“Second, Having declined to enter the caucus, we adhere to our determination to defeat, if possible, its nominee, but only by the election of a citizen of unquestioned fidelity to the principles of the Republican party. In declaring our independency from the caucus domination we do not forget our allegiance to the party whose chosen representatives we are. The only result of our policy is the transfer of the contest from the caucus to the joint convention of the two houses. There will be afforded an opportunity for the expression of individual preferences and honorable rivalry for an honorable distinction. If the choice shall fall upon one not of approved loyalty and merit, the fault will not be ours.”
After a long contest both of the leading candidates withdrew, and quickly the Regulars substituted General James A. Beaver, the Independent Congressman, Thomas M. Bayne. On these names the dead-lock remained unbroken. Without material change the balloting continued till February 17th, when both Republican factions agreed to appoint conference committees of twelve each, with a view to selecting by a three-fourths vote a compromise candidate. The following were the respective committees: For the Independents: Senators Davis, Bradford; Lee, Venango; Stewart, Franklin; Lawrence, Washington; Representatives Wolfe, Union; Silverthorne, Erie; Mapes, Venango; McKee, Philadelphia; Slack, Allegheny; Stubs, Chester; Niles, Tioga; and Derickson, Crawford. For the Regulars: Senators Greer, Butler; Herr, Dauphin; Smith, Philadelphia; Keefer, Schuylkill; Cooper, Delaware; Representatives Pollock, Philadelphia; Moore, Allegheny; Marshall, Huntingdon; Hill, Indiana; Eshleman. Lancaster; Thomson, Armstrong; and Billingsley, Washington.
The joint convention held daily sessions and balloted without result until February 22d, when John I. Mitchell, of Tioga, Congressman from the 16th district, was unanimously agreed upon as a compromise candidate. He was nominated by a full Republican caucus on the morning of February 23d, and elected on the first ballot in joint convention on that day, the vote standing: Mitchell, 150; Wallace, 92; MacVeagh, 1; Brewster, 1.
The spirit of this contest continued until fall. Senator Davies, a friend of Mr. Grow, was a prominent candidate for the Republican nomination for State Treasurer. He was beaten by General Silas M. Baily, and Davies and his friends cordially made Baily’s nomination unanimous. Charles S. Wolfe, himself the winter before a candidate for United States Senator, was dissatisfied. He suddenly raised the Independent flag, in a telegram to the Philadelphia Press, and as he announced was “the nominee of a convention of one” for State Treasurer. After a canvass of remarkable energy on the part of Mr. Wolfe, General Baily was elected, without suffering materially from the division. Mr. Wolfe obtained nearly 50,000 votes, but as almost half of them were Democratic, the result was, as stated, not seriously affected.
The Independents in Pennsylvania, however, were subdivided into two wings, known as the Continental and the Wolfe men—the former having met since the election last fall, (State Senator John Stewart, chairman) and proclaimed themselves willing and determined to abide all Republican nominations fairly made, and to advocate “reform within the party lines.” These gentlemen supported Gen. Baily and largely contributed to his success, and as a rule they regard with disfavor equal to that of the Regulars, what is known as the Wolfe movement. These divisions have not extended to other States, nor have they yet assumed the shape of third parties unless Mr. Wolfe’s individual canvass can be thus classed. Up to this writing (March 10, 1882,) neither wing has taken issue with President Arthur or his appointments, though there were some temporary indications of this when Attorney General MacVeagh, of Pennsylvania, persisted in having his resignation accepted. President Arthur refused to accept, on the ground that he desired MacVeagh’s services in the prosecution of the Star Route cases, and Mr. MacVeagh withdrew for personal and other reasons not yet fully explained. In this game of political fence the position of the President was greatly strengthened.
Singularly enough, in the only two States where factious divisions have been recently manifested in the Republican ranks, they effected almost if not quite as seriously the Democratic party. There can be but one deduction drawn from this, to wit:—That a number in both of the great parties, were for the time at least, weary of their allegiance. It is possible that nothing short of some great issue will restore the old partisan unity, and partisan unity in a Republic, where there are but two great parties, is not to be deplored if relieved of other than mere political differences. The existence of but two great parties, comparatively free from factions, denotes government health; where divisions are numerous and manifest increasing growth and stubbornness, there is grave danger to Republican institutions. We need not, however, philosophize when Mexico and the South American Republics are so near.
The Caucus.
