It does not appear that this declaration of infamy was ever made known to Gilles de Retz. It was made by the Bishop of Nantes in accordance with his ecclesiastical right and duty. It had, from early Christian times, been the duty of the bishops of the Church to make episcopal visits throughout their respective dioceses. By the capitularies of Charlemagne and Carloman, it became the bishop’s right, if not his duty, to listen to any complaints of the common people. This was in the nature of an inquest by church authority into the crimes of high or powerful persons, or into public scandals which were without other rectification. The proceeding might be likened to an ecclesiastical grand jury. It was, like that of the grand jury, a secret inquest, inquisitio famæ, and in this particular instance, establishing the infamy of Gilles, it opened against him the inquisitory proceeding according to the rule: Inquisitionem debet clamosa insinuatio prævenire. This declaration of infamy, made by the bishop and based upon the complaints he had received and scandals he had heard during his episcopal visit, was the beginning of the prosecution against Gilles.
The secret investigation doubtless continued and culminated in the citation of the Bishop to Gilles de Retz, September 13th, to appear on September 19th, and answer the charges. After the preamble and declarations of the requisite power and authority, and his knowledge of the crimes of Gilles and of the public clamour, called in the official document hurlements ululantium, the bishop proceeds:
“For these causes we will no longer hide the monstrous things, nor will we allow heresy to develop itself, that heresy which, like a cancer, devours everything if it is not promptly extirpated even to the last root. Farther than that, we would apply a remedy as prompt as it is efficacious. Therefore we enjoin you, all and singular, and to those of you in particular to whom the present letter shall come, immediately and in a definite manner, each for himself and without counting on the other, without depending upon the care of any other, to cite before us, or before the official of our cathedral church, on Monday, the fête-day of the Exaltation of the True Cross, September 19, Gilles, as aforesaid designated the Baron of Retz, to submit to our authority and to accept our jurisdiction; we ourselves cite him by these letters to appear before our bar to respond to the crimes that are laid upon him. Execute, therefore, these orders, you, and each of you, and every one of you, cause them to be executed.
“Given at Nantes on Tuesday, the 13th of September, in the year of our Lord, 1440.
“By the command of the Bishop of Nantes.
(Signed) “Jean Guiole.”
Whether the Bishop of Nantes had, in his official capacity, already established a permanent ecclesiastical court for the trial of such cases as might properly be brought before it, does not appear; nor whether he had the necessary paraphernalia of officers such as prosecutors, clerks, record-keepers, and an executive officer to serve processes, maintain order, etc., etc., as would be usual and necessary in all regularly established courts. So it is not known whether the executive officer charged with the service of this writ was a regular officer, or only one appointed for the occasion; but it abundantly appears that one Robert Guillaumet, a notary of Nantes, received the writ for execution, and that in this matter he acted as executive officer for the Bishop.
Gilles de Retz was at that time at his château of Machecoul. Robert Guillaumet took to his aid Jean l’Abbé, a captain in the service of the Duke of Brittany, with a number of his troop, and together they repaired to Machecoul for the purpose of arresting Gilles on the warrant of the Bishop.
There has been some discussion over the part taken in the affair by the Duke of Brittany himself, and how far the proceeding met his approval, and how far he stood ready to give aid and assistance in carrying out the purpose of the Bishop. Michelet (Histoire de France, vol. v.) asserts that the Duke of Brittany was highly favourable to the accusation; that “he was delighted at the opportunity to thus strike at a Laval,” and he ascribes this to the fact that the Laval family, though related to the Montforts, of which the Duke was one, had formed against him an opposition, the intention of which was to deliver Brittany to France. There can be but little doubt that the Duke of Brittany was entirely favourable to the Bishop—they were near relatives and good friends, they always had stood together, and though the Bishop never had had any dispute with Gilles de Retz, yet the Duke frequently had.
The Duke had already foreseen the waning fortune of Gilles, and stood ready to profit by it. He had refused to make publication in Brittany of the decree of interdiction of the King, for the sake of the opportunity which might accrue to obtain good bargains in purchasing the property of Gilles. It is scarcely possible, dependent as he must have been upon the Duke and his government and the power and force of the secular arm for the execution of any decree that might be passed, that the Bishop of Nantes would proceed against so powerful a baron as Gilles, the dean of the nobility of Brittany, Marshal of France, and Lieutenant-General of the Duke’s army, and enter upon an undertaking so gigantic, so fraught with danger, and so easy to miscarry, without having first consulted with, and obtained the approval and favour of, his sovereign, with the promise of material assistance and governmental aid in case of need. This understanding between the Bishop and the Duke is established by the outcome of the process. We see that in every step the Bishop not only received countenance and favour at the hands of the Duke, but that he could be relied upon to furnish the necessary strong arm for the execution of the Bishop’s writs and decrees.
Armed with the writ and warrant of arrest, Robert Guillaumet and Jean l’Abbé proceeded to Machecoul with their troop of soldiers. What was their reception? Would they be successful in their undertaking and bring the mighty Baron of Retz back to Nantes as prisoner? Would he yield to the mandates of the law, obey the command of the Bishop, and surrender himself as prisoner? He had a château, a veritable stronghold, and he had his army of retainers within it—he could defy both Robert Guillaumet with his writ and Jean l’Abbé with his escort—but would he do so? Would he resist or would he yield? Michelet passes the highest encomiums upon this little band, whose intrepidity and courage he lauds as though it was leading a forlorn hope, for its devotion to duty in entering upon so dangerous a procedure as this arrest. There does not seem, however, to have been any reasonable apprehension of danger. If Gilles resisted arrest, he would simply remain within his castle, refuse to open his gate, and bid defiance to the officers. They would then return to Nantes and report their failure, and what would be done further was a matter for their superiors, the authorities of the kingdom.
There may have been speculations as to what moved Gilles to surrender, and no one can tell with certainty what thus influenced him. He had three alternatives: resist arrest and fight it out with the authorities, drive back the officers and then flee the country, or submit to arrest. To shut himself up in his castle and resist arrest would bring down the entire power of the kingdom, he would be excommunicated by the Church and besieged by the Duke’s army—there was little prospect of success in that direction. Flight would be a confession of guilt, while he would have to leave everything behind—it would be practically impossible for him to take his fortune or even any considerable amount of valuables with him, and he would soon become poverty-stricken and an outcast. It is more likely that he pursued the conservative course of submitting to arrest, trusting to his rank, fortune, power, and the law’s failure to make proof against him, hoping by these to evade conviction.
That he was technically guilty of both heresy and sacrilege there could be but little doubt, and it appears that he had greater fear of these charges than of the others. When he found these were not to be pressed, and that he was to be charged with the abduction of infants, he may have felt stronger in the knowledge that he had never personally committed these crimes, and that they could not be directly proved against him. It is to be remembered that these offences had been running for eight years; that they had been committed in all parts of the country, always in isolated places, east, west, north, south; and Gilles may have come to the conclusion, during the long series of years, that whatever might be proved against his accomplices and active agents, nothing could ever be proved against him. And now, as he must make a decision immediately upon the arrival of Robert Guillaumet with his warrant, Gilles may have felt that the shortest and easiest way was the best. Partly, then, from pride, from policy, from bravado, and in the belief that he would be able to defeat his adversaries in their proofs, he gave orders to lower the bridge, to raise the portcullis, and to open the gates of the castle.