“There are three well-defined schools of thought on the subject.
“First.—The Jabríans (Jabarīyūn), so called from the word “jabr”, compulsion, deny all free agency in man and say that man is necessarily constrained by the force of God’s eternal and immutable decree to act as he does. They hold that as God is the absolute Lord, He can, if He so wills, admit all men into Paradise, or cast all into hell. This sect is one of the branches of the Ashʾaríans with whom on most points they agree.
“Secondly.—The Qadríans (Qadarīyūn), who deny Al-Qadr, or God’s absolute decree, say that evil and injustice ought not to be attributed to God but to man, who is altogether a free agent. God has given him the power to do or not to do an act. This sect is generally considered to be a branch of the Mutazilite body (Muʿtazilah), though in reality it existed before Wásil quitted the school of his master Hasan. As Wásil, however, followed the opinions of Mábad-al-Johní, the leading Qadrían divine, the Mutazilites and Qadríans are practically one and the same.
“Thirdly.—The Ashʾaríans maintain that God has one eternal will which is applied to whatsoever He willeth, both of His own actions and those of men; that He willeth that which He knoweth and what is written on the preserved table; that He willeth both good and evil. So far they agree with the Jabríans; but then they seem to allow some power to man. The orthodox, or Sunní belief is theoretically Ashʾarían, but practically the Sunnís are confirmed Jabríans. The Mutazilite doctrines are looked upon as quite heretical.
“No subject has been more warmly discussed in Islám than that of predestination. The following abstract of some lengthy discussions will present the points of difference.
“The Ashʾaríans, who in this matter represent in the main orthodox views, formulate their objections to the Mutazilite system thus:—
“(i.) If man is the causer of an action by the force of his own will, then he should also have the power of controlling the result of that action.
“(ii.) If it be granted that man has the power to originate an act, it is necessary that he should know all acts, because a creator should be independent in act and choice. Intention must be conditioned by knowledge. To this the Mutazilites well reply that a man need not know the length of a road before he walks, or the structure of the throat before he talks.
“(iii.) Suppose a man wills to move his body and God at the same time wills it to be steady, then if both intentions come to pass there will be a collection of opposites; if neither, a removal of opposites; if the exaltation of the first, an unreasonable preference.
“(iv.) If man can create an act, some of his works will be better than some of the works of God, e.g. a man determines to have faith: now faith is a better thing than reptiles, which are created by God.