3. To say, that God’s fixing the bounds of life, is inconsistent with our praying, that our lives may be prolonged, or that we may be delivered from sickness, or death, when we are apprehensive that we are drawing nigh to it, is no just consequence; for as we do not pray that God would alter his purpose, when we desire any blessing of him, but suppose this to be hid from us, and expect not to know it any otherwise than by the event; so a person, who prays to be delivered from sickness, or death, is not to address the divine Majesty, as one who presumptuously, and without ground, supposes that God has decreed that he shall immediately die, but as one who hopes, or who has no ground to conclude otherwise, but that he will make it appear, by answering his prayer, that he has determined to spare his life. For the secret purpose of God, relating to the event of things, is no more to be a rule of duty, inasmuch as it is secret, than if there had been no purpose relating thereunto; but yet it does not follow from hence, that this matter is not determined by him.
4. As to those scriptures, that seem to give countenance to this objection, they may, without the least absurdity, be understood consistently with other scriptures, which have been before produced, whereby it is proved, that God has fixed, or determined the bounds of life. As for those promises, which God has made of a long life, to those that love him, and keep his commandments, the meaning thereof is this, that he will certainly bestow this blessing, either in kind or value, on those whose conversation is such as is therein described; this none can deny, who rightly understand the meaning of that scripture, in which it is said, that godliness hath the promise of the life that now is, as well as of that which is to come, 1 Tim. iv. 8. But, so far as it affects the argument we are maintaining, we must consider, that that efficacious grace, whereby we are enabled to love God, and keep his commandments, is as much his gift, and consequently the result of his purpose, as the blessing connected with it; therefore if he has determined that we shall enjoy a long and happy life in this world, and to enable us to live a holy life therein; if both the end and the means are connected together, and are equally the objects of God’s purpose, then it cannot justly be inferred from hence, that the event, relating to the lengthening or shortening our lives, is not determined by him.
As for those scriptures that speak of the wicked’s dying before their time, or not living half their days, these are to be understood agreeably to that distinction before-mentioned, between men’s dying sooner, than they would have done according to the course of nature, or the concurrence of second causes thereunto, in which sense it is literally true, that many do not live out half their days; and their dying sooner than God had before determined. May not the sovereign Disposer of all things inflict a sudden and immediate death, as the punishment of sin, without giving us reason to conclude that this was not pre-concerted, if we may so express it, or determined beforehand?
As for that other scripture, referred to in the objection, in which Martha tells our Saviour, that if he had been with Lazarus, when sick, he had not died, she does not suppose Christ’s being there, would have frustrated the divine purpose, for then, he would, doubtless, have reproved her for it; whereas, in reality, he did not come to visit him, because he knew that God had purposed that he should die, and be afterwards raised from the dead; so that this does not argue that he has not fixed the bounds, or term of life.
Again, as for that argument, to support this objection, taken from the destruction of the world in the flood, or that of Sodom, by fire from heaven, that they might have prolonged their lives, had they repented, we do not deny but that this would have been the consequence thereof, but then their repentance would have been as much determined by God, as their deliverance from that untimely death, which befel them.
The last scripture mentioned, in which God, by the prophet Isaiah, tells Hezekiah, that he should die, and not live; notwithstanding which, fifteen years were added to his life, which is very frequently insisted on, by those who deny the unalterable decree of God, relating to life and death, as that which they apprehend to be an unanswerable argument to support it: to this it may be replied, that when God says, Set thine house in order, for thou shalt die, and not live, he gave Hezekiah to understand, that his disease was what we call mortal, namely, such as no skill of the physician, or natural virtue of medicine, could cure, and therefore that he must expect to die, unless God recovered him by a miracle; and Hezekiah, doubtless, took the warning in this sense, otherwise it would have been a preposterous thing for him to have prayed for life, as it would have been an affront to God, to have desired to have changed his purpose. But God, on the other hand, designed, by this warning, to put him upon importunate prayer for life; therefore when he says, I will add to thy days fifteen years, the meaning is only this, though thou mightest before have expected death, my design in giving thee that intimation, was, that thou shouldest pray for life, which might be given thee by a miracle, and now I will work a miracle, and fulfil, in this respect, what I before purposed in adding to thy life fifteen years.
