Mr. Jefferson’s position, however, made his later conduct natural. He was the acknowledged leader of his party, its founder indeed, and that party had carried him into power. He desired to keep it intact, to strengthen its lines with whatever patronage he had at his disposal, and he evidently regarded the cause of Adams in not rewarding his friends as a mistake. It was, therefore, Jefferson, and not Jackson, who was the author of the theory that “to the victors belong the spoils.” Jackson gave it a sharp and perfectly defined shape by the use of these words, but the spirit and principle were conceived by Jefferson, who throughout his life showed far greater originality in politics than any of the early patriots. It was his acute sense of just what was right for a growing political party to do, which led him to turn the thoughts of his followers into new and popular directions. Seeing that they were at grave disadvantage when opposing the attitude of the government in its policy with foreign nations; realizing that the work of the Federalists in strengthening the power of the new government, in providing revenues and ways and means for the payment of the debt, were good, he changed the character of the opposition by selecting only notoriously arbitrary measures for assault—and changed it even more radically than this. He early saw that simple opposition was not progress, and that it was both wise and popular to be progressive, and in all his later political papers he sought to make his party the party favoring personal freedom, the one of liberal ideas, the one which, instead of shirking, should anticipate every change calculated to enlarge the liberties and the opportunities of citizens. These things were not inconsistent with his strong views in favor of local self-government; indeed, in many particulars they seemed to support that theory, and by the union of the two ideas he shrewdly arrayed political enthusiasm by the side of political interest. Political sagacity more profound than this it is difficult to imagine. It has not since been equalled in the history of our land, nor do we believe in the history of any other.
After the New Haven episode, so jealous was Jefferson of his good name, that while he confided all new appointments to the hands of his political friends, he made few removals, and these for apparent cause. The mere statement of his position had proved an invitation to the Federalists in office to join his earlier friends in the support of his administration. Many of them did it, so many that the clamorings of truer friends could not be hushed. With a view to create a new excuse, Jefferson declared that all appointments made by Adams after February 14th, when the House began its ballotings for President, were void, these appointments belonging of right to him, and from this act of Adams we date the political legacies which some of our Presidents have since handed down to their successors. One of the magistrates whose commission had been made out under Adams, sought to compel Jefferson to sign it by a writ of mandamus before the Supreme Court, but a “profound investigation of constitutional law” induced the court not to grant the motion. All commissions signed by Adams after the date named were suppressed.
Jefferson’s apparent bitterness against the Federalists is mainly traceable to the contest in the House, and his belief that at one time they sought a coalition with Burr. This coalition he regarded as a violation of the understanding when he was nominated, and a supposed effort to appoint a provisional office he regarded as an usurpation in fact. In a letter to James Monroe, dated February 15th, speaking of this contest, he says:
“Four days of balloting have produced not a single change of a vote. Yet it is confidently believed that to-morrow there is to be a coalition. I know of no foundation for this belief. If they could have been permitted to pass a law for putting the government in the hands of an officer, they would certainly have prevented an election. But we thought it best to declare openly and firmly, one and all, that the day such an act passed, the Middle States would arm, and that no such usurpation, even for a single day, should be submitted to.”
It is but fair to say that the Federalists denied all such intentions, and that James A. Bayard, of Delaware, April 3, 1806, made formal oath to this denial. In this he says that three States, representing Federalist votes, offered to withdraw their opposition if John Nicholas, of Virginia, and the personal friend of Jefferson, would secure pledges that the public credit should be supported, the navy maintained, and that subordinate public officers, employed only in the execution of details, established by law, should not be removed from office on the ground of their public character, nor without complaint against their conduct. The Federalists then went so far as to admit that officers of “high discretion and confidence,” such as members of the cabinet and foreign ministers, should be known friends of the administration. This proposition goes to show that there is nothing very new in what are called our modern politics; that the elder Bayard, as early as 1800, made a formal proposal to bargain. Mr. Nicholas offered his assurance that these things would prove acceptable to and govern the conduct of Jefferson’s administration, but he declined to consult with Jefferson on the points. General Smith subsequently engaged to do it, and Jefferson replied that the points given corresponded with his views and intentions, and that Mr. Bayard and his friends might confide in him accordingly. The opposition of Vermont, Maryland and Delaware was then immediately withdrawn, and Mr. Jefferson was made President. Gen’l Smith, twelve days later, made an affidavit which substantially confirmed that of Bayard. Latimer, the collector of the port of Philadelphia, and M’Lane, collector of Wilmington, (Bayard’s special friend) were retained in office. He had cited these two as examples of his opposition to any change, and Jefferson seemed to regard the pledges as not sacred beyond the parties actually named in Bayard’s negotiations with Gen’l Smith.
This misunderstanding or misconstruction of what in these days would be plainly called a bargain, led to considerable political criticism, and Jefferson felt it necessary to defend his cause. This he did in letters to friends which both then and since found their way into the public prints. One of these letters, written to Col. Monroe, March 7th, shows in every word and line the natural politician. In this he says:
“Some (removals) I know must be made. They must be as few as possible, done gradually, and bottomed on some malversation or inherent disqualification. Where we shall draw the line between all and none, is not yet settled, and will not be till we get our administration together; and perhaps even then we shall proceed ā talons, balancing our measures according to the impression we perceive them to make. This may give you a general view of our plan.”
A little later on, March 28, he wrote to Elbridge Gerry:
“Officers who have been guilty of gross abuses of office, such as marshals packing juries, etc., I shall now remove, as my predecessor ought in justice to have done. The instances will be few, and governed by strict rule, not party passion. The right of opinion shall suffer no invasion from me.”
Jefferson evidently tired of this subject, and gradually modified his views, as shown in his letter to Levi Lincoln, July 11, wherein he says: