It would appear from such of the history of this great criminal as we have, that the only thing which produced any emotion in him and caused him to exhibit fear or dread of his position was this decree of excommunication. The Bishop was in his forgiving mood, he had resumed his rôle of priest, and, very properly, he consented to do in writing what he had already done verbally, and the decree of excommunication was revoked.
The court adjourned until the Monday thereafter, the 17th of October, when it was expected that the introduction of evidence would begin. The examination was taken either orally (viva voce), before the court, or by the clerks, or greffiers, who acted as examiners, or notaries, and reduced the testimony to writing, reporting it or its substance to the court. De Alneto, Jo. Parvi, and G. Lesne were greffiers, and took most of the testimony for the ecclesiastical court; while de Touscheronde did the same for the civil court, and it was reported under their respective certificates.
October 17th was occupied with witnesses proving the crime of sacrilege committed on the chapel of Saint Étienne-de-Mer-Morte. On the 19th the witnesses were examined touching the crime of abduction of infants. This interests us more than the other, and therefore we follow it with the names of the witnesses: Professor Jean de Pencortic, Jean Andilanrech, André Seguin, Pierre Vimain, Jean Orienst, Jean Brient, Jean Le Veill, Jean Picard, Guillaume Michel, Pierre Drouet, Eutrope Chardavoine, Robert Guillaumet (Doctor), Robin Riou, Jacques Tennecy, and Jean Letournours. All of these were sworn, as before, to tell the truth without consideration of prayers, or recompense, or fear, or favour, or hate, or resentment, or friendship, or acquaintance’s sake. Gilles again declined to cross-examine the witnesses; he declared his willingness to abide by their conscientious declarations.
On the 20th of October the court was convened for the purpose of hearing the depositions, and Gilles was asked, with many questions, what response he had to make. He continually said he had none: nothing to say, nothing to ask of the witnesses, and no witnesses of his own to introduce. Practically, he made no controversy over the testimony against him.
The ecclesiastical court was equal to a court of the Inquisition. Two hundred or more years of practice by the Inquisition in prosecution of heresy had served to formulate rules of practice. And here is introduced one of the curiosities of human nature manifested in trials of justice when they are started in a given direction. Recurring to remarks concerning the legal necessity of obtaining a plea to the indictment or information, in order, possibly, to show the presence of the accused, and speculating upon that as the origin of the theory of the common law requiring the personal presence of the accused in order to give the court jurisdiction to try the case, and the proof of the corpus delicti in order to convict, it seems proper that a similar course of procedure and reasoning should prevail in cases of heresy, an offence which dealt so largely with matters of belief; therefore, the ecclesiastical court, or the Inquisitor, whether established as a court or not, deemed it necessary to appeal to the inner consciousness and the private knowledge of the accused in regard to his belief, and to that end put questions that demanded an answer.
As a matter of course, the prisoner, if a heretic, would refuse to answer because he would not convict himself, and hence grew up (this is only a suggestion of the author) a system which seems horrible and revolting to all lawyers; that is, the application of torture to compel the prisoner to make the necessary answer. No other punishment could be provided, for the accused was already a prisoner, and being punished as such. As nothing in the way of legal punishment further than imprisonment would be visited upon him, the Inquisition fell upon torture as a means of extorting a confession, and thus it forced from the unwilling lips of the accused a declaration of his belief. This would soon extend to include all his knowledge concerning matters at issue; and when he should declare himself innocent, however true it might be, the torture could be applied again and again, harder and greater, until the power of resistance on the part of the accused was overcome, and he would give up because of his inability to resist further.
So it appeared in the case of Gilles. The witnesses had testified to everything necessary to be proved; Gilles had admitted the jurisdiction and the corpus delicti, had practically admitted his immediate and direct connivance and assistance in the various abductions, as well as the sacrilege; still, on his refusal to proceed further, the prosecutor demanded the application of torture.
It was, according to our ideas, a lamentable condition of the course of justice when the application of the torture should have been so common a proceeding that, on demand of the prosecutor, it would be allowed by the court, even when the guilt of the prisoner was beyond dispute. This seems to have been the course of the court in the case of Gilles, and the petition for torture, as made by the prosecutor, was allowed by the court, and the next day set for its application.
“Et tunc idem promotor dixit quod, attenta confessione dicti Egidii, rei, productionibus testium et eorum dictis depositionibus satis constabat de intencione sua in causa et hujusmodi, sed nichilominus, ad veritatem lacius elucidandam et perscrutandam, torturam seu questionem dicto Egidio, reo, per eosdem dominos episcopum Nannetensem et Fratrem Johannem Blouyn, judices, et ipsum questionari debere, instanter postulavit.
“Qui quidem domini episcopus et vicarius dicti inquisitoris, prius habito per eos super his omnibus consilio cum peritis, premissis consideratis, decreverunt questionem sive torturam dicto Egidio de Rays, et eum torturam pati, ipsumque Egidium, reum, torturis sive questionibus subici debere.”
It was said that the instrument of torture had already been put in place, and for the convenience of all parties the prosecutor had chosen the hall adjoining that occupied by Gilles, to the end that the torture could be applied with as little trouble as possible, and whatever might be the result of it that Gilles could be properly attended to in case of need. On this demand of the prosecutor for torture, and its allowance by the judges, Gilles’s courage left him; he became frightened, turned pale and trembled. So full of fear and terror was he, as scarcely to be able to speak intelligently. He threw himself at the feet of his judges and, in broken accents, with cries and sobs, besought and supplicated them not to put him to this test, making all kinds of promises as to what he would do in order to escape torture.