[17] Cf. M. F. Washburn, The Animal Mind, ch. x, xi, where the simpler facts of habituation are suggestively presented in conformity with current views of empirical psychology.
[18] Cf., e. g., Spencer and Gillen, Native Tribes of Central Australia; Seligmann, The Veddas.
[19] Hutton Webster, Primitive Secret Societies, especially ch. iii and iv.
[20] J. G. Frazer, Early History of the Kingship, ch. iv, p. 107.
[21] E. g., some native tribes of Australia; cf. Spencer and Gillen, The Native Tribes of Central Australia, especially ch. i.
[22] Skeat and Blagden, Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula.
[23] J. Murdoch, “The Point Barrow Eskimo,” Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, 1887–1888; F. Boas, “The Central Eskimo,” Ibid, 1884–1885.
[24] E. H. Man, “On the Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands,” J. A. I., vol. xii.
[25] Reports, Bureau of American Ethnology, numerous papers by different writers, perhaps especially Mrs. Stevenson, “The Sia,” 11th Report (1889–1890).
[26] Current economic theory commonly proceeds on the “hedonistic calculus”, so called, (cf. Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation) or the “hedonic principle”, as it has also been called, (cf. Pantaleoni, Pure Economics, ch. i). This “principle” affords the major premise of current theory. It postulates that individual self-seeking is the prime mover of all economic conduct. There is some uncertainty and disagreement among latterday economists as to the precise terms proper to be employed to designate this principle of conduct and its working-out; in the apprehension of later speculators Bentham’s “pleasure and pain” has seemed too bald and materialistic, and they have had recourse to such less precise and definable terms as “gratification,” “satisfactions,” “sacrifice,” “utility” and “disutility,” “psychic income,” etc., but hitherto without any conclusive revision of the terminology. These differences and suggested innovations do not touch the substance of the ancient postulate. Proceeding on this postulate the theoreticians have laid down the broad proposition that “present goods are preferred to future goods”; from which arise many meticulous difficulties of theory, particularly in any attempt to make the deliverances of theory square with workday facts. The modicum of truth contained in this proposition would appear to be better expressed in the formula: “Prospective security is preferred to prospective risk;” which seems to be nearly all that is required either as a generalisation of the human motives in the case or as a premise for the theoretical refinements aimed at, whereas the dictum that “present goods are preferred to future goods” must, on reflection, commend itself as substantially false. By and large, of course, goods are not wanted except for prospective use—beyond the measure of that urgent current consumption that plays no part in the theoretical refinements for which the dictum is invoked. It will immediately be apparent on reflection that even for the individual’s own advantage “present goods are preferred to future goods” only where and in so far as property rights are secure, and then only for future use. It is for productive use in the future, or more particularly for the sake of prospective revenue to be drawn from wealth so held, by lending or investing it, that such a preference becomes effective. Apart from this pecuniary advantage that attaches to property held over from the present to the future there appears to be no such preference even as a matter of individual self-seeking, and where such pecuniary considerations are not dominant there is no such preference for “present goods.” It is present “wealth,” not present “goods,” that is the object of desire; and present wealth is desired mainly for its prospective advantage. It is well known that in communities where there are habitually no businesslike credit extensions or investments for profit, savings take the form of hoarding, that is, accumulation for future use in preference to present consumption. There might be some division of opinion as to the character of the prospective use for which goods are sought, but there can be little question that much, if not most, of this prospective use is not of a self-regarding character and is not sought from motives of sensuous gain.