Divine communicative goodness has been termed benevolence when in intention, beneficence when carried into effect. This is nearly the same as moral rectitude, because the government of the Universe must, that it may produce the good of the whole, be administered in righteousness. The correct administration of justice in rewarding every good, if there be merit in a creature, and punishing every evil is no less an effect of benevolence, than the conferring of benefits, which are purely gratuitous. In like manner the punishment of offenders in civil society has for its object general utility, whether we imagine the power which judges and inflicts, to spring from the social compact, or to have been ordained of God.
The cutting off of flagrant offenders, as by the deluge, the destruction of Sodom, &c. has been obviously designed to prevent the spreading contagion of sin. But there is a time appointed, unto which all things are tending, and unto which men generally refer the wrongs they sustain, in which perfect justice shall be administered. Some attributes of Deity seem to be ground of terror, and others of love; but God is one; he is subject to no perturbation of mind; his wrath and indignation are but other terms for his steady and unchangeable goodness, bearing down the evil, which sinful creatures oppose to his purposes of general advantage. Those acts of justice which are accounted by the guilty to be unnecessary severity, are deemed, by glorified saints and angels, the effects of that goodness, which they make the subject of their Hallelujahs. Thus the highest proof of God’s goodness consisted in his not sparing his own Son, nor abating any thing from the demands of his law. After this all hopes that Divine goodness shall favour the finally impenitent must be utterly vain.
[63]. “Mark iii. 11, v. 7; Luke viii. 28; and Mat. viii. 29. These extraordinary personages in the New Testament, are not called devils, Διαβολοι, in the original; that word never occurring in the Christian scriptures, but in the singular number, and as applied to one Being alone. They are called dæmons, Δαιμονες or Δαιμονια. Yet they are plainly devils in fact; being called Unclean Spirits, though sometimes only Spirits (Mark ix. 20; and Luke x. 20;) and showing themselves to be devils, by their whole history. In Mat. xii. 24 and 26 particularly, the Pharisees say ‘our Saviour casts out devils, (dæmons) by Beelzebub the prince of the devils (dæmons);’ and our Saviour replies, that then ‘Satan casts out Satan.’ See also Luke x. 17-18; where the apostles rejoicing declare, ‘even the devils (dæmons) are subject unto us;’ and our Saviour says unto them, ‘I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven.’ So very false in itself, and directly contradicted by the very words of our Saviour, is that hypothesis of Dr. Campbell’s in his new translation of the Gospels; which asserts these possessions of the New Testament to be nowhere attributed to the devil, and which avers the dominion or authority of the devil to be nowhere ascribed to the dæmons! Beelzebub is expressly called the prince of the dæmons, the dæmons are expressly denominated Satan with him, and these are only inferior devils subordinate to the great one. And though the word dæmons (as Dr. Campbell urges) might critically be more exact in a translation; yet the word devils better accords, with the usages of our language and the course of our ideas. Exactness therefore has been properly sacrificed to utility.”
WHITAKER.
[64]. See Quest. xx.
[65]. See Quest. cv.
[66]. “As gravity is the common quality of all bodies, arising not from the nature and properties of matter, nor to be explained without the agency of a foreign cause, yet producing numberless uniform effects in the corporeal system, it is in all reason to be attributed to one contrivance, rather than the different designs of two or more partial independent causes. What a vast variety of appearances in nature depend on this one? The self-balanced earth hangs upon its centre; the mountains are set fast; there is a perpetual flux and reflux of the sea; vapours continually arise; the clouds are balanced till by their own weight they descend in rain; animals breathe and move; the heavenly bodies hold their stations, and go on in their constant course, by the force of gravity, after the ordinance of that wisdom which appointed them this law. Now when we see a multitude of effects proceeding from one Cause, effects so various in their kind and so important, a Cause simple and unvaried in all the diversity produced by it, can we avoid ascribing this to an unity of intelligence, if there be intelligence in it all? For could we suppose different independent beings, acting with different designs, and by distinct operations to have formed the several parts of the world, and the several species of creatures which are in it, what reason can be imagined why they should all be governed by, and all necessarily depend upon, one law? The Maker of the sun, or, if a partial cause of nature could be supposed to have an understanding large enough for it, the Contriver of the whole visible heavens, must, one would think, have finished his scheme independently on any other, without borrowing aid from the work of another God. In like manner the Gods of the seas and of the dry land, and the Creator of animals, would have completed their several systems, each by itself, not depending on any other for its order and preservation. Whereas, on the contrary, we see in fact they are none of them independent, but all held together by the common bond of gravity. The heavens and the earth continue in their situations at a proper distance from each other by the force of this law; the sea keeps within its channels; and animals live and move by it. All which lead us to acknowledge one directing Counsel in the whole frame. For what but an understanding which comprehends the whole extent of nature, reaching from the utmost circuit of heaven to the centre of the earth, could have fixed such a common law, so necessary to all its parts, that without it not one of them could subsist, nor the harmony of the whole be preserved? The strict cohesion of the parts which constitute particular bodies requires a peculiar cement, different from that of the gravitating force; and as it can never be explained by the nature and properties of matter itself, and is absolutely necessary to the forms and the uses of bodies in the several far distant regions of the world, it must in like manner be attributed to the contrivance of an understanding, and the agency of a power, which takes in the whole corporeal system, not to a partial cause, limited in its intelligence and operation.
