[2.] A person may speak that which is contrary to truth, being imposed on himself, without any design to deceive another. This cannot, indeed, according to the description before given, be properly called a lie: However, he may sin by asserting too positively, that which he thinks to be true from probable circumstances, or uncertain information; especially if what he reports, carries in it that which is matter of scandal, or censure. This was the case of Job’s friends, who did not tell a lie against their own consciences: Nevertheless, they were too peremptory in charging him with hypocrisy, without sufficient ground; therefore God imputes folly to them, in that they had not spoken of him the thing which was right, Job xlii. 8.
Here it may be enquired, whether a person, who designs not to deceive, nor speaks contrary to the dictates of his own conscience; yet if he promises to do a thing, and does it not, is guilty of lying? To which it may be replied,
1st, That if a person promises to do a thing, which, at the same time he really designs, and afterwards uses all the endeavours he could, to fulfil his promise, and something unforeseen happens, in the course of providence, which prevents the execution thereof, he cannot, properly speaking, be said to be guilty of a lie; though we ought not to promise any thing but upon this supposition, that God enables us to perform it.
2dly, If a person intends to do a thing, and, accordingly, promises to do it, but afterwards sees some justifiable reason to alter his mind, he is not guilty of a lie; since all creatures are supposed to be mutable. Thus the angels told Lot, that they would abide in the street all night; but afterwards, upon his intreaty, they went into the house with him, Gen. xix. 2,
3. And our Saviour, when he walked with his disciples to Emmaus, made as though he would have gone farther: But they constrained him, saying, abide with us; and he went in to tarry with them, Luke xxiv. 28, 29. But, notwithstanding this if a person promises to do any thing that is of advantage to another, as the paying a just debt, &c. it is not a sufficient excuse, to clear him from the guilt of sin, if he pretends that he has altered his mind, supposing that it is in his power to fulfil it: For this is, indeed, a breach of the eighth Commandment, and in some respects, it will appear to him, to be a violation of this.
That we may more particularly speak concerning the sin of lying which multitudes are chargeable with, let it be observed, that there are three sorts of lies,
1st, When a person speaks that which is contrary to truth, and the dictates of his own conscience, with a design to cover a fault or excuse himself or others: This we generally call an officious lie[[6]].
2dly, When a person speaks that which is contrary to the known truth, in a jesting way; and embellishes his discourse with his own fictions, designing hereby to impose on others: This they are guilty of, who invent false news, or tell stories for truth, which they know to be false. This is to lie in a jesting, ludicrous manner[[7]].
3dly, There is a pernicious lie, viz. when a person raises and spreads a false report with a design to do injury to another; which is a complicated crime, and the worst sort of lying[[8]].
Here there are two or three enquiries which it may not be improper to take notice of;