5. God’s purpose concerning election is unchangeable; this is the result of his being infinitely perfect. Mutability is an imperfection that belongs only to creatures: As it would be an instance of imperfection, if there were the least change in God’s understanding, so as to know more or less than he did from all eternity; the same must be said with respect to his will, which cannot admit of any new determinations. There are, indeed, many changes in the external dispensations of his providence, which are the result of his will, as well as the effects of his power; yet there is not the least appearance of mutability in his purpose. We have before considered, in speaking concerning the immutability of the divine nature[[207]], that whatever may be a reason obliging men to alter their purposes, it cannot, in the least, take place, so that God hereby should be obliged to alter his: No unforeseen occurrence can render it expedient for him to change his mind, nor can any superior power oblige him to do it; nor can any defect of power, to bring about what he had designed, induce him to alter his purpose.
If it be objected to this, that the obstinacy of man’s will may do it; that is to suppose his will exempted from the governing influence of divine providence, and the contrary force, that offers resistance, superior to it, which cannot be supposed, without detracting from the glory of the divine perfections. It would be a very unworthy thought for any one to conclude that God is one day of one mind, and another day forced to be of the contrary; how far this is a necessary consequence from that scheme of doctrine that we are opposing, let any one judge. It will be very hard to clear it of this entanglement, which they are obliged to do, or else all the absurdities that they fasten on the doctrine of election, which are far from being unanswerable, will not be sufficient to justify their prejudices against it.
They who are on the other side of the question, are sensible that they have one difficulty to conflict with, namely, the inconsistency of God’s infallible knowledge of future events, with a mutability of will relating thereunto; or how the independency of the divine fore-knowledge is consistent with the dependence and mutability of his will. To fence against this, some have ventured to deny the divine prescience; but that is to split against one rock, whilst endeavouring to avoid another. Therefore others distinguish concerning the objects of the divine prescience, and consider them, either as they are necessary or contingent, and accordingly suppose that God has a certain foreknowledge of the former; but his knowledge of the latter, (from the nature of the things known) is uncertain, and consequently the determination of his will is not unalterable. But this is to set bounds to the fore-knowledge of God, with respect to its object, and, indeed, to exclude the free actions of the creature from being the objects thereof, which is a limiting and lessening of this perfection, and is directly contrary to the idea of omniscience; and therefore we must insist on their proving this to be consistent with the infinite perfection of God, which they will find it very difficult to do; and to suppose, on the other hand, that any thing is the object of God’s certain fore-knowledge, about which his will is no way conversant, or only so, in such a way, as that it is subject to change, according to the mutability of things, is altogether as indefensible, and equally subversive of the independency, wisdom, and sovereignty thereof.
Object. The most material objection against this doctrine, is take from some scriptures, which seem to represent God as repenting, and therein, as it is supposed, changing his purpose. Thus he is sometimes said to repent, that he had bestowed some blessings upon men, when he perceives how they have been abused by them, and accordingly he purposes to bring evil on them; as we read, in Gen. vi. 6, 7. It repented the Lord that he had made man, and it grieved him at his heart; and the Lord said, I will destroy man, whom I have created; and, at other times he is said to repent of the evil that he designed to bring upon them, and alter his purpose in their favour; thus it is said, in Deut. xxxii. 36. The Lord shall judge his people, and repent himself for his servants; when he seeth that their power is gone, and there is none shut up, or left; and in Joel ii. 13. Rend your hearts, and not your garments, and turn unto the Lord your God; for he is gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth him of the evil; and in Psal. xc. 13, Return, O Lord, how long? and let it repent thee concerning thy servants; and in Jer. xviii. 8. If that nation, against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I have thought to do unto them. And we have a very remarkable instance of this, in God’s sparing Nineveh, on their repentance, after he had threatened, by the prophet Jonah, that within forty days they should be destroyed.
Answ. It is true, there are many scriptures, in which repentance is ascribed to God, which, if we consider nothing else but the grammatical sense of the words, seem to favour the objection; but we are bound to conclude, that such a sense of repentance, as that on which it is founded, is inconsistent with the divine perfections, and therefore those scriptures, referred to therein, cannot imply a change in God’s purpose. And, indeed, there are other scriptures, which assert what is directly contrary thereunto; as when it is said, in Numb, xxiii. 19. God is not a man, that he should lye, neither the son of man, that he should repent; hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good? And elsewhere, in 1 Sam. xv. 29. it is said, The strength of Israel will not lye, nor repent; for he is not a man that he should repent.
