American politics (non-partisan) from the beginning to date

by Thomas V. Cooper; Hector T. Fenton

In August, 1796, prior to the meeting of the Congressional caucus which then placed candidates for the Presidency in nomination, Washington issued his celebrated Farewell Address, in which he gave notice that he would retire from public life at the expiration of his term. He had been solicited to be a candidate for re-election (a third term) and told that all the people could unite upon him—a statement which, without abating one jot, our admiration for the man, would doubtless have been called in question by the Republicans, who had become implacably hostile to his political views, and who were encouraged to believe they could win control of the Presidency, by their rapidly increasing power in the House. Yet the address was everywhere received with marks of admiration. Legislatures commended it by resolution and ordered it to be engrossed upon their records; journals praised it, and upon the strength of its plain doctrines the Federalists took new courage, and prepared to win in the Presidential battle which followed. Both parties were plainly arrayed and confident, and so close was the result that the leaders of both were elected—John Adams, the nominee of the Federalists, to the Presidency, and Thomas Jefferson, the nominee of the Republicans, to the Vice-Presidency. The law which then obtained was that the candidate who received the highest number of electoral votes, took the first place, the next highest, the second. Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina was the Federal nominee for Vice-President, and Aaron Burr of the Republicans. Adams received 71 electoral votes, Jefferson 68, Pinckney 59, Burr 30, scattering 48. Pinckney had lost 12 votes, while Burr lost 38—a loss of popularity which the latter regained four years later. The first impressions which our forefathers had of this man were the best.

John Adams was inaugurated as President in Philadelphia, at Congress Hall, March 4th, 1797, and in his inaugural was careful to deny the charge that the Federal party had any sympathy for England, but reaffirmed his endorsement of the policy of Washington as to strict neutrality. To this extent he sought to soften the asperities of the parties, and measurably succeeded, though the times were still stormy. The French revolution had reached its highest point, and our people still took sides. Adams found he would have to arm to preserve neutrality and at the same time punish the aggression of either of the combatants. This was our first exhibition of “armed neutrality.” An American navy was quickly raised, and every preparation made for defending the rights of Americans. An alliance with France was refused, after which the American Minister was dismissed and the French navy began to cripple our trade. In May, 1797, President Adams felt it his duty to call an extra session of Congress, which closed in July. The Senate approved of negotiations for reconciliation with France. They were attempted but, proved fruitless; in May, 1798, a full naval armament was authorized, and soon several French vessels were captured before there was any declaration of war. Indeed, neither power declared war, and as soon as France discovered how earnest the Americans were she made overtures for an adjustment of difficulties, and these resulted in the treaty of 1800.

The Republicans, though warmly favoring a contest, did not heartily support that inaugurated by Adams, and contended after this that the militia and a small naval force were sufficient for internal defense. They denounced the position of the Federals, who favored the enlargement of the army and navy, as measures calculated to overawe public sentiment in time of peace. The Federals, however, through their prompt resentment of the aggressions of France, had many adherents to their party. They organized their power and sought to perpetuate it by the passage of the alien and sedition, and a naturalization law.

The alien and sedition law gave the President authority “to order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government thereof, to depart out of the territory of the United States, within such time as shall be expressed in such order.” The provisions which followed were in keeping with that quoted, the 3d section commanding every master of a ship entering a port of the United States, immediately on his arrival, to make report in writing to the collector of customs, the names of all aliens on board, etc. The act was to continue in force for two years from the date of its passage, and it was approved June 25th, 1798.

A resolution was introduced in the Senate on the 25th of April, 1798, by Mr. Hillhouse of Connecticut, to inquire what provision of law ought to be made, &c., as to the removal of such aliens as may be dangerous to the peace of the country, &c. This resolution was adopted the next day, and Messrs. Hillhouse, Livermore and Read were appointed the committee, and subsequently reported the bill. It passed the Senate by 16 to 7, and the House by 46 to 40, the Republicans in the latter body resisting it warmly. The leading opposing idea was that it lodged with the Executive too much power, and was liable to great abuse. It has frequently since, in arguments against centralized power, been used for illustration by political speakers.

The Naturalization law, favored by the Federalists, because they knew they could acquire few friends either from newly arrived English or French aliens, among other requirements provided that an alien must reside in the United States fourteen years before he could vote. The Republicans denounced this law as calculated to check immigration, and dangerous to our country in the fact that it caused too many inhabitants to owe no allegiance. They also asserted, as did those who opposed Americanism later on in our history, that America was properly an asylum for all nations, and that those coming to America should freely share all the privileges and liberties of the government.

These laws and the political resentments which they created gave a new and what eventually proved a dangerous current to political thought and action. They were the immediate cause of the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798, Jefferson being the author of the former and Madison of the latter.

These resolutions were full of political significance, and gave tone to sectional discussion up to the close of the war for the Union. They first promulgated the doctrine of nullification or secession, and political writers mistake who point to Calhoun as the father of that doctrine. It began with the old Republicans under the leadership of Jefferson and Madison, and though directly intended as protests against the alien and sedition, and the naturalization laws of Congress, they kept one eye upon the question of slavery—rather that interest was kept in view in their declarations, and yet the authors of both were anything but warm advocates of slavery. They were then striving, however, to reinforce the opposition to the Federal party, which the administration of Adams had thus far apparently weakened, and they had in view the brief agitation which had sprung up in 1793, five years before, on the petition to Congress of a Pennsylvania society “to use its powers to stop the traffic in slaves.” On the question of referring this petition to a committee there arose a sectional debate. Men took sides not because of the party to which they belonged, but the section, and for the first time the North and South were arrayed against each other on a question not then treated either as partisan or political, but which most minds then saw must soon become both partisan and sectional. Some of the Southern debaters, in their protests against interference, thus early threatened civil war. With a view to better protect their rights to slave property, they then advocated and succeeded in passing the first fugitive slave law. This was approved February 12, 1793.

The resolutions of 1798 will be found in the book devoted to political platforms. So highly were these esteemed by the Republicans of that day, and by the interests whose support they so shrewdly invited, that they more than counterbalanced the popularity acquired by the Federals in their resistance to France, and by 1800 they caused a rupture in the Cabinet of Adams.

In the Presidential election of 1800 John Adams was the nominee for President and C. C. Pinckney for Vice-President. A “Congressional Convention” of Republicans, held in Philadelphia, nominated Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr as candidates for these offices. On the election which followed the Republicans chose 73 electors and the Federalists 65. Each elector voted for two persons, and the Republicans so voted that they unwisely gave Jefferson and Burr each 73 votes. Neither being highest, it was not legally determined which should be President or Vice-President, and the election had to go to the House. The Federalists threw 65 votes to Adams and 64 to Pinckney. The Republicans could have done the same, but Burr’s intrigue and ambition prevented this, and the result was a protracted contest in the House, and one which put the country in great peril, but which plainly pointed out some of the imperfections of the electoral features of the Constitution. The Federalists proposed to confess the inability of the House to agree through the vote by States, but to this proposition the Republicans threatened armed resistance. The Federalists next attempted a combination with the friends of Aaron Burr, but this specimen of bargaining to deprive a nominee of the place to which it was the plain intention of his party to elect him, really contributed to Jefferson’s popularity, if not in that Congress, certainly before the people. He was elected on the 36th ballot.