Mr. President, I might pause to inquire if that is a part of the doctrine of my colleague and the Senators who co-operate with him, when they stand here to represent the party for which Governor Walker then spoke, the pretended debt-payers of Virginia? It was this repeal bill which the Virginia court of appeals held to be unconstitutional, and here the matter rested until the State had accumulated interest arrears to over five million dollars, beside diverting one and a half million dollars which was dedicated by the constitution to the public free schools.
In 1877 what is known as the Barbour bill was proposed and passed, not a few of the latter-day self-styled debt-payers being among its most zealous supporters. Although this did not repeal in terms the original funding bill, it was nevertheless vetoed by the governor.
Such was our condition at the succeeding election—schools reduced 50 per cent., length of sessions abridged, asylums sustained by money borrowed from the banks—after exhausting every possible expedient even to a reduction of judicial salaries, that a Legislature was returned pledged to a resettlement of this debt.
That settlement came in the form of the brokers’ bill, for which my colleague stands at home and here the champion, aided and abetted by distinguished gentlemen on this floor. I commend the virtuous democracy of this Chamber to read that bill, and then tell this Senate whether there ever was a more undemocratic measure than the bill propounded in Virginia by the party whose cause they espouse.
That settlement came in the form of the broker’s bill, as I have said, and this was the last repeal of the original contract. Yet my colleague would say the readjusters of to-day disregard the court decisions. Surely he has not forgotten that he was upon the hustings in Virginia advocating each of the successive measures repealing the “irrepealable” contract, while in every instance the readjusters proper opposed the new measure.
But here again I am called upon to answer the charge of personal inconsistency. My colleague cannot ascertain that I opposed the funding scheme of 1871—a measure which, I assert without the fear of contradiction, not only repudiated but forcibly repudiated what my colleague understands to be one-third of the debt of Virginia. I suggest to my fellow-Senators on the opposite side to take care of that contamination of which they have warned the country in respect to the readjusters of Virginia.
My colleague adverted to the Richmond Whig, and proclaimed it as my mouthpiece. Mr. President, nobody speaks for me; I speak for myself. Why not have ascertained from the same source how I stood on the funding bill of 1871? Senators will not find that I ever supported the measure of 1871.
Passing over what appears in my colleague’s speech as extracts from newspapers, to whose misstatements he has contributed a full share, I come now to notice his animadversions on the Riddleberger bill. If his criticisms were based on fact and a proper understanding of that measure, they would be unanswerable. He says that “the ‘Riddleberger bill’ has been substantially pronounced unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States.” I ask him in what particular? Is it in this—that it does not recognize the interest that accrued during the war? If so, will my learned colleague inform me upon what principle of right he last summer sustained a measure which repudiated one-half of the interest that has accrued since the complete restoration of our State? Does he not know that that measure of forcible readjustment absolutely repudiated one-half of the accrued and unfunded interest, while the Riddleberger bill provides for paying it dollar for dollar? The difference is simply this: that since 1871 we have denied the right of the creditor to exact war interest and proposed to pay him all else in full. Our adversaries would and did fund that war interest and proposed to repudiate one-half of that which we are in honor and in law bound to pay.
Is it unconstitutional in that it pays but 3 per cent.? The only measure ever passed by the Virginia Assembly to pay as much as 4 per cent. and the only one under which one-third of our creditors have received a penny of interest, was introduced and patronized by Mr. Riddleberger. The first time that our Legislature ever voiced 3 per cent. was when they passed the brokers’ job, the pet scheme of my colleague, so ably re-enforced in his advocacy of it on this floor by distinguished gentlemen on the other side, the Legislature then themselves admitting and declaring in the preamble of their bill that this is all the State can pay for ten years “without destroying its industries;” and last winter every legislator of their party voted to run the 3 per cent. for the whole time.
Is it unconstitutional in that it does not exempt the bonds from taxation forever, as the brokers’ bill attempted to do, a feature peculiar to that measure for paying the debt of Virginia which my colleague advocates here? If so, I would respectfully refer my colleague to his State constitution, which says that all property shall be taxed equally and uniformly; that no one species of property shall be taxed higher than another, and that only such property as is used for religious, educational, and charitable purposes may be exempt from taxation. My learned colleague, who so unkindly characterized the patron of that bill as a county court lawyer, cites only Hartman vs. Greenhow as the case which holds this bill unconstitutional. That case decided no principle that this bill infringes. The Riddleberger bill imposes no tax upon bonds held either in or out of the State. It simply does not exempt any. By what authority, I would ask my colleague, can such a tax be made and collected? He must answer to the party which he undertakes to represent here for doing an unconstitutional act: to tax bonds of the State of Virginia held by a non-resident. The Riddleberger bill does not tax them. Whenever the General Assembly, carrying out the Riddleberger bill, shall endeavor to tax bonds held out of the State, it will be time for the Senator to renew the test in the Supreme Court of the United States and cite the precedent of Hartman vs. Greenhow.