But still it is demanded, ‘in what way can the death of Christ, considered as a sacrifice of expiation, be conceived to operate to the remission of sins, unless by the appeasing a Being, who otherwise would not have forgiven us?’—To this the answer of the Christian is, ‘I know not, nor does it concern me to know in what manner the sacrifice of Christ is connected with the forgiveness of sins; it is enough, that this is declared by God to be the medium through which my salvation is effected. I pretend not to dive into the counsels of the Almighty. I submit to his wisdom: and I will not reject his grace, because his mode of vouchsafing it is not within my comprehension.’ But now let us try the doctrine of pure intercession by this same objection. It has been asked, how can the sufferings of one Being be conceived to have any connexion with the forgiveness of another. Let us likewise inquire, how the meritorious obedience of one Being, can be conceived to have any connexion with the pardon of the transgressions of another: or whether the prayers of a righteous Being in behalf of a wicked person, can be imagined to have more weight in obtaining forgiveness for the transgressor, than the same supplication, seconded by the offering up of life itself, to procure that forgiveness? The fact is, the want of discoverable connexion has nothing to do with either. Neither the sacrifice nor the intercession has, as far as we can comprehend, any efficacy whatever. All that we know, or can know of the one or of the other is, that it has been appointed as the means, by which God has determined to act with respect to man. So that to object to the one, because the mode of operation is unknown, is not only giving up the other, but the very notion of a Mediator; and if followed on, cannot fail to lead to pure deism, and perhaps may not stop even there.
Thus we have seen, to what the general objections against the doctrine of atonement amount. The charges of divine implacability, and of inefficacious means, we have found to bear with as little force against this, as against the doctrine which is attempted to be substituted in its room.
We come now to the objections which are drawn from the immediate language of scripture, in those passages in which the nature of our redemption is described. And first, it is asserted, that it is no where said in scripture, that God is reconciled to us by Christ’s death, but that we are every where said to be reconciled to God. Now in this objection, which clearly lays the whole stress upon our obedience, we discover the secret spring of this entire system, which is set up in opposition to the scheme of atonement: we see that reluctance to part with the proud feeling of merit, with which the principle of redemption by the sacrifice of Christ is openly at war: and consequently we see the essential difference there is between the two doctrines at present under consideration; and the necessity there exists for separating them by the clearest marks of distinction. But to return to the objection that has been made, it very fortunately happens, that we have the meaning of the words in their scripture use, defined by no less an authority than that of our Saviour himself—If thou bring thy gift to the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way—first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift. Now, from this plain instance, in which the person offending is expressly described, as the party to be reconciled to him who had been offended, by agreeing to his terms of accommodation, and thereby making his peace with him; it manifestly appears, in what sense this expression is to be understood in the language of the New Testament. The very words then produced for the purpose of showing that there was no displeasure on the part of God, which it was necessary by some means to avert, prove the direct contrary: and our being reconciled to God, evidently does not mean, our giving up our sins, and thereby laying aside our enmity to God, (in which sense the objection supposes it to be taken) but the turning away his displeasure, whereby we are enabled to regain his favour. And indeed it were strange, had it not meant this. What! are we to suppose the God of the Christian, like the deity of the Epicurean, to look on with indifference upon the actions of this life, and not to be offended at the sinner? The displeasure of God, it is to be remembered, is not like man’s displeasure, a resentment or passion, but a judicial disapprobation: which if we abstract from our notion of God, we must cease to view him as the moral governor of the world. And it is from the want of this distinction, which is so highly necessary; and the consequent fear of degrading the Deity, by attributing to him what might appear to be the weakness of passion; that they, who trust to reason more than to scripture, have been withheld from admitting any principle that implied displeasure on the part of God. Had they attended but a little to the plain language of scripture, they might have rectified their mistake. They would there have found the wrath of God against the disobedient, spoken of in almost every page. They would have found also a case which is exactly in point to the main argument before us; in which there is described, not only the wrath of God, but the turning away of his displeasure by the mode of sacrifice. The case is that of the three friends of Job,—in which God expressly says, that his wrath is kindled against the friends of Job, because they had not spoken of him the thing that was right; and at the same time directs them to offer up a sacrifice, as the way of averting his anger.
But then it is urged, that God is every where spoken of as a being of infinite love. True; and the whole difficulty arises from building on partial texts. When men perpetually talk of God’s justice, as being necessarily modified by his goodness, they seem to forget that it is no less the language of scripture, and of reason, that his goodness should be modified by his justice. Our error on this subject proceeds from our own narrow views, which compel us to consider the attributes of the Supreme Being, as so many distinct qualities, when we should conceive of them as inseparably blended together; and his whole nature as one great impulse to what is best.
As to God’s displeasure against sinners, there can be then upon the whole no reasonable ground of doubt. And against the doctrine of atonement, no difficulty can arise from the scripture phrase of men being reconciled to God: since, as we have seen, that directly implies the turning away the displeasure of God, so as to be again restored to his favour and protection.