Both the “Independents” of Pennsylvania and the “Half-Breeds” of New York at first proclaimed their opposition to the caucus system of nominating candidates for U. S. Senators, and the newspapers in their interest wrote as warmly for a time against “King Caucus” as did the dissatisfied Democratic journals in the days of De Witt Clinton. The situation, however, was totally different, and mere declamation could not long withstand the inevitable. In Pennsylvania almost nightly “conferences” were held by the Independents, as indeed they were in New York, though in both States a show of hostility was kept up to nominating in party caucus men who were to be elected by representative, more plainly legislative votes. It was at first claimed that in the Legislature each man ought to act for himself or his constituents, but very shortly it was found that the caucuses of the separate wings were as binding upon the respective wings as they could have been upon the whole. Dead-locks were interminable as long as this condition of affairs obtained, and hostility to the caucus system was before very long quietly discouraged and finally flatly abandoned, for each struggle was ended by the ratification of a general caucus, and none of them could have been ended without it. The several attempts to find other means to reach a result, only led the participants farther away from the true principle, under republican forms at least, of the right of the majority to rule. In Pennsylvania, when Mr. Oliver withdrew, fifty of his friends assembled and informally named General Beaver, and by this action sought to bind the original 95 friends of Oliver. Their conduct was excused by the plea that they represented a majority of their faction. It failed to bind all of the original number, though some of the Independents were won. The Independents, rather the original 44, bound themselves in writing not to change their course of action unless there was secured the previous concurrence of two-thirds, and this principle was extended to the 56 who supported Mr. Bayne. Then when the joint committee of 24 was agreed upon, it was bound by a rule requiring three-fourths to recommend a candidate. All of these were plain departures from a great principle, and the deeper the contest became, the greater the departure. True, these were but voluntary forms, but they were indefensible, and are only referred to now to show the danger of mad assaults upon great principles when personal and factious aims are at stake. Opposition to the early Congressional caucus was plainly right, since one department of the Government was by voluntary agencies actually controlling another, while the law gave legal forms which could be more properly initiated through voluntary action. The writer believes, and past contests all confirm the view that the voluntary action can only be safely employed by the power by the law with the right of selection. Thus the people elect township, county and State officers, and it is their right and duty by the best attainable voluntary action to indicate their choice. This is done through the caucus or convention, the latter not differing from the former save in extent and possibly breadth of representation. The same rule applies to all offices elective by the people. It cannot properly apply to appointive offices, and while the attempt to apply it to the election of U. S. Senators shows a strong desire on the part, frequently of the more public-spirited citizens, to exercise a greater share in the selection of these officers than the law directly gives them, yet their representatives can very properly be called upon to act as they would act if they had direct power in the premises, and such action leads them into a party caucus, where the will of the majority of their respective parties can be fairly ascertained, and when ascertained respected. The State Legislatures appoint U. S. Senators, and the Representatives and Senators of the States are bound to consider in their selection the good of the entire State. If this comports with the wish of their respective districts, very well; if it does not, their duty is not less plain. Probably the time will never come when the people will elect United States Senators; to do that is to radically change the Federal system, and to practically destroy one of the most important branches of the Government; yet he is not a careful observer who does not note a growing disposition on the part of the people, and largely the people of certain localities, and imaginary political sub-divisions, to control these selections. The same is true of Presidential nominations, where masses of people deny the right of State Conventions to instruct their delegates-at-large. In many States the people composing either of the great parties now select their own representative delegates to National Conventions, and where their selections are not respected, grave party danger is sure to follow. There is nothing wrong in this, since it points to, and is but paving the way for a more popular selection of Presidents and Vice-Presidents—to an eventual selection of Presidential electors probably by Congressional districts. Yet those to be selected at large must through practical voluntary forms be nominated in that way, and the partisan State Convention is the best method yet devised for this work, and its instructions should be as binding as those of the people upon their representatives. In this government of ours there is voluntary and legal work delegated to the people directly; there is legal work delegated to appointing powers, and an intelligent discrimination should ever be exercised between the two. “Render unto Cæsar those things which are Cæsar’s,” unless there be a plain desire, backed by a good reason, to promote popular reforms as enduring as the practices and principles which they are intended to support.
