“If a Muslim attack infidels without previously calling them to the faith, he is an offender, because this is forbidden; but yet if he do attack them before thus inviting them and slay them, and take their property, neither fine, expiation, nor atonement are due, because that which protects (namely, Islām) does not exist in them, nor are they under protection by place (namely, the Dāru ʾl-Islām, or Muslim territory), and the mere prohibition of the act is not sufficient to sanction the exaction either of fine or of atonement for property; in the same manner as the slaying of the women or infant children of infidels is forbidden, but if, notwithstanding, a person were to slay such, he is not liable to a fine. It is laudable to call to the faith a people to whom a call has already come, in order that they may have the more full and ample warning; but yet this is not incumbent, as it appears in the Traditions that the Prophet plundered and despoiled the tribe of al-Muṣt̤aliq by surprise, and he also agreed with Asāmah to make a predatory attack upon Qubnā at an early hour, and to set it on fire, and such attacks are not preceded by a call. (Qubnā is a place in Syria: some assert it is the name of a tribe.)
“If the infidels, upon receiving the call, neither consent to it nor agree to pay capitation tax, it is then incumbent on the Muslims to call upon God for assistance, and to make war upon them, because God is the assistant of those who serve Him, and the destroyer of His enemies, the infidels, and it is necessary to implore His aid upon every occasion; the Prophet, moreover, commands us so to do. And having so done, the Muslims must then with God’s assistance attack the infidels with all manner of warlike engines (as the Prophet did by the people of T̤āʾif), and must also set fire to their habitations (in the same manner as the Prophet fired Baweera), and must inundate them with water and tear up their plantations and tread down their grain, because by these means they will become weakened, and their resolution will fail and their force be broken; these means are, therefore, all sanctified by the law.
“It is no objection to shooting arrows or other missiles against the infidels that there may chance to be among them a Muslim in the way either of bondage or of traffic, because the shooting of arrows and so forth among the infidels remedies a general evil in the repulsion thereof from the whole body of Muslims, whereas the slaying of a Muslim slave or trader is only a particular evil, and to repel a general evil a particular evil must be adopted, and also because it seldom happens that the strongholds of the infidels are destitute of Muslims, since it is most probable that there are Muslims residing in them, either in the way of bondage or of traffic, and hence, if the use of missile weapons were prohibited on account of these Muslims, war would be obstructed. If the infidels in time of battle should make shields of Muslim children, or of Muslims, who are prisoners in their hands, yet there is no need on that account to refrain from the use of missile weapons, for the reason already mentioned. It is requisite, however, that the Muslims in using such weapons aim at the infidels, and not at the children or the Muslim captives, because, as it is impossible in shooting to distinguish precisely between them and the infidels, the person who discharges the weapon must make this distinction in his intention and design by aiming at the infidels, and not at the others, since thus much is practicable, and the distinction must be made as far as is practicable.
“There is also neither fine nor expiation upon the warriors on account of such of their arrows or other missiles as happen to hit the children or the Muslims, because the war is in observance of a divine ordinance, and atonement is not due for anything which may happen in the fulfilment of a divine ordinance, for otherwise men would neglect the fulfilment of the ordinance from an apprehension of becoming liable to atonement. It is otherwise in the case of a person eating the bread of another when perishing for hunger, as in that instance atonement is due; although eating the bread of other people, in such a situation, be a divine ordinance, because a person perishing for hunger will not refrain from eating the provision of another, from the apprehension of atonement, since his life depends upon it; whereas war is attended with trouble and dangerous to life, whence men would be deterred, by apprehension of atonement, from engaging in it. There is no objection to the warriors carrying their Qurʾāns and their women along with them, where the Muslim force is considerable, to such a degree as to afford a protection from the enemy, and not to admit of any apprehension from them, because in that case safety is most probable, and a thing which is most probable stands and is accounted as a thing certain. If the force of the warriors be small (such as is termed a Sarrīyah), so as not to afford security from the enemy, in this case their carrying their women or Qurʾāns along with them is reprobated, because in such a situation taking those with them is exposing them to dishonour; and taking the Qurʾān with them, in particular, is exposing it to contempt, since infidels scoff at the Qurʾān, with a view of insulting the Muslims; and this is the true meaning of the saying of the Prophet, ‘Carry not the Qurʾān along with you into the territory of the enemy’ (that is, of the infidels). If a Muslim go into an infidel camp under a protection, there is no objection to his taking his Qurʾān along with him, provided these infidels be such as observe their engagements, because from these no violence is to be apprehended.
