But there are other instances, in which the event of things is not expressly revealed; as when God has only discovered to us what is the rule of our duty. Nevertheless, since it is natural for man, when any duty is commanded, to pass some judgment concerning the event thereof; and, inasmuch as we suppose the event not expressly revealed, it follows, that the judgment, which we pass concerning it, is only what appears to us, or what, according to our rule of judging, seems to be the probable event of things. In this case we are not infallibly assured concerning it; and when we pass a judgment relating thereunto, we may conclude that some consequences may attend our present duty, which, perhaps, will never come to pass. As if a general of an army gives forth a command to his soldiers, to march towards the enemy, they will readily conclude, that he designs, by this command, that they should enter on some action, which, had he expressly told them, he must either change his purpose, or else the event must certainly happen; but, inasmuch as he has not discovered this to them, all the judgment that they can form, at present, concerning it, is only such, as is founded on the appearance of things, and the event might probably afterwards shew, without any impeachment of his veracity or conduct herein, that his only design was to try whether his soldiers would obey the word of command, or not. Or if a king should order a number of malefactors to the place of execution, without discovering the event thereof, the apparent event is their immediate death; but if, pursuant to his secret purpose, he resolved, there to give forth a pardon to them, it cannot be supposed that he changed his purpose; but the event makes it appear, that his purpose was not then known; whatever the apparent event might be, his real design was to humble them for their crimes, and afterwards to pardon them.
It is only in such-like instances as these, that we apply this distinction to the doctrine that we are maintaining; and therefore it must be a very great stretch, of malicious insinuation, for any one to suppose, that hereby we charge God with insincerity in those declarations of his revealed will, by which we pass a probable judgment concerning the event of things. But to apply this to particular instances. God commanded Abraham to offer up his son Isaac, Gen. xxii. 2. whereas it is certain, unless we suppose that he altered his purpose, that he intended, not that he should lay his hand upon him, but, when Isaac was upon the altar, to forbid him to do it. Here was a great and a difficult duty, which Abraham was to perform pursuant to God’s revealed will, which was the rule of his obedience; had Abraham known, before this, that God designed to hold his hand, and prevent him from striking the fatal blow, it had been no trial of his faith; for it would have been no difficult matter for him to have done every thing else. The holy patriarch knew well enough that God could prevent him from doing it; but this he had no ground to conclude, because he had no divine intimation concerning it; therefore that which appeared to him to be the event, was the loss of his son, and he reconciled this with the truth of the promise before given him, that in Isaac his seed should be called, by supposing that God, at some time or other, would raise him from the dead, as the apostle observes, Heb. xi. 19. therefore that which Abraham concluded as judging, not by an express revelation, but by the voice of providence, was, that Isaac must be slain by his hand: But this was contrary to the real event, as is evident, from the account thereof in scripture; and, consequently since the real event was agreeable to the divine determination, as all events are, it follows, that there is a difference between the will of God, determining the event of things, which shall certainly come to pass accordingly; and the revelation of his will, relating to what is the creatures present duty, which may, at the same time, appear to them, when judging only by the command, which is the rule of duty, and some circumstances that attend it, to be contrary to what will afterwards appear to have been the real design of God therein. God’s real design was to try Abraham’s faith, and to prevent him from slaying his son, when he had given a proof of his readiness to obey him; but this remained, at first, a secret to Abraham, and the apparent design was, that he should slay him. Therefore there is a foundation for this distinction, as thus explained, concerning the secret and revealed will of God; the former belongs not to us, nor are we to take our measures from it, as being unknown: and, when the latter appears contrary to it, we must distinguish between two things, that are contrary in the same, and different respects; or between the judgment which we pass concerning events, which are apparent to us, and, at most, are only probable and conjectural, as we judge of the consequence of a duty commanded; and those events, which, though they are infallibly certain, yet are not revealed, nor can be known, till they come to pass. In this sense we understand the distinction between God’s secret and revealed will, when they seem to oppose each other; which it was necessary for us thus to explain, inasmuch as we shall frequently have occasion to mention, and apply it, when we account for the difference that there seems to be, between the purpose of God, relating to the event of things, and our present views thereof, whereby we may understand and account for the difficulties contained in several scriptures, which I would have mentioned in this place, for the farther illustration hereof, had it been necessary. But this is sufficient to explain and vindicate it from the prejudices entertained against it, by those who are disposed to misrepresent what is said in defence of this doctrine.
