The ninth article, charging the President with endeavoring to induce General Emory to violate the law by receiving orders directly from him, was very briefly touched upon, it being maintained that, as shown by the evidence, “the reason why the President sent for General Emory was not that he might endeavor to seduce that distinguished officer from his allegiance to the laws and Constitution of his country, but because he wished to obtain information about military movements which might require his personal attention.”
As to the tenth article, based upon the President’s speeches, it was averred that they were in no way in violation of the Constitution, or of any law existing at the time when they were made, and were not therefore, impeachable offenses.
The reply to the eleventh article was very brief. The managers had “compounded it of the materials which they had previously worked up into others,” and it “contained nothing new that needed notice.” Mr. Curtis concluded his speech by saying that—“This trial is and will be the most conspicuous instance that has ever been, or even can be expected to be found, of American justice or of American injustice; of that justice which is the great policy of all civilized States; of that injustice which is certain to be condemned, which makes even the wisest man mad, and which, in the fixed and unalterable order of God’s providence, is sure to return and plague the inventor.”
At the close of this opening speech for the defense, General Lorenzo Thomas was brought forward as a witness. His testimony, elicited upon examination and cross-examination, was to the effect that, having received the order appointing him Secretary of War ad interim, he presented it to Mr. Stanton, who asked, “Do you wish me to vacate the office at once, or will you give me time to get my private property together?” to which Thomas replied, “Act your pleasure.” Afterward Stanton said, “I don’t know whether I will obey your instructions.” Subsequently Thomas said that he should issue orders as Secretary of War. Stanton said he should not do so, and afterward gave him a written direction, not to issue any order except as Adjutant-General. During the examination of General Thomas a question came up which, in many ways, recurred upon the trial. He was asked to tell what occurred at an interview between himself and the President. Objection was made by Mr. Butler, and the point was argued. The question was submitted to the Senate, which decided, by a vote of 42 to 10, that it was admissible. The testimony of General Thomas, from this point, took a wide range, and, being mainly given in response to questions of counsel, was, apparently, somewhat contradictory. The substance was that he was recognized by the President as Secretary of War; that, since the impeachment, he had acted as such only in attending Cabinet meetings, but had given no orders; that, when he reported to the President that Mr. Stanton would not vacate the War Department, the President directed him to “take possession of the office;” that, without orders from the President, he had intended to do this by force, if necessary; that, finding that this course might involve bloodshed, he had abandoned this purpose, but that, after this, he had, in several cases, affirmed his purpose to do so, but that these declarations were “merely boast and brag.” On the following day General Thomas was recalled as a witness, to enable him to correct certain points in his testimony. The first was the date of an unimportant transaction; he had given it as taking place on the 21st of February, whereas it should have been the 22d. The second was that the words of the President were that he should “take charge,” not “take possession” of the War Department. In explanation of the fact that he had repeatedly sworn to the words “take possession,” he said that these were “put into his mouth.” Finally, General Thomas, in reply to a direct question from Mr. Butler, said that his testimony on these points was “all wrong.”
Lieutenant-General Sherman was then called as a witness. After some unimportant questions, he was asked in reference to an interview between himself and the President which took place on the 14th of January: “At that interview what conversation took place between the President and you in reference to Mr. Stanton?” To this question objection was made by Mr. Butler, and the point was elaborately argued. The Chief Justice decided that the question was admissible within the vote of the Senate of the previous day; the question then was as to the admissibility of evidence as to a conversation between the President and General Thomas; the present question was as to a conversation between the President and General Sherman. “Both questions,” said the Chief Justice, “are asked for the purpose of procuring the intent of the President to remove Mr. Stanton.” The question being submitted to the Senate, it was decided, by a vote of 28 to 23, that it should not be admitted. The examination of General Sherman was continued, the question of the conversation aforesaid being frequently brought forward, and as often ruled out by the Senate. The only important fact elicited was that the President had twice, on the 25th and 30th of January, tendered to General Sherman the office of Secretary of War ad interim.
On Monday, April 13th, after transactions of minor importance, the general matter of the conversations between the President and General Sherman again came up, upon a question propounded by Senator Johnson—“When the President tendered to you the office of Secretary of War ad interim, did he, at the very time of making such tender, state to you what his purpose in so doing was?” This was admitted by the Senate, by a vote of 26 to 22. Senator Johnson then added to his question, “If he did, what did he state his purpose was?” This was admitted by a vote of 25 to 26. The testimony of General Sherman, relating to several interviews, was to the effect that the President said that the relations between himself and Mr. Stanton were such that he could not execute the office of President without making provision to appoint a Secretary of War ad interim, and he offered that office to him (General Sherman), but did not state that his purpose was to bring the matter directly into the courts. Sherman said that, if Mr. Stanton would retire, he might, although against his own wishes, undertake to administer the office ad interim, but asked what would be done in case Mr. Stanton would not yield. To this the President replied, “He will make no opposition; you present the order, and he will retire. I know him better than you do; he is cowardly.” General Sherman asked time for reflection, and then gave a written answer, declining to accept the appointment, but stated that his reasons were mostly of a personal nature.
On the 14th the Senate adjourned, on account of the sudden illness of Mr. Stanbery. It reassembled on the 15th, but the proceedings touched wholly upon formal points of procedure and the introduction of unimportant documentary evidence. On the 16th Mr. Sumner moved that all evidence not trivial or obviously irrelevant shall be admitted, the Senate to judge of its value. This was negatived by a vote of 23 to 11.
The 17th was mainly taken up by testimony as to the reliability of the reports of the President’s speeches. Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, was then called to testify to certain proceedings in Cabinet Council at the time of the appointment of General Thomas. This was objected to. The Chief Justice decided that it was admissible, and his decision was sustained by a vote of 26 to 23. The defense then endeavored to introduce several members of the Cabinet, to show that, at meetings previous to the removal of Mr. Stanton, it was considered whether it was not desirable to obtain a judicial determination of the unconstitutionality of the Tenure-of-Office Act. This question was raised in several shapes, and its admission, after thorough argument on both sides, as often refused, in the last instance by a decisive vote of 30 to 19. The defense considered this testimony of the utmost importance, as going to show that the President had acted upon the counsel of his constitutional advisers, while the prosecution claimed that he could not plead in justification of a violation of the law that he had been advised by his Cabinet, or any one else, that the law was unconstitutional. His duty was to execute the laws, and, if he failed to do this, or violated them, he did so at his own risk of the consequences. With the refusal of this testimony, the case, except the final summings up and the verdict of the Senate, was virtually closed.
The case had been so fully set forth in the opening speeches of Messrs. Butler and Curtis, and in the arguments which came up upon points of testimony, that there remained little for the other counsel except to restate what had before been said.
After the evidence had been closed the case was summed up, on the part of the managers by Messrs. Boutwell, Williams, Stevens, and Bingham in oral arguments, and Mr. Logan, who filed a written argument, and on the part of the President by Messrs. Nelson, Groesbeck, Stanbery, and Evarts. Many of these speeches were distinguished by great brilliancy and power, but, as no new points were presented, we omit any summary.