But, though all this must be admitted by those who will not shut their eyes against reason and scripture; yet still it is contended, that the death of Christ cannot be considered as a propitiatory sacrifice. Now, when we find him described as the Lamb of God which taketh away the sins of the world; when we are told, that Christ hath given himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God; and that he needed not, like the high-priests under the law, to offer up sacrifice daily, first for his own sins, and then for the people’s; for that this he did once, when he offered up himself; when he is expressly asserted to be the propitiation for our sins; and God is said to have loved us, and to have sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins; when Isaiah describes his soul as made an offering for sin; when it is said that God spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all; and that by him we have received the atonement; when these, and many other such passages are to be found; when every expression referring to the death of Christ, evidently indicates the notion of a sacrifice of atonement and propitiation; when this sacrifice is particularly represented, as of the nature of a sin-offering; which was a species of sacrifice ‘prescribed to be offered upon the commission of an offence, after which the offending person was considered as if he had never sinned;’ it may well appear surprising on what ground it can be questioned, that the death of Christ is pronounced in scripture to have been a sacrifice of atonement and expiation for the sins of men.
It is asserted, that the several passages which seem to speak this language, contain nothing more than figurative allusions: that all that is intended is, that Christ laid down his life for, that is, on account of mankind: and that there being circumstances of resemblance between this event and the sacrifices of the law, terms were borrowed from the latter, to express the former in a manner more lively and impressive. And as a proof that the application of these terms is but figurative, it is contended, 1st. That the death of Christ did not correspond literally and exactly, to the ceremonies of the Mosaic sacrifice: 2dly. That being in different places compared to different kinds of sacrifices, to all of which it could not possibly correspond, it cannot be considered as exactly of the nature of any: and lastly, that there was no such thing as a sacrifice of propitiation or expiation of sin under the Mosaic dispensation at all; this notion having been entirely of Heathen origin.
As to the two first arguments, they deserve but little consideration. The want of an exact similitude to the precise form of the Mosaic sacrifice, is but a slender objection. It might as well be said, that because Christ was not of the species of animal, which had usually been offered up; or because he was not slain in the same manner; or because he was not offered by the high-priest, there could have been no sacrifice. But this is manifest trifling. If the formal notion of a sacrifice for sin, that is, a life offered up in expiation be adhered to, nothing more can be required to constitute it a sacrifice, except by those who mean to cavil, not to discover truth.
Again, as to the second argument, which from the comparison of Christ’s death, to the different kinds of sacrifices, would infer that it was not of the nature of any, it may be replied, that it will more reasonably follow, that it was of the nature of all. Resembling that of the Passover, inasmuch as by it we were delivered from an evil yet greater than that of Egyptian bondage; partaking the nature of the sin offering, as being accepted in expiation of transgression; and similar to the institution of the scape-goat, as bearing the accumulated sins of all: may we not reasonably suppose that this one great sacrifice contained the full import and completion of the whole sacrificial system? And that so far from being spoken of in figure, as bearing some resemblance to the sacrifices of the law, they were on the contrary, as the apostle expressly tells us, but figures, or faint and partial representations of this stupendous sacrifice which had been ordained from the beginning? And besides, it is to be remarked in general, with respect to the figurative application of the sacrificial terms to the death of Christ; that the striking resemblance between that and the sacrifices of the law, which is assigned as the reason of such application, would have produced just the contrary effect upon the sacred writers; since they must have been aware that the constant use of such expressions, aided by the strength of the resemblance, must have laid a foundation for error, in that which constitutes the main doctrine of the Christian faith. Being addressed to a people whose religion was entirely sacrificial, in what but the obvious and literal sense, could the sacrificial representation of the death of Christ have been understood?
We come now to the third and principal objection, which is built upon the assertion, that no sacrifices of atonement (in the sense in which we apply this term to the death of Christ) had existence under the Mosaic law: such as were called by that name having had an entirely different import. Now that certain offerings under this denomination, related to things, and were employed for the purpose of purification, so as to render them fit instruments of the ceremonial worship, must undoubtedly be admitted. That others were again appointed to relieve persons from ceremonial incapacities, so as to restore them to the privilege of joining in the services of the temple, is equally true. But that there were others of a nature strictly propitiatory, and ordained to avert the displeasure of God from the transgressor, not only of the ceremonial, but, in some cases, even of the moral law, will appear manifest upon a very slight examination. Thus we find it decreed, that if a soul sin and commit a trespass against the Lord, and lie unto his neighbour in that which was delivered to him to keep—or have found that which was lost, and lieth concerning it, and SWEARETH FALSELY, then, because he hath sinned in this, he shall not only make restitution to his neighbour—but he shall bring his trespass-offering unto the Lord, a ram without blemish out of the flock; and the priest shall make an ATONEMENT for him before the Lord, and it shall be FORGIVEN HIM. And again in a case of criminal connexion with a bond-maid who was betrothed, the offender is ordered to bring his trespass-offering, and the priest is to make ATONEMENT for him with the trespass-offering, for the sin which he hath done; and the sin which he hath done shall be FORGIVEN him. And in the case of all offences which fell not under the description of presumptuous, it is manifest from the slightest inspection of the book of Leviticus, that the atonement prescribed, was appointed as the means whereby God might be propitiated, or reconciled to the offender.