From what has been said, concerning God’s secret and revealed will, we may infer,
1st, That it is a great boldness, and unwarrantable instance of presumption, for any one to enter into, or judge of God’s secret purpose, so as peremptorily to determine, beyond the present appearance of things, that this or that shall certainly come to pass, till he makes them known; for secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but those things which are revealed belong unto us, and to our children forever, Deut. xxiv. 29. Therefore no one ought to determine that he is elected to salvation, before the work of grace is wrought, and, some way or other, made visible to him; or, on the other hand, to determine that he is rejected or reprobated, when he has no other ground to go upon, but uncertain conjecture, which would be a means to drive him to despair: that some are, indeed, elected, and others rejected, is no secret because God has revealed this in his word; so that we may assert it as a proposition, undoubtedly true, when we do not apply it to particular persons; and therefore this doctrine has not that pernicious tendency, which many pretend that it has.
2dly, The first act of saving faith does not consist in our believing that we are elected; neither is it the duty of unregenerate persons, as such to apply this privilege to themselves any more than to conclude themselves rejected: But our business, is, so long as the purpose of God remains a secret to us, to attend on the means of grace, hoping and waiting for the display of divine power, in effectually calling us; and afterwards for the Spirit’s testimony, or seal, to be set to it, whereby he discovers his own work; and then it may, in some measure, be reckoned a branch of his revealed will and will afford us matter of thanksgiving and praise to him, and a foundation of peace and comfort in our own souls. But this may be farther insisted on, when we come to consider the improvement we ought to make of this doctrine. We proceed to consider the next property of election.
4. It is free, and sovereign, or absolute, and unconditional; for that which would be a reflection on the divine perfections, if applied to God’s method of working, is, by no means, to be said concerning his purpose to work, or, (which is the same) his decree of election; therefore if there are no obligations laid on him by his creatures, to display or perform any of his works of grace, but they are all free and sovereign, then it follows, that the fore-sight of any thing that shall be done by them, in time, could not be the motive, or reason of his purpose, or decree, to save them, or of his choosing them to salvation.
This may be farther argued, from the independence of the divine nature: if his nature and perfections are independent, his will must be so. But more particularly,
(1.) The displays of God’s grace, in time, are expressly resolved into his sovereign pleasure, in scripture, in Rom. ix. 15. He saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. And there are many other scriptures, which might be referred to, where all merit, or motives, taken from the creature, which might be supposed to induce him to bestow spiritual and saving blessings, are entirely excluded, and the whole is resolved in to the glory of his own name, and in particular, of those perfections which he designed herein to illustrate. This is applied, even to the common blessings of providence; Nevertheless, he saved them for his name’s sake, that he might make his mighty power to be known, Psal. cvi. 8. and it is also applied to sparing mercy, or the exercise of God’s patience, For my name’s sake will I defer mine anger, and for my praise will I refrain for thee, that I cut thee not off, Isa. xlviii. 9. and to pardoning mercy, For thy name’s sake, O Lord, pardon mine iniquity, for it is great, Psal. xxv. 11. And when he is represented as doing great things for his people, he puts them in mind, at the same time, of their own vileness and unworthiness, that the freeness and sovereignty of his grace, to them, might be more conspicuous: Thus, when he tells them how he delivered Israel out of Egypt, he puts them in mind of their idolatry in that land; therefore no motive could be taken, from their behaviour towards him, which could induce him to do this for them; as it is said, But they rebelled against me, and would not hearken unto me; they did not every man cast away the abominations of their eyes, neither did they forsake the idols of Egypt; then I said, I will pour out my fury upon them, to accomplish my anger against them, in the midst of the land of Egypt. But I wrought, for my name’s sake, that it should not be polluted before the heathen, among whom they were, in whose sight I made myself known unto them, in bringing them forth out of the land of Egypt, Ezek. xx. 8, 9.
(2.) If the grace of God, and consequently his purpose relating thereunto, were not absolute, free, and sovereign, then all the glory thereof could not be attributed to him, neither would boasting be excluded; but as the creature might be said to be a worker together with God, so he would lay claim to a share, if not to the greatest part of the honour, that will redound to him from it; which is directly contrary to the divine perfections, and the great design of the gospel. This will farther appear, if we consider,
1st. That a conditional purpose to bestow a benefit, cannot take effect till the condition be performed, and accordingly it is said to depend on it. This is obvious, from the known idea affixed to the word condition, and the common signification thereof; it follows therefore,