject to magistrates, or that it was lawful for them to hold theoffice of magistracy; and the rest referring to the case of a small number of Christians scattered through heathen and infidel countries, which was the situation of the primitive church. In this last case, he said, he perfectly agreed with the writers whom Maitland had quoted; but when the majority of a nation were professors of the true religion, the case was very different. While the posterity of Abraham were few in number, and while they sojourned in different countries, they were merely required to avoid all participation in the idolatrous rites of the heathen; but as soon as they “prospered into a kingdom,” and obtained possession of Canaan, they were strictly charged to suppress idolatry, and to destroy all its monuments and incentives. The same duty was now incumbent on the professors of the true religion in Scotland, whose release from bondage, temporal and spiritual, was no less wonderful than the redemption of the Israelites from Egypt. Formerly, when not more than ten persons in a country were enlightened, and when these were called to seal their testimony to the truth by giving their bodies to the flames, it would have been foolishness to have demanded of the nobility the suppression of idolatry. But now, when knowledge had increased, and God had given such a signal victory to the truth, that it had been publicly embraced by the realm, if they suffered the land to be again defiled, both they and their queen should drink of the cup of divine indignation—she, because, amidst the great light of the gospel, she continued obstinately addicted toidolatry, and they, because they tolerated, and even countenanced her in such conduct.
Maitland challenged his opponent to prove that the apostles or prophets ever taught that subjects might suppress the idolatry of their rulers. Knox appealed to the conduct of the prophet Elisha in anointing Jehu, and giving him a charge to punish the idolatry and bloodshed of the royal family of Ahab. “Jehu was a king before he put any thing in execution,” said the secretary.—“My lord, he was a mere subject, and no king, when the prophet’s servant came to him; yea, and albeit that his fellow captains, hearing of the message, blew the trumpet, and said ‘Jehu is king,’ yet I doubt not but Jezebel both thought and said he was a traitor, and so did many others in Israel and Samaria.”—“Besides this,” said Maitland, “the fact is extraordinary, and ought not to be imitated.”—“It had the ground of God’s ordinary judgment, which commands the idolater to die the death,” answered Knox. “We are not bound to imitate extraordinary examples,” rejoined Maitland, “unless we have like commandment and assurance.” Knox granted that this was true when the example was repugnant to the ordinary precept of the law, as in the case of the Israelites borrowing from the Egyptians without repayment. But when the example agreed with the law, he insisted that it was imitable; and of this kind was the instance to which he had appealed. But, said Maitland, “whatsoever they did, was done at God’s commandment.”—“That fortifies my argument,” retorted the Reformer; “for God,by his commandment, has approved that subjects punish their princes for idolatry and wickedness by them committed.”—“We have not the like commandment,” said the secretary.—“That I deny; for the commandment, that the idolater shall die the death, is perpetual, as ye yourself have granted; ye doubted only who should be the executioner, and I have sufficiently proven that God has raised up the people, and by his prophet has anointed a king, to take vengeance upon the king and his posterity, which fact God since that time has never retracted.”—“Ye have produced but one example,” said Maitland.—“One sufficeth; but yet, God be praised, we lack not others, for the whole people conspired against Amaziah, king of Judah, after he had turned away from the Lord.”—“I doubt whether they did well, or not,” said Maitland.—“God gave sufficient approbation of their fact, for he blessed them with victory, peace, and prosperity, the space of fifty‑two years after.”—“But prosperity does not always prove that God approves the facts of men.”—“Yes, when the facts of men agree with the law of God, and are rewarded according to his promise, I say that the prosperity succeeding the fact is a most infallible assurance that God has approved that fact. And now, my lord, I have but one example to produce, and then I will put an end to my reasoning, because I weary longer to stand.” The lords desired him to take a chair; but he declined it, saying, “that melancholic reasons needed some mirth to be intermixed with them.” After a short dispute on the resistance of thepriests to Uzziah, the Reformer recapitulated the propositions which he thought had been established in the course of the debate. “Well,” said Maitland, “I think ye shall not have many learned men of your opinion.” Knox replied, that the truth ceased not to be the truth, because men misunderstood or opposed it, and yet he did not want the suffrages of learned men to his opinions.Upon which he presented a copy of the Apology of Magdeburgh, desiring the secretary to look at the names of the ministers who had approved of the defence of that city against the emperor, and subscribed the proposition, that to resist a tyrant is not to resist the ordinance of God. “Homines obscuri!”[129] said Maitland, slightingly, after perusing the list.“Dei tamen servi!”[130] replied the Reformer.
The secretary now insisted that the questions which they had discussed should be put to the vote, and that the determination of the meeting should fix a rule for uniformity of doctrine among the ministers. Knox protested against this motion, and reminded their lordships that the General Assembly had agreed to the present conference upon the express condition that nothing should be voted or decided at it. At last it was agreed, that the opinions of those who were present should be taken, but that they should not be considered as decisive. Winram, superintendent of Fife, and Douglas, rector of the university of St Andrew’s, were the principal persons among the ministers,who agreed in sentiment with the courtiers. Knox’s colleague, in delivering his opinion, took occasion to give an account of a public dispute at which he had been present in Bologna, upon the question, Whether subjects have a right to control and reform their rulers, when they have been guilty of violating their oaths of office. Thomas de Finola, rector of the University, and Vincentius de Placentia, persons celebrated for their learning, maintained the affirmative on this question, and their opinion was adopted after long discussion. “Ye tell us what was done in Bologna,” exclaimed one of the courtiers; “we are in a kingdom, and they are but a commonwealth.”—“My lord,” replied Craig, “my judgment is, that every kingdom is a commonwealth, or at least should be, albeit that every commonwealth is not a kingdom; and therefore I think that in a kingdom no less diligence ought to be taken that laws be not violated than in a commonwealth, because the tyranny of princes who continually reign in a kingdom, is more hurtful to the subjects than the misgovernment of those that from year to year are changed in free commonwealths.” He added, that the dispute to which he had referred was conducted on general principles, applicable equally to monarchies and republics; and that one of the conclusions adopted was, that, although laws contrary to the law of God, and to the true principles of government, had been introduced, through the negligence of the people or the tyranny of princes, yet the same people, or their posterity, had a right to demand that all thingsshould be reformed according to the original institution of kings and commonwealths.[131]
The speech of Craig alarmed the courtiers as to the issue of the vote; and the clerk register took occasion to observe that, at a former conference, it had been agreed that Knox should write to Calvin to obtain his opinion on this question. Knox corrected this statement, by saying that the secretary had undertaken to consult that reformer, but although repeatedly reminded of his promise, had never fulfilled it. Maitland acknowledged this, and said that upon mature deliberation he durst not, considering his station, ask advice respecting any controversy between the queen and her subjects, without her majesty’s consent. It was now proposed that Knox should write to Calvin; but he refused to be employed in the business. Before he returned to the kingdom, he said, he had obtained the judgment of the most eminent foreign divines on that question, and he could not renew his application to them, without exposing himself to the charge of forgetfulness or inconsistency. The proper course was for them to write, complaining that he had taught such doctrines as he had now defended, and requesting Calvin tocommunicate his judgment respecting them.This proposal was thought reasonable, but none would undertake the task; and the conference broke up without any determinate resolution being adopted.[132]