3. It cannot, in the least, be proved that this doctrine has any tendency to lead persons to licentiousness; nor is it inconsistent with our using the utmost endeavours to attain salvation. If it be said, that many vile persons take occasion, from hence, to give the reins to their corruption; that is not the natural, or necessary consequence thereof; since there is no truth but what may be abused. The apostle Paul did not think the doctrine of the grace of God, which he so strenuously maintained, was less true, Or glorious, because some drew this vile consequence from it, Let us continue in sin, that grace may abound, Rom. vi. 1.
And as for those means, which God has ordained to bring about the salvation of his people, we are obliged to attend upon them, though we know not, before-hand, what will certainly be the event thereof; and if through the blessing of God accompanying them, we are effectually called and sanctified, and thereby enabled to know our election, this will (agreeably to the experience of all true believers,) have a tendency to promote holiness.
Object. 6. It is farther objected, that more especially against the doctrine of reprobation, that it argues God to be the author of sin; and particularly in such instances as these, viz. with respect to the first entrance of sin into the world, and in God’s imputing the sin of our first parents to all their posterity, and afterwards suffering it to make such a progress as it has done ever since; and, most of all, when it is supposed that this is not only the result of the divine purpose, but that it also respects the blinding men’s minds, and hardening their hearts, and so rendering their final impenitency and perdition unavoidable.
Answ. To this it may be answered,
1. As to what concerns the first entrance of sin into the world, it cannot reasonably be denied, that the purpose of God was concerned about it, before it was committed, in the same sense as his actual providence was afterwards, namely, in permitting, though not effecting it; notwithstanding this was not the cause of the committing it, since a bare permission has no positive efficiency in order thereunto; the not hindering, or restraining a wicked action, does not render him the author of it. It is true, God knew how man would behave, and particularly, that he would mis-improve and forfeit that original righteousness, in which he was created, and that, by this means, he would contract that guilt, which was the consequence thereof, and thereby render himself liable to his just displeasure; to deny this, would be to deny that he foreknew that, from eternity, which he knew in time. And, so far as the actual providence of God was conversant about what was natural therein, so far his purpose determined that it should be; but neither does this argue him to be the author of sin. But this will be farther considered, when we speak concerning the actual providence of God under a following answer.[[235]]
2. As to that part of the objection, which respects the imputing the sin of our first parents to all their posterity, that is more frequently brought against this doctrine than any other; and it is generally represented in the most indefensible terms, without making any abatements as to the degree of punishment that was due to it; and, accordingly, they think that we can hardly have the front to affirm, that our arguments, in defence hereof, are agreeable to the divine perfections, as we pretend those others are, which have been brought in defence of this doctrine. But, I hope, we shall be able to maintain the doctrine of original sin, in consistency with the divine perfections, as well as scripture, in its proper place, to which we shall refer it.[[236]] Therefore all that I shall add, at present, is, that if the doctrine of original sin be so explained, as that it does not render God the author of sin, his purpose relating thereunto, which must be supposed, in all respects, to correspond with it, does not argue him to be the author of it.
3. As to the progress of sin in the world, and the proneness of all mankind to rebel against God; this, as before was observed, concerning sin in general, is the object of his permissive, but not his effective will; though there is this difference between God’s suffering sin to enter into the world at first, and his suffering the continuance, or increase of it therein, that, at first, he dealt with man as an innocent creature, and only left him to the mutability of his own will, having before given him a power to retain his integrity. But the fallen creature is become weak, and unable to do any thing that is good in all its circumstances, and afterwards is more and more inclined to sin, by contracting vicious habits, and persisting therein. Now, though God’s leaving man to himself at first, when there was no forfeiture made of his preventing grace, must be reckoned an act of mere sovereignty, his leaving sinners to themselves may be reckoned an act of justice, as a punishment of sin before committed, and neither of these argue him to be the author of it; neither does the purpose of God, relating thereunto, give the least occasion for such an inference.
Again, we must distinguish between the occasion and the cause of sin. God’s providential dispensations, though unexceptionably holy and righteous, are often-times the occasion thereof: thus his afflictive hand sometimes occasions the corruptions of men to break forth, in repining at, and quarrelling with his providence; and his giving outward blessings to one, which he withholds from another, gives occasion, to some, to complain of the injustice of his dealings with them; and the strictness, and holiness of his law, and gives occasion, to corrupt nature to discover itself in the blackest colours; the apostle plainly evinces this truth, when he says, Sin taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence, Rom. vii. 8. and, indeed, there is nothing in the whole compass of providence, or in the methods of the divine government therein, but what may be, and often is, an occasion of sin, in wicked men. But certainly it is not the cause of it; even as the clemency of a prince may occasion a rebellion among his subjects; but it is the vile ingratitude, and wickedness of their nature, that is the spring and cause thereof; so the providence, and consequently the purpose of God, which is executed thereby, may be the occasion of sin, and yet the charge brought in this objection, as though God hereby was argued to be the author of sin, is altogether groundless.
4. As to what is farther objected, relating to the purpose of God, to blind the minds, and harden the hearts of men, and that final impenitency, which is the consequence thereof, God forbid that we should assert that this is a positive act in him; and, so far as it contains nothing else but his determining to deny that grace, which would have had the contrary effect, or his providence relating thereunto, this does not give any countenance to the objection, or weaken the force of the arguments that we have before laid down, which is very consistent therewith.
Object. 7. There is another objection, which is generally laid down in so moving a way, that, whether the argument be just or no, the style is adapted to affect the minds of men with prejudice against this doctrine, and that is taken from the inconsistency thereof with God’s judicial proceedings against the wicked in the day of judgment, and that it will afford the sinner a plea, in which he may say to this effect: Lord, I sinned by a fatal necessity; it was impossible for me to avoid that which thou art now offended with me for; it was what thou didst decree should come to pass. I have been told, that thy decrees are unalterable, and that it is as impossible to change the course of nature, or to remove the mountains, which thou hast fixed with thy hand, as to alter thy purpose; wilt thou then condemn one, who sinned and fell pursuant to thy will? Dost thou will that men should sin and perish, and then lay the blame at their door, as though they were culpable for doing what thou hast determined should be done?