SECTION II.
THE TERRITORIAL WATERS
CHAPTER I.
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA.
From what has been said in previous chapters, it is apparent that the extensive claims which were formerly made to the dominion of the English or British seas were practically abandoned in the eighteenth century, and the pretensions of other states to a similar and more effective dominion in particular seas long ago shared the same fate. It is now settled as indisputable, both by the usage of nations and the principles of international law, that the open ocean cannot be appropriated by any one Power. But it is also as firmly established that all states possess sovereign rights in those parts of the sea which wash their shores, although there is not, and has never been, universal agreement as to the precise nature of those rights, or as to the extent of the sea that may be thus appropriated. While the general movement of opinion and practice in modern times has thus been from the mare clausum to the mare liberum—from the sea held to be appropriated by particular nations to the sea under no sovereignty, but free and open to all for all purposes,—there has been another movement in the opposite direction, by which the exclusive rights of maritime states in the waters immediately adjoining their coasts have come to be more clearly recognised and definitely incorporated in international law. To this extent all maritime countries now possess a sovereignty of the sea.
It is desirable to trace the evolution of this limited sovereignty over what is now known as the territorial waters or territorial sea (also named the neighbouring, proximal, adjacent, or littoral sea—mare proximum, mare vicinum, mer territoriale, nächstangrenzendes Meer), and to consider in particular the two main aspects it presents,—first, the actual practice of nations on the one hand, and, second, the opinions of the accredited writers on international law.
The sovereignty over the so-called territorial sea has sometimes been regarded as the direct remnant of a sovereignty which was previously asserted by particular nations over whole seas or large parts of them.[968] This is true in a general sense, but in tracing the historical evolution of the territorial waters it is found that the steps by which the transference was effected varied in different cases. The pretensions of Denmark, for example, to a wide dominion over the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic, were slowly curtailed by gradual concessions to the opposition of other Powers, so that the extensive territorial waters at present pertaining to Norway may be looked upon as the residuum of the ancient claim. The exclusive rights have persisted, while the area over which they are exercised has dwindled. In like manner, the equally extensive territorial waters of Sweden may be regarded as an abridgment of her old claims in the Baltic. The same process may have operated in the case of Spain and Portugal, both of which Powers now claim maritime sovereignty to a distance of six miles from their coasts; but here the successive stages of contraction are not obvious. The territorial sea now held to pertain to Great Britain, so far as it has been defined, did not originate in this way, by direct descent from the old claim to the dominion of the British seas. That claim simply died out and vanished in the lapse of time, without apparently leaving a single juridical or international right behind it. The British territorial waters, as usually defined, are of modern origin, and were derived from the international jurisprudence of the Continent, and especially from the doctrine of Bynkershoek, to be referred to later.
Even during the time when some nations were asserting a wide maritime dominion, and other nations were opposing such pretensions, there was a general recognition that every maritime state was entitled to exercise jurisdiction over some extent of the neighbouring sea. This was admitted by the most thoroughgoing advocates of the mare liberum, as by Grotius himself, and it was acknowledged by the common usage of nations. The rights exercised by the crown of England, for instance, in the so-called King’s Chambers in the seventeenth century were apparently not challenged by foreign Powers. But while the sovereign rights of a state over a part of the adjacent sea were recognised by the usage of nations and the opinions of publicists, there was no agreement as to the extent which might be appropriated, and various limits or boundaries have from time to time been proposed or adopted, by which the sea pertaining to a state might be divided off from that which was open and free to all. From an early date attempts were made by jurists to discover some general principle or to lay down rules which might be applied in all such cases. Some of these rules were of such a nature as to assign to states an extent of sea almost as great as any comprised under the widest claims to maritime sovereignty, and none of them received a general assent. The early English lawyers of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Glanville, Bracton, Britton, and “Fleta,” merely followed the Roman law with regard to the sea—that is to say, they held that it is by its nature common, like the air, and they did not suggest any limit within which the prince of the adjoining state had exclusive jurisdiction or dominion ([see p. 66]).
It is in the writings of the early Italian jurists, who lived after the time when Venice by force of arms had established her sovereignty over the Adriatic, that we first meet with proposals to assign legal limits to the maritime jurisdiction of the neighbouring state. Bartolus of Saxo-Ferrato, a great Perugian jurist who died in 1357, and whose authority in the middle ages was very great, declared the law to be that jurisdiction extended to a distance of one hundred miles from the coast, or less than two days’ journey from it. Within this space the ruler had power to apprehend and punish delinquents just as he had on land.[969] Baldus Ubaldus, another eminent Italian jurist, who was a pupil of Bartolus and died in 1400, also allotted a wide limit to the maritime rights of the prince of the adjoining territory; but he reduced the space from one hundred to sixty miles, a distance which was supposed to be equal to one day’s journey from the coast.[970] The boundaries assigned by these jurists, or sometimes the equivalent of one or two days’ voyage from the coast, were very generally accepted by civilians later, although frequently with qualification, more particularly as to the nature of the rights to be exercised.[971] Bartolus confined the rights of the prince to jurisdiction and the appropriation of islands, and since the distance prescribed included the space within which navigation in those times was almost entirely restricted, it is probable that the primary idea was the maintenance of order and the suppression of piracy. The underlying principle was the range of navigation from the coast or from a port, just as later it was the range of guns.