“2dly, The beautiful order and harmony of the universe, since it must be acknowledged to be the work of understanding, has all the appearance which is necessary to satisfy any fair inquirer, of its being formed under the direction of one governing wisdom. Disconcerted counsels can never produce harmony. If a plurality of intelligent causes pursue each his separate design, disunion will continually cleave to their works; but when we see an intire piece made up of many parts, all corresponding to each other, and conspiring together so as to answer one common end, we naturally conclude unity of design. As a work of art is formed according to the preconceived idea of a designing artificer, without which it has not its necessary intireness and uniformity, the same may be observed in the works of nature. A tree is as much one as a house; an animal as complete a system in it self, (only much more curiously framed,) as a clock. If we carry our views farther into nature, and take in whole regions of the universe, with all their contents, the same characters of unity are still visible. The earth itself is not a confused mass, or a medley of incoherent and unrelated parts, but a well contrived fabric, fitted and plainly designed for use. If we consider what a multitude of living creatures are in it, of different kinds and degrees of perfection, each sort having proper apartments assigned them, where they dwell conveniently together, with suitable provision made for them, and instincts directing them to the use of it; if we consider the interests of the several kinds, not interfering in the main, but rather serviceable to each other, furnished with necessary defences against the inconveniences to which they are liable, either by the preventing care of nature, which without any thought of their own has provided for their safety, by the appointed advantages of their situation, or by an implanted wisdom directing them to find out the means of it; and if we consider the constant interposition of the same liberal intelligent nature, appearing by the daily new productions from the same fertile womb of the earth, whereby the returning wants of animals are relieved with fresh supplies, all the species of living things having the common benefit of the air, without which they could not subsist, and the light of the sun, which cannot at once illuminate the whole globe, being dispensed among them with so good œconomy, that they have every one what is sufficient to guide them in the exercise of their proper functions, that they may fulfil the purposes of their beings;—when we consider all this, can we doubt but the earth is disposed and governed by one intending Cause? If in a large house, wherein are many mansions, and a vast variety of inhabitants, there appears exact order, all from the highest to the lowest continually attending their proper business, and all lodged and constantly provided for suitably to their several conditions, we find ourselves obliged to acknowledge one wise œconomy. And if in a great city or commonwealth there be a perfectly regular administration, so that not only the whole society enjoys an undisturbed peace, but every member has the station assigned him which he is best qualified to fill; the unenvied chiefs constantly attend their more important cares, served by the busy inferiors, who have all a suitable accommodation, and food convenient for them, the very meanest ministering to the public utility and protected by the public care; if, I say, in such a community we must conclude there is a ruling Counsel, which if not naturally, yet is politically one, and, unless united, could not produce such harmony and order, much more have we reason to recognize one governing Intelligence in the earth, in which there are so many ranks of beings disposed of in the most convenient manner, having all their several provinces appointed to them, and their several kinds and degrees of enjoyment liberally provided for, without encroaching upon, but rather being mutually useful to each other, according to a settled and obvious subordination. What else can account for this but a sovereign Wisdom, a common provident nature, presiding over, and caring for the whole?
