And that we may prepare our way for this, let it be considered, that there are some finite things, which we cannot now comprehend, by reason of the imperfection of our present state, which are not incomprehensible in themselves. How little do we know of some things, which may be called mysteries in nature; such as the reason of the growth and variety of colours and shapes of plants; the various instinct of brute creatures; yea, how little do we know comparatively of ourselves, the nature of our souls, any otherwise, than as it is observed by their actions, and the effects they produce; the reason of their union with our bodies, or of their acting by them, as the inspired writer observes; so that it may well be said, Thou knowest not the way of the spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child; even so thou knowest not the works of God, who maketh all things, Eccles. xi. 5. and Elihu, together with some of the other wonderful works of nature, which he challengeth Job to give an account of, speaks of this in particular. Dost thou know how thy garments are warm, when he quieteth the earth, by the south wind? Job xxxvii. 17, &c. which not only signifies that we cannot account for the winds producing heat or cold, as blowing from various quarters of heaven; but that we know not the reason of the vital heat, which is preserved for so many years, in the bodies of men, the inseparable concomitant and sign of life; or what gives the first motion to the blood and spirits, or fits the organized body to perform its various functions. These things cannot be comprehended by us.
But if we speak of that which is infinite, we must conclude it to be incomprehensible, not only because of the imperfection of our present state, but because, as has been before observed, of the infinite disproportion that there is between the object and our finite capacities. In this respect we have before shewn that the perfections of the divine nature cannot be comprehended, such as the immensity, eternity, omnipresence, and simplicity of God; yet we are to believe that he is thus infinitely perfect. And it seems equally reasonable to suppose the doctrine of the Trinity to be incomprehensible; for the mutual relation of the Father, Son, and Spirit, to each other, and their distinct personality, are not the result of the divine will; these are personal perfections, and therefore they are necessary, and their glory infinite, as well as that of his essential perfections; and if we are bound to believe one to be incomprehensible, why should we not as well suppose the other to be so? or if there are some things which the light of nature gives us some ideas of, concerning which we are notwithstanding bound to confess that we know but little of them, for the reason but now mentioned, why should it be thought strange, that this doctrine, though the subject of pure revelation, should be equally incomprehensible? This consequence appears so evident, that some of them, who deny the doctrine of the Trinity to be incomprehensible, do not stick to deny the perfections of the divine nature to be so, when they maintain that there is nothing which is the object of faith but what may be comprehended by us, which is to run such lengths in the defence of their cause, as no one who hath the least degree of that humility, which becomes a finite creature, should venture to do. But they proceed yet farther, as the cause they defend seems to require it, and say, that every doctrine which we cannot comprehend is to be rejected by us, as though our understandings were to set bounds to the truth and credibility of all things.
This, I think, is the true state of the question about mysteries in Christianity: it is not whether the word Mystery is never used in scripture to signify what is incomprehensible; for if that could be sufficiently proved, which I think hath not yet been done, we would assert the doctrine of the Trinity to be more than a mystery, namely, an incomprehensible doctrine; and the proof thereof seems absolutely necessary, since the Antitrinitarians, and some of them with an air of insult, conclude this to be our last resort, which we betake ourselves to when they have beaten us out of all our other strong holds; and therefore we may suppose, that this would be opposed with the greatest warmth, but I do not find that it has hitherto been overthrown: and indeed when they call it one of our most plausible pretences, as though we laid the whole stress of the controversy upon it, it might be expected that it should be attacked with stronger arguments than it generally is. Sometimes they bend their force principally against the sense of the word Mystery; and here they talk not only with an air of insult, but profaneness, when they compare it with the abominable mysteries of the heathen, which were not to be divulged to any but those of them who were in the secret; and the doctrine of the Trinity, and that of transubstantiation, are compared together, so that they are to be reckoned equally mysterious, that is, according to their application of the word, absurd and nonsensical. And this way of arguing has so far prevailed among them, that no one must apply the word to any doctrines of religion without exposing himself to scorn and ridicule; but this will do no service to their cause, nor prejudice to our doctrine, in the opinion of those who enquire into the truth thereof, with that seriousness and impartiality, that the importance of the doctrine calls for.[[78]]
The question therefore in controversy is; whether any doctrines of religion may be deemed incomprehensible, that is, such as we can have no adequate ideas of, because of the disproportion between them and our finite minds? and whether the incommunicable perfections of God are not to be reckoned among these incomprehensible doctrines? if they are not, then it will be reasonable to demand that every thing relating to them be particularly accounted for, and reduced to the standard of a finite capacity; and if this cannot be done, but some things must be allowed to be incomprehensible in religion, then it will be farther enquired, Why should the doctrine of the Trinity be rejected, because we cannot account for every thing that relates to the personal glory of God, any more than we can for those things that respect his essential glory? or may not some things, that are matter of pure revelation, be supposed to exceed our capacities, and yet we be bound to believe them, as well as other things which appear to be true, and at the same time, incomprehensible, by the light of nature? But, that we may enter a little more particularly into this argument, we shall consider the most material objections that are brought against it, and what may be replied to them.
