Object. 1. It is objected, that it might then be sanctified with this view, that man should observe it after his fall, or, in particular, at that time when the observation of it was enjoined.
Answ. To this it may be replied, that there never was any ordinance instituted, but what was designed to be observed by man, immediately after the institution thereof. Now the sanctification of the Sabbath imports as much as its institution, or setting apart for a holy use; therefore we cannot but suppose, that God designed that it should be observed by man in innocency.
Object. 2. It is farther objected, that it is inconsistent with the happy state, in which man was created, for God to appoint a day of rest for him, to be then observed; for rest supposes labour, and therefore is more agreeable to that state into which he brought himself by sin, when, by the sweat of his brow, he was to eat bread.
Answ. Though it is true, man, in innocency, was not exposed to that uneasiness and fatigue that attended his employment after his fall, neither was the work he was engaged in a burthen to him, so as that he needed a day of rest to give him ease, in that respect; yet a cessation from a secular employment, attended with a more immediate access to God in his holy institutions, wherein he might hope for a greater degree of communion with him, was not inconsistent with that degree of holiness and happiness, in which he was created, which, as was before observed, was short of the heavenly blessedness; so that, though heaven is a state, in which the saints enjoy an everlasting Sabbath, it does not follow that man, how happy soever he was in paradise, was so far favoured therein, as that a day of rest was inconsistent with that state.
3. We shall proceed to enquire how the providence of God had a more immediate reference to the spiritual or eternal happiness of man, in that he entered into a covenant of life with him, under which head we are to consider the personal concerns of our first parents therein.[[45]]
(1.) The dispensation they were under was that of a covenant. This is allowed by most, who acknowledge the imputation of Adam’s sin, and the universal corruption of nature, as consequent thereupon. And some call it, a covenant of innocency, inasmuch as it was made with man while he was in a state of innocency; others call it, a covenant of works, because perfect obedience was enjoined, as the condition of it, and so it is opposed to the covenant of grace, as there was no provision made therein for any display of grace, as there is in that covenant which we are now under; but, in this answer, it is called the covenant of life, as having respect to the blessings promised therein.
It may seem indifferent to some, whether it ought to be termed a covenant, or a law of innocency; and, indeed, we would not contend about the use of a word, if many did not design, by what they say, concerning its being a law, and not properly a covenant, to prepare the way for the denial of the imputation of Adam’s sin; or did not, at the same time, consider him as no other than the natural head of his posterity, which, if it were to be allowed, would effectually overthrow the doctrine of original sin, as contained in some following answers. Therefore we must endeavour to prove that man was not barely under a law, but a covenant of works; and, that we may proceed with more clearness, we shall premise some things, in general, concerning the difference between a law and a covenant.
A law is the revealed will of a sovereign, in which a debt of obedience is demanded, and a punishment threatened, in proportion to the nature of the offence, in case of disobedience. And here we must consider, that as a subject is bound to obey a law; so he cannot justly be deprived of that which he has a natural right to, but in case of disobedience; therefore obedience to a law gives him a right to impunity, but nothing more than this; whereas a covenant gives a person a right, upon his fulfilling the conditions thereof, to all those privileges, which are stipulated, or promised therein. This may be illustrated, by considering it as applied to human forms of government, in which it is supposed that every subject is possessed of some things, which he has a natural or political right to, which he cannot justly be deprived of, unless he forfeit them by violating the law, which, as a subject, he was obliged to obey; therefore, though his obedience give him a right to impunity, or to the undisturbed possession of his life and estate, yet this does not entitle him to any privilege, which he had no natural right to. A king is not obliged to advance a subject to great honours, because he has not forfeited his life and estate by rebellion: but in case he had promised him, as an act of favour, that he would confer such honours upon him, upon condition of his yielding obedience in some particular instances, then he would have a right to them, not as yielding obedience to a law, but as fulfilling the conditions of a covenant.
This may be farther illustrated, by considering the case of Mephibosheth. He had a natural and legal right to his life and estate, which descended to him from his father Jonathan, because he behaved himself peaceably, and had not rebelled against David; but this did not entitle him to those special favours which David conferred upon him, such as eating bread at his table continually, 2 Sam. ix. 13. for those were the result of a covenant between David and Jonathan; in which David promised, that he would shew kindness to his house after him. Now, to apply this to our present case, if we consider our first parents only as under a law, their perfect obedience to it, it is true, would have given them a right to impunity, since punishment supposes a crime; therefore God could not, consistently with his perfections, have punished them, had they not rebelled against him. I do not say, that God could not, in consistency with his perfections, have taken away the blessings that he conferred upon them, as creatures, in a way of sovereignty, but this he could not do as a judge; so that man would have been entirely exempted from punishment, as long as he had stood. But this would not, in the least, have entitled him to any superadded happiness, unless there had been a promise made, which gave him ground to expect it, in case he yielded obedience; and if there were, then that dispensation, which before contained the form of a law, having this circumstance added to it, would afterwards contain the form of a covenant, and so give him a right to that super-added happiness promised therein, according to the tenor of that covenant. Therefore, if we can prove (which we shall endeavour to do, before we dismiss this subject) not only that man was obliged to yield perfect obedience, as being under a law; but that he was given to expect a super-added happiness, consisting either in the grace of confirmation in his present state, or in the heavenly blessedness; then it will follow, that he would have had a right to it, in case of yielding that obedience, according to the tenor of this dispensation, as containing in it the nature of a covenant.
This I apprehend to be the just difference between a law and a covenant, as applicable to this present argument, and consequently must conclude, that the dispensation man was under, contained both the ideas of a law and a covenant: his relation to God, as a creature, obliged him to yield perfect obedience to the divine will, as containing the form of a law; and this perfect obedience, had it been performed, would have given him a right to the heavenly blessedness, by virtue of that promise, which God was pleased to give to man in this dispensation, as it contained in it the nature of a covenant. And this will farther appear, when we consider,