This was, as it proved, but a temporary settlement on the principle of popular sovereignty, and was regarded at the time as a triumph of the views of Stephen A. Douglas by the friends of that great politician. The more radical leaders of the South looked upon it with distrust, but the blood of the more excitable in both sections was rapidly rising toward fever heat, and the border men from the Free and Slave States alike were preparing to act upon a compromise which in effect invited a conflict.
The Presidential election in 1856 had singularly enough encouraged the more aggressive of both sections. Buchanan’s election was a triumph for the South; Fremont’s large vote showed the power of a growing party as yet but partially organized, and crippled by schisms which grew out of the attempt to unite all elements of opposition to the Democrats. The general plan of the latter was now changed into an attempt to unite all of the free-soil elements into a party organization against slavery, and from that time forward until its total abolition slavery was the paramount issue in the minds of the more aggressive men of the north. Lincoln voiced the feelings of the Republicans when he declared in one of his Illinois speeches:—
“We will, hereafter, speak for freedom, and against slavery, as long as the Constitution guaranties free speech; until everywhere, on this wide land, the sun shall shine, and the rain shall fall, and the wind shall blow upon no man who goes forth to unrequited toil.”
In the Congressional battle over the admission of Kansas and Nebraska, Douglas was the most conspicuous figure, and the language which we have quoted from Buchanan’s inaugural was the literal meaning which Douglas had given to his idea of “popular” or “squatter sovereignty.”
Prior to the Kansas struggle the Free Soilers of the North had regarded Douglas as an ally of the South, and his admitted ambition for the Presidency gave color to this suspicion. He it was who reported and carried through Congress the bill for the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, a measure which at that time was thought to obstruct Southern designs in the territories of the great West, but this repeal proved in fact the first plain steps toward the freedom of the territories. Having repealed that compromise, something must take its place, and what better than “popular sovereignty,” thought Douglas. Territories contiguous to the Slave States, or in the same latitude, would thus naturally revert to slavery; while those farther north, and at that time least likely of early settlement, would be dedicated to freedom. There was a grave miscalculation just here. Slave-owners were not apt to change their homesteads, and could not with either profit or convenience carry their property to new lands which might or might not be fruitful in the crops best adapted to slave labor. Slave-owners were few in number compared with the free citizens of the North and the thousands of immigrants annually landing on our shores. People who had once moved from the New England or Middle States westward, were rather fond of it, and many of these swelled the tide which constantly sought homes in the territories; and where these did not go in person their sons and daughters were quite willing to imitate the early adventures of their parents. All these counted for the North under the doctrine of “popular sovereignty,” and it was the failure of that doctrine to aid the South which from this time forward caused that section to mistrust the friendship of Douglas.
No political writer has since questioned his motives, and we doubt if it can be done successfully. His views may have undergone some change since 1850, and it would be singular if they had not; for a mind as discerning as his could hardly fail to note the changes going on all about him, and no where more rapidly than in his own State. He thought his doctrine at least adapted to the time, and he stood by it with rare bravery and ability. If it had been accepted by the Republicans, it would have been fatal to their organization as a party. We doubt the ability of any party to stand long upon any mere compromise, made to suit the exigencies and avoid the dangers of the moment. It may be said that our government, first based on a confederacy and then a constitution, with a system of checks and balances, with a division of power between the people and the States, is but a compromise; but the assertion will not hold good. These things were adopted because of a belief at the time that they were in themselves right, or as nearly right as those who participated in their adoption were given to see the right. There was certainly no attempt at a division of right and wrong, and the closest investigation will show nothing beyond a surrender of power for the good of all, which is in itself the very essence and beginning of government.
We have said that Douglas fought bravely for his idea, and every movement in his most remarkable campaign with Lincoln for the U. S. Senate demonstrated the fact. The times were full of agitation and excitement, and these were increased when it became apparent that Buchanan’s administration would aid the effort to make Kansas a slave State. Douglas was the first to see that the application of administration machinery to his principle, would degrade and rob it of its fairness. He therefore resented Buchanan’s interference, and in turn Buchanan’s friends sought to degrade him by removing him from the chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Territories, the position which had given him marked control over all questions pertaining to the organization of territories and the admission of new States.
The Lincoln and Douglas Debate.
The Senatorial term of Douglas was drawing near to its close, when in July, 1858, he left Washington to enter upon the canvass for re-election. The Republican State Convention of Illinois had in the month previous met at Springfield, and nominated Abraham Lincoln as a candidate for United States Senator, this with a view to pledge all Republican members of the Legislature to vote for him—a practice since gone into disuse in most of the States, because of the rivalries which it engenders and the aggravation of the dangers of defeat sure to follow in the selection of a candidate in advance. “First get your goose, then cook it,” inelegantly describes the basic principles of improved political tactics. But the Republicans, particularly of the western part of Illinois, had a double purpose in the selection of Lincoln. He was not as radical as they, but he well represented the growing Republican sentiment, and he best of all men could cope with Douglas on the stump in a canvass which they desired should attract the attention of the Nation, and give shape to the sentiment of the North on all questions pertaining to slavery. The doctrine of “popular sovereignty” was not acceptable to the Republicans, the recent repeal of the Missouri compromise having led them, or the more radical portion of them, to despise all compromise measures.
The plan of the Illinois Republicans, if indeed it was a well-settled plan, accomplished even more than was anticipated, though it did not result in immediate success. It gave to the debate which followed between Lincoln and Douglas a world-wide celebrity, and did more to educate and train the anti-slavery sentiment, taken in connection with the ever-growing excitement in Kansas, than anything that could have happened.