Object. 3. It is farther objected, against the doctrine of election and reprobation, and particularly the immutability of God’s purpose therein, that it tends to establish a fatal necessity of things, and overthrow that known distinction that there is between things, as necessary, or contingent, as though nothing in the whole series of causes and effects could happen otherwise than it does, and God himself were confined to such a method of acting, that it was impossible for him to have done the contrary; which is nothing else but the Stoical doctrine of fate applied to, and defended by some scriptures, though it be contrary to others, which speak of the uncertainty of future events.
Thus God speaks of the Jews, turning from their iniquities, and his bestowing pardoning mercy, as the result thereof, as an uncertain event, when he says, in Jer. xxxvi. 3. It may be that the house of Judah will hear all the evil, which I purpose to do unto them, that they may return every man from his evil way, that I may forgive their iniquity and their sin. So when God gave the Jews a sign, immediately before the captivity, taken from the prophet Ezekiel’s personating one that was removing his stuff, or household-goods, as signifying, that the nation in general should soon remove to other habitations, when carried captive into Babylon, he adds, upon this occasion, It may be they will consider, though they be a rebellious house, Ezek. xii. 3. And the prophet Zephaniah exhorts the people to seek righteousness and meekness, and, as the consequence thereof, says, It may be ye shall be hid in the day of the Lord’s anger, Zeph. ii. 3. And the apostle speaks of the uncertainty of the divine dispensations of grace, when he advises Timothy, in meekness, to instruct those that oppose themselves, if God, peradventure, will give them repentance, to the acknowledging of the truth, 2 Tim. ii. 25. which is directly contrary to the unalterable necessity of events, depending upon the divine purpose, according to the doctrine of election.
Answ. 1. As to the former part of this objection, in which this doctrine is pretended to have taken its rise from, and to be agreeable to, that of the Stoics, concerning fate and destiny, it will not be much to our purpose to enquire what was the opinion of that sect of philosophers concerning it; and, indeed, it will be difficult to fix on a just sense thereof, in which they all agree. Some are of opinion, that many of them intended nothing else thereby, but the immutability of God’s purposes, but the dispensation of his providence, being a necessary execution thereof; and when he is said to be bound by the laws of fate, they mean, that he cannot act contrary to what himself has determined.[[234]] And, had it been universally explained by them in this sense, it would not have done them much service, who oppose the doctrine of election, to have compared it therewith; for it would only have proved the agreeableness of the doctrine of the immutability of God’s purpose, relating to all events, to the light of nature, as some of the heathen were thereby instructed in it. But since this does not appear to be the sense of all the Stoicks about the doctrine of fate, but some of them understood it in the same sense as it is represented in the objection, this we cannot but militate against, and assert the doctrine of election to be very remote from it.
Therefore we need only, in answer to this part of the objection, explain what we mean, when we maintain the necessity of events, as founded on the will of God. We are far from asserting that there is a necessary connexion between second causes, and their respective effects, in which some are produced arbitrarily, by the will of intelligent creatures; and when we call any thing a necessary cause, producing effects, according to its own nature, we suppose that this is agreeable to the order, or course of nature, which was fixed by God. All that we pretend to prove, is the dependence of things on the divine will, and the necessity of God’s purposes taking effect; so that that which is arbitrary or contingent, which might be, or not be, as depending on, or relating to second causes, is eventually necessary, as it is an accomplishment of the divine purpose. Therefore we always distinguish between things being contingent, with respect to us, and their being so, with respect to God; and, consequently, though it may be, or peradventure, may be applied to the apparent event of things, these words can never be applied to the fulfilling of the divine will; and this leads us to consider the latter part of the objection; therefore,