(4.) Insufficient dower. If the stipulated dowry is not given when demanded, divorce takes place.
(5.) Refusal of Islām. If one of the parties embrace Islām, the judge must offer it to the other three distinct times, and if he or she refuse to embrace the faith, divorce takes place.
(6.) Laʿn, or “imprecation.” That is, when a husband charges his wife with adultery, the charge is investigated, but if there is no proof, and the man swears his wife is guilty, and the wife swears she is innocent, a divorce must be decreed.
(7.) Īlāʾ, or “vow.” When a husband makes a vow not to have carnal intercourse with his wife for no less than four months, and keeps the vow inviolate, an irreversible divorce takes place.
(8.) Reason of property. If a husband become the proprietor of his wife (a slave), or the wife the proprietor of her husband (a slave), divorce takes place.
(9.) An invalid marriage of any kind, arising from incomplete nikāḥ, or “marriage ceremony,” or from affinity, or from consanguinity.
(10.) Difference of country. For example, if a husband flee from a dāru ʾl-ḥarb, or “land of enmity,” i.e. “a non-Muslim country,” to a dāru ʾl-Islām, or “country of Islām,” and his wife refuse to perform hijrah (flight) and to accompany him, she is divorced.
(11.) Apostasy from Islām. The author of the Raddu ʾl-Muk͟htār (vol. ii. p. 643) says: “When a man or woman apostatises from Islām, then an immediate dissolution (fask͟h) of the marriage takes place, whether the apostasy be of the man or of the woman, without a decree from the Qāẓī.” And again, (p. 645), “If both husband and wife apostatise at the same time, their marriage bond remains; and if at any future time the parties again return to Islām, no re-marriage is necessary to constitute them man and wife; but if one of the parties should apostatise before the other, a dissolution of the marriage takes place ipso facto.”
Mr. J. B. S. Boyle, of Lahore, says: “As relevant to this subject, I give a quotation from Mr. Currie’s excellent work on the Indian Criminal Codes, p. 445. The question is as to the effect of apostasy from Islām upon the marriage relation, and whether sexual intercourse with the apostate renders a person liable to be convicted for adultery under Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code. A. and B., Mahommedans, married under the Mahommedan law, are converted to Christianity. The wife, B., is first converted, but continues to live with her husband; subsequently the husband, A., is converted. Subsequent to the conversion of B., A. and B., still living together as husband and wife, both professing Christianity, B. has sexual intercourse with C. Will a conviction hold against C. under Section 497? Both Macnaghten and Baillie say the marriage becomes dissolved by apostasy of either party, and Grady, in his version of Hamilton’s Hidāyah, p. 66, says: “If either husband or wife apostatize from the faith, a separation takes place, without divorce, according to Abū Haneefa and Abū Yoosuf. Imām Mahommed alleges if the apostasy is on the part of the husband.
“Apostasy annuls marriage in Haneefa’s opinion, and in apostasy separation takes place without any decree of the magistrate. Cases which might decide this point have been lately tried both at Lucknow and Allahabad: at the former place in re Afzul Hosein v. Hadee Begum, and at the latter Zuburdust Khan v. Wife. But from certain remarks to be found in the judgment of the High Court, N. W. P., the Courts of Oudh and N. W. P., appear to differ on the most essential point. The point before the Oudh Court was (Hadee Begum’s plea) that her marriage contract was dissolved by reason of her own apostasy, a sufficient answer to a suit brought by her Mahommedan husband for restitution of conjugal rights; i.e. Does the apostasy of a Mahommedan wife dissolve a marriage contract against the express wish of a Mahommedan husband in dar-ool-harb (land of war)? for India, it is contended, is not, under its present administration, dar-ool-Islam (land of safety). The Oudh Court held (admitting that apostasy by the husband dissolved the marriage and freed the wife) that apostasy by the wife did not free her if her husband sued for restitution of conjugal rights. They argued that apostasy by the wife, without the wish of the husband, could not be entertained; in fact, that as regards her husband’s volition, the apostasy could not exist, and would not be recognised. That a suit for restitution of conjugal rights before the competent court of the time, seemed to them to be equivalent of the suit before the Cazee (Judge). The Oudh judges, in the absence of distinct precedent, say they fell back on the customs of the people amongst whom they lived. The Oudh Court evidently considered there was an essential difference between apostasy of a man and apostasy of a woman, of the husband or the wife; also between apostasy to a faith in a book and apostasy to the idol worship Mahommed and his followers renounce. Does such an essential difference exist? The point before the High Court N. W. P. was: Can a Mahommedan professing Christianity subsequent to his marriage with a Mussulmani, according to the Mahommedan law, obtain a decree for dissolution of that marriage under Act IV. of 1869, his wife having subsequently to him professed Christianity, and they under their new faith having lived together as man and wife? or whether the wife’s contention is sound, that her marriage was cancelled by her husband’s apostasy? They held the apostasy of the husband dissolved the marriage tie. This the Oudh Court admits, but the point before the Oudh Court was not before the High Court, N. W. P.; nevertheless from comments made by the High Court, N. W. P., on the Oudh decision, they evidently did not agree with the finding come to by the latter Court, on the point before it.