2. From his being the true God, we infer, that all hypocrisy, both in heart and life, is to be avoided; and we should draw nigh to him with a true heart and faith unfeigned; and not like those whom the prophet reproves, when he says, God was near in their mouth, and far from their reins, Jer. xii. 2.
Moreover, let us take heed that we do not set up an idol in our hearts, in opposition to him as the true God: whatever has a greater share in our affections than God, or is set up in competition with him, that is, to us, a god, and is therefore inconsistent with our paying that regard which is due to him; as our Saviour says, Ye cannot serve God and mammon, Mat. vi. 24. and, upon this account, covetousness is styled idolatry, Col. iii. 5. as the world is loved more than him; and we read of some whose God is their belly, Phil. iii. 19. who make provision for the flesh, to fulfil the lusts thereof, as though this was their chief good. And when we confide in any thing below him, in a religious way, or expect that from the creature which is only to be found in him; or when we esteem men as lords of our faith; or when his sovereignty, or right to govern us, is called in question, while we presumptuously, or wilfully, rebel against him; this is, in effect, a dethroning, or denying him to be the true God: but more of this when we consider the sins forbidden in the first commandment[[74]].
3. From the unity of the Godhead, we may infer, that we ought to take heed that we do not entertain any conceptions of the divine Being, which are inconsistent herewith; therefore, as we are not to assert a plurality of gods, so we are not to think or speak of God in such a way as tends to overthrow the simplicity of the divine nature; therefore we must not conceive that it is compounded of various parts, all which, being taken together, tend to constitute the divine essence; which gives occasion to that known aphorism, generally laid down by those who treat of this subject, that whatever is in God, is God; which we must reckon as one of the incomprehensibles of the divine Being, which when we attempt to speak of, we only give an evident proof of the imperfection of our finite understandings, and that we cannot order our words, by reason of darkness: however, it is necessary, when we lay down this proposition, that we signify what we intend hereby, that so we may not be supposed to use words without ideas; and especially that we may, in some measure, account for those modes of speaking, which are agreeable to scripture, which so often describes God as having a plurality of perfections, and those, in some respects, distinct; and yet, at the same time, that we may not hereby be led to infer a plurality of gods. Here let it be considered,
(1.) That we have not the least similitude, or resemblance, of this in any finite being. Every thing below God is composed of parts, some of which we call integral, as all the parts of matter taken together constitute the whole; others are called essential, as when we say an intelligent being has various powers or properties which are essential to it; so that it would not be complete without every one of them; and that these are all of them distinct, so that we cannot say whatever is in the soul of man is the soul, but every one of those powers, or properties, taken together, constitute the man; but this is by no means to be applied to the divine Being; therefore,
(2.) When we conceive of God, as holy, powerful, just, good, &c. we must not suppose that these perfections are so many ingredients in the divine Being, or that, when taken together, they constitute it, as the whole is constituted of its parts; for then every one of them would have no other than a partial perfection, and consequently the essential glory of one of those attributes would not be equal to the glory of the divine Being, which is supposed to consist of them all; and therefore there would be something in God less than God, or a divine perfection less than all the divine perfections taken together, which we are not to suppose. These are the properties of composition; and therefore, when we speak of God as a simple or uncompounded Being, we cannot forbear to mention them as what are inconsistent with his perfection as such.
Neither are the divine perfections distinct or different from one another, as the various parts of which the whole is constituted are said to be distinct; which follows from the former, since the divine essence has no parts; therefore we are not to suppose, that the divine attributes, considered as they are in God, are so distinguished, as one thing, or being, is from another; or as wisdom, power, justice, mercy, &c. are in men; for that would be to suppose the divine Being as having several distinct, infinitely perfect beings contained in it, which is contrary to its simplicity or unity; or, at least, if we call it one, it would be only so by participation and dependence, as a general or complex idea is said to be one, which partakes of, and depends on, all those particular or simple ideas that are contained in it; or, to illustrate it by numbers, as one hundred is one, as it contains such a number of units in it, as are, all taken together, equal to a hundred; this is not what we mean, when we say God is one.
Moreover, when we speak of the divine perfections, as being in God, we suppose them all essential to him, as opposed to what is accidental. Now an accident is generally described, as what belongs, or is superadded, to a being or subject, which it might have existed without, or have been destitute of, and yet sustained no loss of that perfection, which is essential to it: thus, wisdom, holiness, justice, faithfulness, are accidents in men; so that they who have them not, do not cease to be men, or to have the essential perfection of the human nature: but this is by no means to be applied to the divine Being and attributes; for to suppose God to be destitute of any of them, is as much as to say that he is not infinitely perfect, or that he is not God. This, I think, is generally intended, when it is said, whatever is in God, is God; which, because it may be reckoned by some to be a metaphysical speculation, I should have avoided to mention, had it not been, in some respects, necessary, since the unity of God cannot well be conceived of, unless his simplicity be defended; and I do not see how that can be maintained, if this proposition be not duly considered. If I have used more words than are needful, or repeated the same ideas too often, in attempting to explain it, I have done it to avoid some scholastic modes of speaking, or with a design to render what has been said more intelligible; but to this we may add,
(3.) That when we speak of the divine perfections as many, or distinct from one another, as we often do, and have scripture warrant to justify us therein, namely, when we speak of the justice of God, as different from his mercy, or these, from his power, wisdom, faithfulness, &c. this must not be deemed inconsistent with what has been said concerning the divine simplicity: and therefore let it be considered, that the nature and perfections of God are incomprehensible; and therefore all the ideas which we have of them are taken from our comparing them with some small resemblance that there is thereof in intelligent creatures, and, at the same time, separating from them whatever argues imperfection.
And from hence it follows, that we are not supposed to know, or be able to describe, what God is in himself, and, as I humbly conceive, never shall: such knowledge as this is too great for any but a divine person; therefore our conceptions of him are taken from and conformed to those various ways, by which he condescends to make himself visible, or known to us, namely, by various acts conversant about certain objects, in which he is said to manifest his perfections: thus, when an effect is produced, we call that perfection that produces it his power; or as the divine acts are otherwise distinguished with respect to the objects, or the manner of his glorifying himself therein, these we call his wisdom, justice, goodness, &c. And this is what we mean, when we speak of various perfections in God; though some suppose that they express themselves more agreeably to the nature of the subject, or to the simplicity of God, in that, whenever they speak of any of the divine perfections, they speak of them in such a way, as that they are denominated from the effect thereof; as when they take occasion to mention the power of God, they call it God acting powerfully; or of his justice or faithfulness, they express those perfections by, God acting justly or faithfully[[75]]. But however we express ourselves, when we speak of the distinct perfections of the divine nature, this is what we principally intend thereby: and here our thoughts must stop, and make what is too great for a finite mind to conceive of the subject of our admiration, and adore what we cannot comprehend: such knowledge is too wonderful for us; it is high, we cannot attain to it.