Just prior to this the old issue, made by the Republicans against Hamilton’s scheme for a National Bank, was revived by the fact that the charter of the bank ceased on the 4th of March, 1811, and an attempt was made to re-charter it. A bill for this purpose was introduced into Congress, but on the 11th of January, 1811, it was indefinitely postponed in the House, by a vote of 65 to 64, while in the Senate it was rejected by the casting vote of the Vice-President, Geo. Clinton, on the 5th of February, 1811—this notwithstanding its provisions had been framed or approved by Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury. The Federalists were all strong advocates of the measure, and it was so strong that it divided some of the Democrats who enjoyed a loose rein in the contest so far as the administration was concerned, the President not specially caring for political quarrels at a time when war was threatened with a powerful foreign nation. The views of the Federalists on this question descended to the Whigs some years later, and this fact led to the charges that the Whigs were but Federalists in disguise.
The eleventh Congress continued the large Democratic majority, as did the twelfth, which met on the 4th of November, 1811, Henry Clay, then an ardent supporter of the policy of Madison, succeeding to the House speakership. He had previously served two short sessions in the U. S. Senate, and had already acquired a high reputation as an able and fluent debater. He preferred the House, at that period of life, believing his powers better calculated to win fame in the more popular representative hall. Calhoun was also in the House at this time, and already noted for the boldness of his views and their assertion.
In this Congress jealousies arose against the political power of Virginia, which had already named three of the four Presidents, each for two terms, and De Witt Clinton, the well-known Governor of New York, sought through these jealousies to create a division which would carry him into the Presidency. His efforts were for a time warmly seconded by several northern and southern states. A few months later the Legislature of New York formally opened the ball by nominating DeWitt Clinton for the Presidency. An address was issued by his friends, August 17th, 1812, which has since become known as the Clintonian platform, and his followers were known as Clintonian Democrats. The address contained the first public protest against the nomination of Presidential candidates by Congressional caucuses. There was likewise declared opposition to that “official regency which prescribed tenets of political faith.” The efforts of particular states to monopolize the principal offices was denounced, as was the continuance of public men for long periods in office.
Madison was nominated for a second term by a Congressional caucus held at Washington, in May, 1812. John Langdon was nominated for Vice-President, but as he declined on account of age, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, took his place. In September of the same year a convention of the opposition, representing eleven states, was held in the city of New York, which nominated De Witt Clinton, with Jared Ingersoll for Vice-President. This was the first national convention, partisan in character, and the Federalists have the credit of originating and carrying out the idea. The election resulted in the success of Madison, who received 128 electoral votes to 89 for Clinton.
Though factious strife had been somewhat rife, less attention was paid to politics than to the approaching war. There were new Democratic leaders in the lower House, and none were more prominent than Clay of Kentucky, Calhoun, Cheves and Lowndes, all of South Carolina. The policy of Jefferson in reducing the army and navy was now greatly deplored, and the defenceless condition in which it left the country was the partial cause, at least a stated cause of the factious feuds which followed. Madison sought to change this policy, and he did it at the earnest solicitation of Clay, Calhoun and Lowndes, who were the recognized leaders of the war party. They had early determined that Madison should be directly identified with them, and before his second nomination had won him over to their more decided views in favor of war with England. He had held back, hoping that diplomacy might avert a contest, but when once convinced that war was inevitable and even desirable under the circumstances, his official utterances were bold and free. In the June following the caucus which renominated him, he declared in a message that our flag was continually insulted on the high seas; that the right of searching American vessels for British seamen was still in practice, and that thousands of American citizens had in this way been impressed in service on foreign ships; that peaceful efforts at adjustment of the difficulties had proved abortive, and that the British ministry and British emissaries had actually been intriguing for the dismemberment of the Union.
The act declaring war was approved by the President on the 18th of June, 1812, and is remarkably short and comprehensive. It was drawn by the attorney-general of the United States, William Pinckney, and is in the words following:—
“An act declaring war between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their territories.
“Be it enacted, &c. That war be, and the same is hereby declared to exist between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America, and their territories; and that the President of the United States is hereby authorized to use the whole land and naval force of the United States to carry the same into effect, and to issue to private armed vessels of the United States commissions, or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper, and under the seal of the United States, against the vessels, goods, and effects, of the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the subjects thereof.”
This was a soul-stirring message, but it did not rally all the people as it should have done. Political jealousies were very great, and the frequent defeats of the Federalists, while they tended to greatly reduce their numbers and weaken their power, seemed to strengthen their animosity, and they could see nothing good in any act of the administration. They held, especially in the New England states, that the war had been declared by a political party simply, and not by the nation, though nearly all of the Middle, and all of the Southern and Western States, warmly supported it. Clay estimated that nine-tenths of the people were in favor of the war, and under the inspiration of his eloquence and the strong state papers of Madison, they doubtless were at first. Throughout they felt their political strength, and they just as heartily returned the bitterness manifested by those of the Federalists who opposed the war, branding them as enemies of the republic, and monarchists who preferred the reign of Britain.
Four Federalist representatives in Congress went so far as to issue an address, opposing the war, the way in which it had been declared, and denouncing it as unjust. Some of the New England states refused the order of the President to support it with their militia, and Massachusetts sent peace memorials to Congress.