But we must have recourse to some methods to reconcile this seeming contradiction, and so consider the sense thereof, in different respects, as applicable to them both; in some scriptures, God is said to repent; in others, it is said that he cannot repent. That these may not appear inconsistent with one another, nor either of them infer any imperfection in God, let it be considered, that God is sometimes represented, in scripture, in condescension to our common mode of speaking, as though he had human passions, as in others, he is described, as though he had a body, or bodily parts: But such expressions are always to be taken in a metaphorical sense, without the least supposition, that he is subject to any such imperfections; and particularly we must not conclude, that repentance is ever ascribed to God in the same sense as it is to men, viz. as implying a change in his purpose, occasioned by an unforeseen occurrence, which is the sense contained in the objection. Such a repentance, as this, is a passion peculiarly belonging to the creature, and therefore in this sense we must understand those words; God is not a man, that he should lye, nor the son of man, that he should repent; accordingly, he is said to repent, not by changing his purpose, but by changing his work. Thus when it is said, that he repented that he had made man, nothing is meant by it, but that he determined to destroy him, as he did afterwards by the flood. And this was no new determination arising from any thing in the creature, which God did not foresee; he knew before-hand that all flesh would corrupt their way, and therefore his determination to punish them for it, was not a new resolve of the divine will, after the sin was committed; but God determined things in their respective order, first to permit sin, and then knowing what would be the consequence thereof, namely, that they would rebel against him, he determined to punish it, or to destroy the old world, which is, in effect, the same, as though he had repented that he made it. He cannot be said to repent as we do, by wishing that he had not done that which he is said to repent of, but by denying us the advantage, which we might have otherwise expected from it. In this sense we are to understand all those scriptures that speak of God, as repenting of the good that he had bestowed on man.
And, on the other hand, when he is said to repent of the evil which he threatened to bring on men, as in the case of Nineveh, this does not argue any change in his purpose; for he determined that Nineveh should be destroyed, provided they did not repent, and it was not uncertain to him whether they would repent or no; for, at the same time, he determined to give them repentance, as appears by the event, and so not to inflict the judgment threatened; and therefore when Jonah was sent to make a public proclamation to the people, that in forty days they should be destroyed, it is plain that they understood the threatening in this sense, that they had no ground to expect any thing else, except they repented, which accordingly they did, and so were spared, without having any reason to conclude that God changed his purpose relating thereunto.
If it be objected hereunto, that this is nothing less than to establish a conditional purpose in God, and so overthrows the argument that we are maintaining; the reply that may be made to it, is, that we distinguish between a conditional purpose, in God’s secret will, and a conditional proposition, which was to be the subject of the prophet’s ministry: The prophet, it is plain, was not told, when he received his commission to go to Nineveh, that God would give them repentance, but only, that, without repentance, they should be destroyed; whereas God, as the event makes it appear, determined that they should repent, and therefore that they should not be destroyed; and, consequently, we must not suppose, that, when God sent him, he was undetermined, in his own purpose, whether to destroy them or not, or that there was any thing conditional in the divine mind, that rendered the event uncertain to God, though there was a condition contained in the subject-matter of the prophet’s message, which the Ninevites very well understood, namely, that they had no ground to expect deliverance without repentance, and therefore they repented, in hope of obtaining mercy, which they supposed would be connected with their repentance; and it is evident, that Jonah himself suspected that this might be the event, though God had not told him that it would be so, and therefore says, in chap. iv. 2. For I knew that thou art a gracious God, and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repentest thee of the evil.
6. The purpose of God, in choosing men to eternal life, renders their salvation necessary; so that nothing shall defeat, or disannul it. What God says concerning Israel’s deliverance from the Babylonish captivity, may be applied to all his other determinations, and particularly to what relates to the eternal salvation of his people; My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure; yea, I have spoken it, I will also bring it to pass; I have purposed it, I will also do it, Isa. xlvi. 10, 11. The purposes of God, indeed, are distinguished from his bringing them to pass; it is one thing to design to bring his people to glory, and another thing to bring them to it. It is not to be supposed that the decree of God has, in itself, a proper efficiency to produce the thing decreed:[[208]] for then there would be no difference between an eternal decree, and an eternal production of things; whereas the apostle plainly distinguishes between man’s being predestinated to glory, and brought to it, when he says, Those whom he predestinated, them he glorified, Rom. viii. 30.
The purpose of God, is, indeed, the internal moving cause, or the first ground and reason of the salvation of those who are elected to it; but his power is the more immediate cause of it, so that his purpose is the reason of his exerting this power, and both concurring to the salvation of men, render it certain and necessary. Therefore some distinguish, for the explaining of this, between the determining and powerful will of God; the latter of which, is sometimes called the word of his power, and renders the former effectual; this it must certainly do, otherwise God would be said to will the existence of things, that shall never have a being. In this respect, the purpose of God renders things necessary, which are in themselves contingent, or arbitrary, and would otherwise never come to pass.[[209]]