But to this I answer, That there is a vast difference between asserting, that many of the actions of life are arbitrary or indifferent, so that we might do the contrary; and saying that indifferency is essential to liberty; for that which is essential to an action must belong to every individual action of the same kind.[[9]] Thus concerning their notion of liberty, whom we oppose.
But on the other hand, that which we acquiesce in, is, that its essential property or nature, consists in a person’s doing a thing without being laid under a natural necessity to do it;[[10]] or doing it of his own accord, without any force laid on him.[[11]] Others express it by a person’s doing a thing out of choice, as having the highest reason to determine him so to do.[[12]] This is that notion of liberty which we cannot but approve of; and we are now to shew,
(2.) How far the power of man’s free-will may be extended, with a particular view to the matter under our present consideration. Here let it be observed,
1st, That the power of man’s will extends itself to things, within its own sphere, and not above it; all actions and powers of acting, are contained within certain limits, agreeable to the nature and capacity of the agent. Creatures below man, cannot put forth rational actions: and man cannot put forth supernatural actions, if he be not made partaker of a divine or spiritual nature, as being endowed with a supernatural principle, such as that which is implanted in regeneration. Consider him as an intelligent creature, and it is agreeable to his nature to put forth free actions, under the conduct and direction of the understanding; but if we consider him as renewed, converted, or effectually called, and acting agreeably thereunto, then he is under the influence of an higher principle, which I call a divine nature, according to the phrase which the apostle uses, 2 Pet. i. 4. The former of these supposes no more than the concourse of common providence, which at first gave, and then maintains our reasoning faculties; whereas the latter supposes, that we are under the influence of the Spirit; whereby we are enabled to act in a supernatural way, our natures being renewed and disposed thereunto, in which we are not divested of the liberty of our wills; but they are improved and enabled, to do what before they were averse and disinclined to.
That man acts freely in those things which are agreeable to his nature, as an intelligent creature, all will allow. Moreover, we consider the understanding and will, as both concurring in actions that are free, and that one of these is subservient to the other; as for instance, we cannot be said to desire, delight in, choose, or refuse a thing unless we have some idea of it, as an object, which we apprehend meet to be desired or rejected.
And if it be farther enquired, Whether the will has, in itself, a power to follow the dictates of the understanding, in things that are agreeable to our nature, and be generally disposed to do it, unless biassed by the passions, inclining and determining it another way? This, I think, is not to be denied; but in our present argument, we are to consider the will of man as conversant about things supernatural, and accordingly, must give a different account of Christian liberty, from that which is merely human, as before described. The Pelagians will allow what has been said concerning the nature of liberty in general; but the difference between us and them is, that we confine it within its own sphere; whereas they extend it farther, and apply it to regeneration, effectual calling, and conversion; in which respect it discovers itself no otherwise than as enslaved to, or a servant of sin;[[13]] and the powers and faculties of the soul, with relation hereunto, are weakened by the prevalency of corruption, so that we are not able to put forth those actions which proceed from, and determine a person to be renewed in the spirit of his mind; or to have put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness.
Again, if it be farther enquired; whether the will necessarily follows the dictates of the understanding, so that the grace of God takes its first rise from thence? that which I would say in answer thereunto is, That the understanding, indeed, represents things spiritual and heavenly to us, as good and desirable, and worthy of all acceptation; and gives us an undeniable conviction, that all the motives used in scripture, to choose and embrace them, are highly probable; but yet it does not follow from hence, that the will of man is always overcome thereby;[[14]] and the reason is, because of that strong propensity and inclination that there is in corrupt nature to sin, which bids defiance to all those arguments and persuasions that are used to the contrary, till we are brought under the influence of a supernatural principle, implanted in the soul in effectual calling.
And this leads us farther to enquire: Whether, supposing a man has this principle implanted in effectual calling, he then acts freely; or, what is the liberty of man’s will, when internally moved and influenced by divine grace? In answer to which, we must consider, that special grace does not destroy, but improve the liberty of man’s will: when there is a new nature implanted in him, it discovers its energy, and makes a change in all the powers and faculties of the soul; there is a new light shining in the understanding, vastly different from, and superior to that which it had before; and it may truly be called, The light of life, John viii. 12. not only as it leads to eternal life; but as it proceeds from a principle of spiritual life: and this is what we generally call saving knowledge; as it is said, This is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent, chap. xvii. 13. Now this light in the understanding, being attended with power in the will, it is hereby induced to comply with its dictates, not barely as being prevailed on by rational arguments, but as there is a divine power accompanying them; it is not indeed prevailed on without arguments; for the Spirit makes use of the word to persuade, as well as to direct; though we do not, with the Pelagians, say, that the will is overcome only by arguments, as though the victory was owing to our power of reasoning; yet we freely own, that we act with judgment, and see the highest reason for what we do: we are enabled to use our reasoning powers indeed; but these are sanctified by the Spirit, as well as the will renewed; and both concur together, in order to our receiving and improving the doctrines contained in the gospel; and the Spirit of God also removes those rooted prejudices which we had entertained against the way of salvation by Christ: so that upon the whole, the gospel has its use, as it directs and excites our faith: our reasoning powers and faculties have their use also, as we take in, and are convinced, by what is therein contained; all this would be to no purpose, if there were not a superior power determining the will to a thorough compliance therewith. We do not deny that moral suasion oftentimes has a tendency to incline a man to the performance of moral duties; but it is what I rather choose to call evangelical persuasion, or the Spirit of God setting home upon the heart and conscience, what is contained in the gospel, that makes it effectual to salvation.[[15]] Thus concerning the nature and extent of human liberty; but inasmuch as this is not to be assigned as that which renders the gospel-call effectual, let it be farther considered,
III. That this is brought about by the almighty power of God, as it is observed in this answer, that it is a work of God’s almighty power and grace: this is that which enhances the excellency and glory of it, above all the works of common providence: however, when we say that it is a divine work, this is hardly sufficient to distinguish it from what the Pelagians often call it, by which they intend nothing more, than the powerful work of God, as the God of nature and providence; therefore we must farther consider it as a work of divine power, exerting itself in a supernatural way and not only excluding the agency of creatures, as bearing a part therein, but as opposed to those works which are brought about by the moral influence of persuasive arguments, without any change wrought in the will of man; in this sense we understand effectual calling to be a work of God’s almighty power.
And that this may appear, let it be premised, that it is not inconsistent with God’s dealing with men as intelligent creatures, endowed with liberty of will, for him to exert this power, since special providence, or efficacious grace, does no more destroy man’s natural powers, by its internal influence, enabling and exciting them to do what is supernaturally good, than common providence’s being conversant about the free actions of men, makes them cease to be free; only the former exerts itself in a different and superior way, producing effects much more glorious and excellent.