(21.) Who knows? (participle, poel, ‘who is knowing?’ or ‘who is there that knows?’ The question does not assert the fact that there is no difference between man and beast; on the contrary, this clause is so ingeniously contrived as to assert the very reverse). The spirit of the sons of men (in its usual meaning, of the whole human race) is the ascending (with the article, ‘the ascending thing’), it is (emphatic) to the ascent (the repetition of the same root in a different grammatical form gives prominence to this word. The human soul is, it appears, especially an ‘ASCENDING thing’); and the spirit of the beast a thing descending (participle, poel with article), it is (emphatic, it really is this) [to the] downwards to the earth (the ל, to, twice repeated, gives emphasis——‘even to’).
22 Wherefore I perceive that there is nothing better, than that a man should rejoice in his own works; for that is his portion: for who shall bring him to see what shall be after him?
Thus I perceived that there can be no real good above that present-pleasure which man can obtain from his work; as that is what belongs to him: for who can bring him to see what may be the subsequent results?
(22.) And I saw (‘and thus I observed’) how there is nothing of real-good (in the technical sense in which this word occurs so often in this book) from which (full relative, ‘more than that in which,’ or ‘above that he should’) he rejoices, even the man does (humanity generally), in his workings (or what he accomplishes, plural), for (or, as כי has occurred in the corresponding clause previously, ‘as’) this is (emphatic) his portion (‘lot’ or ‘inheritance,’ singular): for who (כי again repeated, so we must render it ‘and as none’) can make him come to see (this is not exactly equivalent to ‘make him see;’ it is rather equivalent to ‘who could enable him to see,’ or ‘who could show him some method how he might discover’) in what (‘of what sort’ is that work which) which will be after him (not in respect of time, but results,——‘consequences,’ therefore). Thus Koheleth’s reasoning is quite clear, conclusive, and connected. In ten particulars man and beast are alike. (1.) The result is the same to both; (2.) their death is alike; (3.) their spirit or animal life is the same; (4.) there is no pre-eminence of the one over the other; (5.) they are alike evanescent; (6.) they all go to the same place; (7.) they come from the same dust; (8.) and they all go to the same dust, and no one can tell (i.e. for certain, or by ordinary observations) that they differ in this; (9.) man’s soul goes up, (10.) and the beast’s goes down. The arrangement of the whole, it will be seen, is highly artificial.
The next stage in the argument opens with ‘I turned and saw.’ That is a further observation of a point in which, it may be remarked incidentally, man does differ from the beast: he is the only animal that weeps. The object here is again to show that mere earthly labour, as such, produces no satisfaction. At this point the argument becomes somewhat less sustained, dealing rather with a succession of instances.