And inasmuch, as he never began to determine, as he never began to exist, or as he never was without purposes of what he would do; therefore it is evident, that he before ordained, from eternity, whatever should come to pass, either in time, or to eternity.
It farther appears, that God fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass, otherwise he did not determine to create all things before he gave being to them; and then it could not be said, O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all, Psal. civ. 24. There are, indeed, many admirable discoveries of wisdom, as well as power, in the effects produced; but to suppose that all this was done without fore-thought, or that there was no eternal purpose relating thereunto, would be such a reflection on the glory of this perfection, as is inconsistent with the idea of a God. Moreover, if herein he designed his own glory, as he certainly did, since every intelligent being designs some end, and the highest and most excellent end must be designed by a God of infinite wisdom; and, if he did all this for his own glory, then it must be allowed, that it was the result of an eternal purpose: all which, I am persuaded, will not be denied by those on the other side of the question, who defend their own cause with any measure of judgment.
To this we may farther add, that to deny that God fore-ordained whatever comes to pass, is, in effect, to deny a providence, or, at least, that God governs the world in such a way, as that what he does therein was pre-concerted. And herein we expect to meet with no opposition from any but the Deists, or those who deny a God; and if it be taken for granted that there is a providence, or that God is the Governor of the world, we cannot but conclude from hence, that all the displays of his glory therein, are the result of his eternal purpose. This is also agreeable to what is said concerning him, that he doth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth, Dan. iv. 35. the meaning of which is not barely this, (which is a great truth) that he acts without controul, inasmuch as his power is infinite: But that all he does is pursuant to his will; and, indeed, it cannot be otherwise, if we suppose that the divine power, and will, are so inseparably connected, that he cannot be said to produce any thing, but by the word of his power; or when he willeth that any thing should come to pass, it is not in an efficacious will, as ours is, for want of power, to effect what we have done. Therefore for God to will the present existence of things, is to effect them, which seems to be the reason of that mode of speaking, which was used when he produced all things at first; he said, let them exist in that form, or perfection, which he had before designed to give them, and the effect immediately followed, Gen. i. 3, 6, 9, &c.
Hitherto, I presume, our argument will not be much contested; for the main thing in controversy is what relates to the divine determination respecting intelligent creatures, which will be considered under a following head: What I have hitherto attempted to prove is, the proposition in general, namely, that whatever God brings to pass, or is the effect of power, is the result of his determinate purpose. And herein, I think, I have carefully distinguished between God’s will to effect, and his will to permit; but that will be farther explained, when we speak of the decrees of God, with a particular application to angels and men, under the head of election.
Having endeavoured to prove that God hath fore-ordained whatever comes to pass, we shall lay down the following propositions relating to his end and design in all his purposes, together with the nature of things, as coming to pass pursuant thereunto, and the method in which we are to conceive of the decree, when compared with the execution thereof.
1. God cannot design any thing, in his eternal purpose, as the highest end, but his own glory, which is here assigned, as the end of his decrees. As this is the principal motive, or reason, inducing him to produce whatever comes to pass; so it must be considered as the end of his purpose relating thereunto: This is very evident; for since the divine glory is the most excellent of all things, he cannot, as an infinitely wise God, design any thing short of it, as the great motive or inducement for him to act; therefore, whatever lower ends are designed by him, they are all resolved into this as the principal, to wit, the advancement of his divine perfections. Though God designs his own glory as the highest end, yet he has purposed not only that this should be brought about, by means conducive thereunto, but that there should be a subserviency of one thing to another, all which are the objects of his decree, as well as the highest end, namely, his own glory. As, for instance, he determines that the life and health of man shall be maintained by the use of proper means and medicine, or that grace shall be wrought instrumentally by those means, which he has ordained, in order thereunto: thus his purpose respects the end and means, together with the connexion that there is between them.
2. According to the natural order of things, the divine purpose is antecedent to the execution thereof. Therefore it seems very absurd to distinguish the decree of God, as some do, into antecedent and consequent, one going before the use of means, the other following, of which more hereafter: It is certain, that every intelligent being first determines to act, and then executes his determinations; so that nothing can be more absurd, than to say, that a person determines to do a thing which is already done. Therefore we conclude, that God first decreed what shall come to pass, and then brings it to pass: Accordingly he first determined to create the world, and then created it; he first determined to bestow the means of grace on men, and to render them effectual to the salvation of all who shall be saved, and then he does this accordingly; so, with respect to his judicial actings, he first determined by a permissive decree, not to prevent the commission of sin, though infinitely opposite to his holiness, and then, knowing the consequence of this permissive decree, or that men, through the mutability or corruption of their nature, would rebel against him, he determined to punish sin after it should be committed. Thus the decree of God is, in all respects, antecedent to the execution of it; or his eternal providence, as his decrees are sometimes called, is antecedent to, and the ground and reason of, his actual providence.
3. Though the purpose of God be before the execution thereof, yet the execution of it is first known by us; and so it is by this that we are to judge of his decree and purpose, which is altogether secret, with respect to us, till he reveals it; therefore we first observe the discoveries thereof, as contained in his word, or made visible in his actual providence, and from thence we infer his eternal purpose relating thereunto. Every thing that is first in the order of nature, is not first with respect to the order of our knowing it: thus the cause is before the effect, but the effect is often known before the cause; the sun is, in the order of nature, before the enlightening the world by it; but we first see the light, and then we know there is a sun, which is the fountain thereof: or, to illustrate it by another similitude, which comes nearer the matter before us; A legislator determines first to make a law, which determination is antecedent to the making, and that to the promulgation of it, whereby his subjects come to the knowledge thereof, and act in conformity thereunto; but, according to our method of judging concerning it, we must first know that there is such a law, and from thence we conclude, that there was a purpose relating to it, in him that gave it; Thus we conclude, that though the decree of God be the ground and reason of the execution thereof, yet we know that there was such a decree by its execution, or, at least, by some other way designed to discover this to us.
These things being duly considered, may obviate an objection, which is no other than a misrepresentation of the doctrine we are maintaining, as though we asserted, that our conduct of life, and the judgment we are to pass concerning ourselves, relating to our hope of future blessedness, were to be principally, if not altogether regulated, by God’s secret purpose or decree; as though we were first to consider him as determining the event, that is, as having chosen or rejected us, and, from this supposition, to encourage ourselves to attend upon the means of grace; or otherwise that we should take occasion to neglect them; since it is a preposterous thing for a man, who considers himself as reprobated, to attend on any of those means, which are ordained to salvation.
What has been said under the foregoing heads, is sufficient to take away the force of this objection; but this will be more particularly considered, when we come to answer several objections against the doctrine of election: Therefore all I shall add at present is, that since our conduct and hope is to be governed by the appearances of things, and not by God’s secret purpose relating to the event thereof, we are to act as those who have not, nor can have, any knowlege of what is decreed, with relation thereunto, till it is evinced by the execution thereof; or, at least, those graces wrought in us, which are the objects of God’s purpose, as well as our future blessedness; and our right to one is to be judged of by the other.