“It is lawful for aged women to accompany an army, for the performance of such business as suits them, such as dressing victuals, administering water, and preparing medicines for the sick and wounded; but with respect to young women, it is better that they stay at home, as this may prevent perplexity or disturbance. The women, however, must not engage in fight, as this argues weakness in the Muslims. Women, therefore, must not take any personal concern in battle unless in a case of absolute necessity; and it is not laudable to carry young women along with the army, either for the purpose of carnal gratification, or for service; if, however, the necessity be very urgent, female slaves may be taken, but not wives. A wife must not engage in a fight but with the consent of her husband, nor a slave but with the consent of his owner (according to what was already stated, that the right of the husband and the master has precedence), unless from necessity where an attack is made by the enemy.
“It does not become Muslims to break treaties or to act unfairly with respect to plunder or to disfigure people (by cutting off their ears and noses, and so forth); for as to what is related of the Prophet, that he disfigured the Oorneans, it is abrogated by subsequent prohibitions. In the same manner it does not become Muslims to slay women or children, or men aged, bedridden, or blind, because opposition and fighting are the only occasions which make slaughter allowable (according to our doctors), and such persons are incapable of these. For the same reason also the paralytic are not to be slain, nor those who are dismembered of the right hand, or of the right hand and left foot. Ash-Shāfiʿī maintains that aged men, or persons bedridden or blind, may be slain, because (according to him) infidelity is an occasion of slaughter being allowable, and this appears in these persons. What was before observed, however, that the paralytic or dismembered are not to be slain, is in proof against him, as infidelity appears in these also, yet still they are not slain, whence it is evident that mere infidelity is not a justifiable occasion of slaughter. The Prophet, moreover, forbade the slaying of infants or single persons, and once, when the Prophet saw a woman who was slain, he said, ‘Alas! this woman did not fight, why, therefore, was she slain?’ But yet, if any of these persons be killed in war, or if a woman be a queen or chief, in this case it is allowable to slay them, they being qualified to molest the servants of God. So, also, if such persons as the above should attempt to fight, they may be slain, for the purpose of removing evil, and because fighting renders slaying allowable.
“A lunatic must not be slain unless he fight, as such a person is not responsible for his faith, but yet where he is found fighting it is necessary to slay him, for the removal of evil. It is also to be observed that infants or lunatics may be slain so long as they are actually engaged in fight, but it is not allowed to kill them after they are taken prisoners, contrary to the case of others, who may be slain even after they are taken, as they are liable to punishment because they are responsible for their faith.
“A person who is insane occasionally stands, during his lucid intervals, in the same predicament as a sane person.
“It is abominable in a Muslim to begin fighting with his father, who happens to be among the infidels, nor must he slay him, because God has said in the Qurʾān, ‘Honour thy father and thy mother,’ and also because the preservation of the father’s life is incumbent upon the son, according to all the doctors, and the permission to fight with him would be repugnant to that sentiment. If, also, the son should find the father, he must not slay him himself, but must hold him in view until some other come and slay him: for thus the end is answered without the son slaying his father, which is an offence.
“If, however, the father attempt to slay the son, insomuch that the son is unable to repel him but by killing him, in this case the son need not hesitate to slay him, because the design of the son is merely to repel him, which is lawful; for if a Muslim were to draw his sword with a design of killing his son, in such a way that the son is unable to repel him but by killing him, it is then lawful for the son to slay his father, because his design is merely repulsion. In a case, therefore, where the father is an infidel, and attempts to slay his son, it is lawful for the son to slay the father in self-defence à fortiori.