4. Another thing that may be premised, before we enter on the proof of the doctrine of the Trinity, is, that it is not contrary to reason, though it be above it; neither are our reasoning powers, when directed by scripture-revelation, altogether useless, in order to our attaining such a degree of the knowledge thereof, as is necessary, and ought to be endeavoured after. When a doctrine may be said to be above reason, has been already considered, as well as that the doctrine of the Trinity is so; and now we are obliged to obviate an objection, which is the most popular one of any that is brought against it, namely, that it is an absurd and irrational doctrine; and that they who maintain it must first lay aside their reason, before they can be induced to believe it, for it is as much as to say that three are equal to one; which is contrary to the common sense of all mankind, or else, that we maintain a plurality of gods, which is contrary to the very first principles of the light of nature. And here we are reflected on, as though we demanded that our antagonists should lay aside their reason, before we argue with them, and then it is easy to determine on which side the argument will turn; therefore, to make way for what might be said in defence of the doctrine of the Trinity, we shall, under this head, consider,
(1.) When a doctrine may be said to be contrary to reason.
(2.) Shew that the doctrine of the Trinity is not so.
(3.) What is the use of reason, in establishing it, or any other doctrines, which are the subject of pure revelation.
(1.) When we may conclude, that a doctrine is contrary to reason. This it may be said to be, when it is contrary to the methods of reasoning made use of by particular persons, which are not always just, and therefore it does not follow, from hence, that it is false or absurd, because our reasoning about it is so, but rather the contrary; so that when they, on the other side of the question, tell us, with an air of boasting, that if the doctrine we are maintaining could have been accounted for, how comes it to pass that so many men of sense and learning, as are to be found among the Anti-trinitarians, have not been able to do it? But this is nothing to our present argument; therefore we suppose that a doctrine is contrary to reason, when it contradicts some of the first principles, which the mind of man cannot but yield its assent to, as soon as ever it takes in the sense of the words which contain them, without demanding any proof thereof; as that the whole is greater than the part; and that a thing can be, and not be, at the same time; or that two is more than one, &c. or when we can prove a thing to be true to a demonstration, and yet suppose that a contradictory proposition, in which the words are taken in the same sense, may be equally true.[[80]]
(2.) That the doctrine of the Trinity is not contrary to reason. This appears, inasmuch as we do not say that the three Persons in the Godhead are one Person, or that the one divine Being is three divine Beings.
Object. But it is objected, that it is contrary to reason, which establishes and proves the unity of the Godhead, to say that the divine nature may be predicated of more than one, inasmuch as that infers a plurality of Gods, and every distinct Person must be concluded to be a distinct God; therefore the Trinitarian doctrine is down-right Tritheism, and consequently contrary to reason; and here those words of the Athanasian Creed are produced, as an instance hereof, namely, that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, yet there are not three Gods, but one God; so, that the Father is Eternal, the Son is Eternal, and the Holy Ghost Eternal, yet there are not three Eternals, but one Eternal; and the Father Almighty, the Son Almighty, and the Holy Ghost Almighty, yet are there not three Almighties, but one Almighty. This they suppose, though without ground, to be a plain contradiction.
Answ. But to this it may be replied, that when we say the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are God, we do not say they are distinct Gods, for the distinction between them respects their personality, not their deity: and when we assert that they are all Eternal, or Almighty, we do not suppose that their duration, or power, are distinct; and the same may be said of all other divine perfections that are attributed to them, the perfections are the same in all of them, though the persons are distinct. So that the charge of Tritheism lies in a narrow compass: they say that there is one divine Being, so do we; and to this they add, that this divine Being is a divine person, since existence and personality are the same; therefore, if there are more divine Persons, there must be more Gods; this consequence they maintain, but we deny. But how do they prove it? The proof amounts to no more than this; that there is no instance in finite things, when we speak of angels or men, to whom alone personality can be applied, of any distinct persons, but at the same time their beings are distinct; therefore it must be so with respect to the divine persons. This we are bound to deny, since our ideas of personality and existence are not the same; therefore, how inseparable soever they may be in what respects creatures, we may have distinct ideas of them, when we speak of the divine being and personality of the Father, Son, and Spirit. Here it will, doubtless, be demanded, that we determine wherein the difference consists; or, in particular, since every distinct finite person is a distinct being, what there is in the divine personality, that should exclude the Father, Son, and Spirit, from being distinct beings, because distinct persons; so that when we conclude that there is a small or faint resemblance between divine and human personality, we must be able to comprehend, and fully to describe, that infinite disproportion that is between them, or else must be charged with using words without any manner of ideas annexed to them, and so our cause must fall to the ground. If, indeed, the divine personality were finite, like that of the creature, then it might be required that a finite mind should account for it: but since it is not so, but incomprehensible, we are bound to believe what we cannot comprehend.
But have we no ideas at all of the distinct personality of the Father, Son, and Spirit? To this we may answer; that we have finite ideas thereof, and more than these we have not of any of the divine perfections. We are taught, by scripture, to say that they are distinct persons; and we know what those personal characters, or properties, from whence our ideas take their rise, signify, when applied to men; but, at the same time, abstract, in our thoughts, every thing from them that argues imperfection; or, in short, our conceptions hereof proceed in the same way, as when we think of any of the perfections of the divine nature: these, as well as the divine personality, are equally incomprehensible; yet, while we say they are infinitely more than can be in any creature, we, notwithstanding, retain such ideas of them, as tend to answer those ends of religion, which suppose that we apprehend something of them that is conducive hereunto. We are now to consider,
(3.) The use of reason in proving or defending the doctrine of the Trinity, or any other doctrines of pure revelation. They could not, indeed, have been at first discovered by reason, nor can every thing that is revealed be comprehended by it, yet our reason is not to be laid aside as useless; therefore some call it a servant to faith. Thus revelation discovers what doctrines we are to believe, demands our assent to them, and reason offers a convincing proof that we are under an indispensable obligation to give it: it proves the doctrine to be true, and such as is worthy of God, as it is derived from him, the fountain of truth and wisdom; and this office of reason, or the subserviency thereof to our faith, is certainly necessary, since what is false cannot be the object of faith in general; and nothing unworthy of God can be the matter of divine revelation, nor consequently the object of a divine faith.