American politics (non-partisan) from the beginning to date

by Thomas V. Cooper; Hector T. Fenton

“After much serious reflection, I have arrived at the conclusion that no such power has been delegated to Congress or to any other department of the Federal Government. It is manifest, upon an inspection of the Constitution, that this is not among the specific and enumerated powers granted to Congress; and it is equally apparent that its exercise is not ‘necessary and proper for carrying into execution’ any one of these powers. So far from this power having been delegated to Congress, it was expressly refused by the Convention which framed the Constitution.

“It appears from the proceedings of that body that on the 31st May, 1787, the clause ‘authorizing an exertion of the force of the whole against a delinquent State’ came up for consideration. Mr. Madison opposed it in a brief but powerful speech, from which I shall extract but a single sentence. He observed: ‘The use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound.’ Upon his motion the clause was unanimously postponed, and was never, I believe, again presented. Soon afterwards, on the 8th June, 1787, when incidentally adverting to the subject, he said: ‘Any government for the United States, formed on the supposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, would prove as visionary and fallacious as the government of Congress,’ evidently meaning the then existing Congress of the old confederation.”

At the time of the delivery of this message the excitement was very high. The extreme Southerners differed from it, in so far as it disputed both the right of revolution and secession under the circumstances, but quickly made a party battle cry of the denial of the right of the National Government to coerce a State—a view which for a time won the President additional friends, but which in the end solidified all friends of the Union against his administration. To show the doubt which this ingenious theory caused, we quote from the speech of Senator Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee (subsequently Vice-President and acting President), delivered Dec. 18th, 1860, (Congressional Globe, page 119):—

“I do not believe the Federal Government has the power to coerce a State, for by the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States it is expressly provided that you cannot even put one of the States of this confederacy before one of the courts of the country as a party. As a State, the Federal Government has no power to coerce it; but it is a member of the compact to which it agreed in common with the other States, and this Government has the right to pass laws, and to enforce those laws upon individuals within the limits of each State. While the one proposition is clear, the other is equally so. This Government can, by the Constitution of the country, and by the laws enacted in conformity with the Constitution, operate upon individuals, and has the right and power, not to coerce a State, but to enforce and execute the law upon individuals within the limits of a State.”

Senator Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, publicly objected to the message because of its earnest argument against secession, and the determination expressed to collect the revenue in the ports of South Carolina, by means of a naval force, and to defend the public property. From this moment they alienated themselves from the President. Soon thereafter, when he refused to withdraw Major Anderson from Fort Sumter, on the demand of the self-styled South Carolina Commissioners, the separation became complete. For more than two months before the close of the session all friendly intercourse between them and the President, whether of a political or social character, had ceased.

The Crittenden Compromise.

Congress referred the request in the message, to adopt amendments to the constitution recognizing the rights of the Slave States to take slavery into the territories to a committee of thirteen, consisting of five Republicans: Messrs. Seward, Collamer, Wade, Doolittle, and Grimes; five from slaveholding States: Messrs. Powell, Hunter, Crittenden, Toombs, and Davis; and three Northern Democrats; Messrs. Douglas, Bigler, and Bright. The latter three were intended to act as mediators between the extreme parties on the committee.

The committee first met on the 21st December, 1860, and preliminary to any other proceeding, they “resolved that no proposition shall be reported as adopted, unless sustained by a majority of each of the classes of the committee; Senators of the Republican party to constitute one class, and Senators of the other parties to constitute the other class.” This resolution was passed, because any report they might make to the Senate would be in vain unless sanctioned by at least a majority of the five Republican Senators. On the next day (the 22d), Mr. Crittenden submitted to the committee “A Joint Resolution” (the same which he had two days before presented to the Senate), “proposing certain amendments to the Constitution of the United States,” now known as the Crittenden Compromise. This was truly a compromise of conflicting claims, because it proposed that the South should surrender their adjudged right to take slaves into all our Territories, provided the North would recognize this right in the Territories south of the old Missouri Compromise line. The committee rejected this compromise, every one of its five Republican members, together with Messrs. Davis and Toombs, from the cotton States, having voted against it. Indeed, not one of all the Republicans in the Senate, at any period or in any form, voted in its favor.

The committee, having failed to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, reported their disagreement to the Senate on the 31st December, 1860, in a resolution declaring that they had “not been able to agree upon any general plan of adjustment.”

Mr. Crittenden did not despair of ultimate success, notwithstanding his defeat before the Committee of Thirteen. After this, indeed, he could no longer expect to carry his compromise as an amendment to the Constitution by the necessary two-thirds vote of Congress. It was, therefore, postponed by the Senate on his own motion. As a substitute for it he submitted to the Senate, on the 3d January, 1861, a joint resolution, which might be passed by a majority of both Houses. This was to refer his rejected amendment, by an ordinary act of Congress, to a direct vote of the people of the several States.