Object. 1. It is objected that we take up with the bare sound of words, without any manner of ideas affixed to them. And,
2. That it is unbecoming the divine wisdom and goodness to suppose that God should give a revelation, and demand our belief thereof, as necessary to salvation, when, at the same time, it is impossible for our understandings to yield an assent to it, since nothing that is unintelligible can be the object of faith.
3. That practical religion is designed to be promoted in the world hereby, and therefore the will of man must follow the dictates of the understanding, and not blindly embrace, and be conversant about we know not what, which is to act unbecoming our own character as intelligent creatures.
4. That the design of divine revelation is to improve our understandings, and render our ideas of things more clear, and not to entangle and perplex them.
Answ. 1. As to our using words without ideas, there is no Christian, that I know of, who thinks there is any religion in the sound of words, or that it is sufficient for us to take up with the word Trinity, or Persons in the Godhead, without determining, in some measure, what we understand thereby. We will therefore allow that faith supposes some ideas of the object, namely, that we have some knowledge of what we believe it to be: now our knowledge of things admits of various degrees; some of which we only know that they are what they are determined, or proved to be; if we proceed farther in our enquiries, and would know how every thing is to be accounted for, that may justly be affirmed concerning them, here our ideas are at a stand; yet this is not in the least inconsistent with the belief of what we conclude them to be. For the illustrating of which, let it be considered that we believe that God’s eternity is without succession, his immensity without extension; this we know and believe, because to assert the contrary would be to ascribe imperfection to him. In this respect, our faith extends as far as our ideas: but as for what exceeds them, we are bound to believe that there is something in God, which exceeds the reach of a finite mind, though we cannot comprehend, or fully describe it, as though it was not infinite. And to apply this to the doctrine of the Trinity; it is one thing, to say that the Father, Son, and Spirit, have the perfections of the divine nature attributed to them in scripture, as well as distinct personal characters and properties, and because the Godhead is but one, that therefore these three are one, which we firmly believe, inasmuch as it is so clearly revealed in scripture; and another thing, to say, that we can fully describe all the properties of their divine personality, which, though we cannot do, yet we believe that they subsist in an incomprehensible manner. And while we compare them with finite persons, as we do the perfections of God with those of the creature, we separate from the one, as well as the other, whatever savours of imperfection.
2. As to the unintelligibleness of divine revelation, and its being unbecoming the wisdom and goodness of God to communicate those doctrines that are so, it may be replied, that we must distinguish between the rendering a doctrine, which would be otherwise easy to be understood, unintelligible, by the perplexity or difficulty of the style in which it is delivered, and the imparting a doctrine which none can comprehend; the former of these cannot be charged on any part of scripture, and it is only a revelation, which is liable to such a charge, that could be reckoned inconsistent with the wisdom and goodness of God. As to the latter, the design of revelation is not to make us comprehend what is in itself incomprehensible: as, for instance, God did not design, when he made known his perfections in his word, to give us such a perfect discovery of himself, that we might be said hereby to find him out unto perfection, or that we should know as much of his glory as is possible to be known, or as much as he knows of it himself; for that is to suppose the understanding of man infinitely more perfect than it is. Whatever is received, is received in proportion to the measure of that which contains it; the whole ocean can communicate no more water than what will fill the vessel, that is to contain it. Thus the infinite perfections of God being such as cannot be contained in a finite mind, we are not to suppose that our comprehending them was the design of divine revelation; God, indeed, designed hereby that we should apprehend some things of himself, namely, as much as should be subservient to the great ends of religion; but not so much as might be inconsistent with our humble confession, that we are but of yesterday, and know, comparatively, nothing, Job viii. 9.