“But the earth, as great as it appears to us, complicated in its frame, and having such a variety in its constitution, sustaining and nourishing so many tribes of animals, yet is not an intire system by itself, but has a relation to, and dependence on, other parts of the universe, as well as the beings it contains have upon it. It owes its stability to the common law of gravitation; it derives its light and its heat from the sun, by which it is rendered fruitful and commodious to its inhabitants. In short, a bond of union runs through the whole circle of being, as far as human knowledge reaches; and we have reason to make the same judgment concerning the parts of the world which we do not know, and to conclude that they all together compose one great whole, which naturally leads us to acknowledge one supreme uniting Intelligence. To object against this the possibility of wild confusion reigning in worlds unknown is to feign, and not to argue; and to suppose disorder prevalent in an infinity of being which we are unacquainted with, which is the Atheistic hypothesis, is to take away all rational foundation for regularity any where, though we see it actually obtains every where, as far as our observation can reach. But confining our speculations on this subject within the compass of known existence, as we ought to do in a fair inquiry, the apparent order of the effects is a strong evidence of unity in the Cause. For if different independent causes produced, each, a part, why are there no footsteps of this in the whole extent of nature? Why does not so much as one piece appear, as the separate monument of its author’s power and wisdom? From divided counsels one would naturally expect interfering schemes; but, on the contrary, we see an universal harmony. Men indeed from a sense of their indigence, and by the direction of instincts, which must be attributed to the designing author of their constitution, join in societies; which, though composed of many, are governed by one counsel: but that is only an artificial union, a submission to the majority, or to those who have the supreme power delegated to them, rather than an agreement in design. But this cannot be the case of independent beings, self-existent, and each complete in itself, without relation to any other. And yet we see in nature a perfect harmony, from whence it is plain there must be an agreement at least in counsel and design, if we could suppose a plurality of independent causes. But whence comes this agreement? To say by chance, is atheistically, and very unreasonably, to attribute the most perfect of all effects, universal order, to no cause at all. If we say by design, it must be one comprehensive design forming the whole scheme of nature and providence, which directly brings us to what we are looking for, one sovereign commanding Intelligence in the universe, or one God. This was the argument by which some of the ancient philosophers proved that there is one only eternal and independent Principle, the Fountain of being and the Author of all things. Pythagoras called it a Monad; and Aristotle argued from the phænomena that all things are plainly co-ordered, to one, the whole world conspiring into agreeing harmony: Whereas, if there were many independent principles, the system of the world must needs have been incoherent and inconspiring; like an ill-agreeing drama, botched up of many impertinent intersertions. And he concludes that things are well administered, which they could not be under the government of many, alluding to the verse in Homer, Ουκ αγαθον Πολυκοιρανιη, εις Κοιρανος εστω.
“3dly, The condition and order of inferior, derived, and evidently dependent intelligent agents shew not only intelligence, but unity of intelligence, in the Cause of them. Every man, a single active conscious self, is the image of his Maker. There is in him one undivided animating principle, which in its perceptions and operations runs through the whole system of matter that it inhabits; it perceives for all the most distant parts of the body; it cares for all, and governs all, leading us, as a resemblance, to form an idea of the one great quickening Spirit, which presides over the whole frame of nature, the spring of motion and all operation in it, understanding and active in all the parts of the universe, not as its soul indeed, but as its Lord, by whose vital directing influence it is, though so vast a bulk, and consisting of so many parts, united into one regular fabric. Again, the general apparent likeness which there is among all the individuals of the human kind is a strong evidence of their being the children of one Father. I do not mean principally the similitude of the exterior form, (though even that, in reason, should be attributed to the direction of one intelligent Cause,) but that whereby we are especially God’s offspring, our intellectual capacities, which as far as we can judge are very nearly alike. A great difference there may be, no doubt there is, in the improvement of them; but the powers themselves, and all the original modes of perception, in the different individuals of mankind, seem to resemble each other, as much as any real distinct things in nature. Now from a multitude, or a constant series of similar effects which do not arise from necessity, we infer unity of design in the Cause. So great a number of rational beings as the whole human race, disposed of in the same manner, endued with like faculties and affections, having many, and those principal things in their condition, common, provided for out of the same fund, and made for the same purposes, may reasonably be supposed to belong to one family, to be derived from the same origin, and still under the same paternal care.