Fredrick W. Whitridge, in an able review of the caucus system published[[39]] in Lalor’s Encyclopædia of Political Science, says:
“A caucus, in the political vocabulary of the United States, is primarily a private meeting of voters holding similar views, held prior to an election for the purpose of furthering such views at the election. With the development of parties, and the rule of majorities, the caucus or some equivalent has become an indispensable adjunct to party government, and it may now be defined as a meeting of the majority of the electors belonging to the same party in any political or legislative body held preliminary to a meeting thereof, for the purpose of selecting candidates to be voted for, or for the purpose of determining the course of the party at the meeting of the whole body. The candidates of each party are universally selected by caucus, either directly or indirectly through delegates to conventions chosen in caucuses. In legislative bodies the course of each party is often predetermined with certainty in caucus, and often discussion between parties has been, in consequence, in some degree superseded. The caucus system is, in short, the basis of a complete electoral system which has grown up within each party, side by side with that which is alone contemplated by the laws. This condition has in recent years attracted much attention, and has been bitterly announced as an evil. It was, however, early foreseen. John Adams, in 1814, wrote in the “Tenth Letter on Government:” “They have invented a balance to all balance in their caucuses. We have congressional caucuses, state caucuses, county caucuses, city caucuses, district caucuses, town caucuses, parish caucuses, and Sunday caucuses at church doors, and in these aristocratical caucuses elections have been decided.” The caucus is a necessary consequence of majority rule. If the majority is to define the policy of a party, there must be some method within each party of ascertaining the mind of the majority, and settling the party programme, before it meets the opposing party at the polls. The Carlton and Reform clubs discharge for the Tories and Liberals many of the functions of a congressional caucus. Meetings of the members of the parties in the reichstag, the corps legislatif and the chamber of deputies are not unusual, although they have generally merely been for consultation, and neither in England, France, Germany or Italy, has any such authority been conceded to the wish of the majority of a party as we have rested in the decision of a caucus. What has been called a caucus has been established by the Liberals of Birmingham, England, as to which, see a paper by W. Fraser Rae, in the “International Review” for August, 1880. The origin of the term caucus is obscure. It has been derived from the Algonquin word Kaw-kaw-wus—to consult, to speak—but the more probable derivation makes it a corruption of caulkers. In the early politics of Boston, and particularly during the early difficulties between the townsmen and the British troops, the seafaring men and those employed about the ship yards were prominent among the town-people, and there were numerous gatherings which may have very easily come to be called by way of reproach a meeting of caulkers, after the least influential class who attended them, or from the caulking house or caulk house in which they were held. What was at first a derisive description, came to be an appellation, and the gatherings of so-called caulkers became a caucus. John Pickering, in a vocabulary of words and phrases peculiar to the United States (Boston, 1816), gives this derivation of the word, and says several gentlemen mentioned to him that they had heard this derivation. Gordon, writing in 1774, says: “More than fifty years ago Mr. Samuel Adams’ father and twenty others, one or two from the north end of the town where all the ship business is carried on, used to meet, make a caucus and lay their plan for introducing certain persons into places of trust and power. When they had settled it they separated, and each used their particular influence within his own circle. He and his friends would furnish themselves with ballots, including the names of the parties fixed upon, which they distributed on the days of election. By acting in concert, together with a careful and extensive distribution of ballots, they generally carried their elections to their own mind. In like manner it was that Mr. Samuel Adams first became a representative for Boston.” (History of the American Revolution, vol. i., p. 365.) February, 1763, Adams writes in his diary: “This day I learned that the caucus club meets at certain times in the garret of Tom Dawes, the adjutant of the Boston regiment. He has a large house and he has a movable partition in his garret which he takes down and the whole club meets in his room. There they smoke tobacco until they cannot see one end of the room from another. There they drink flip, I suppose, and there they choose a moderator who puts questions to the vote regularly; and selectmen, assessors, collectors, wardens, fire wards and representatives are regularly chosen in the town. Uncle Fairfield, Story, Ruddock, Adams, Cooper, and a rudis indigestaques moles of others, are members. They send committees to wait on the merchants’ club, and to propose in the choice of men and measures. Captain Cunningham says, they have often solicited him to go to the caucuses; they have assured him their benefit in his business, etc.” (Adams’ Works, vol. ii., p. 144.) Under the title caucus should be considered the congressional nominating caucus; the caucuses of legislative assemblies; primary elections, still known outside the larger cities as caucuses; the evils which have been attributed to the latter, and the remedies which have been proposed. These will accordingly be mentioned in the order given.