“Nous ne trouvons pas cette occupation dans le droit Romain. C’est sur elle que sont fondés les droits que les puissances s’attribuent, en vertu des découvertes.”
It will be seen from the text of M. Wolff, that the intention to take possession at the time of discovery must be declared. The comity of nations, then, presumes that the execution will follow the intention. But the reason of the thing requires that the discovery should be notified at the time when it takes place, otherwise, where actual possession has not ensued, the presumption will be altogether against a discovery, or if there had been a discovery, that it was a mere passing act, that the territory was never taken possession of, or if so, was abandoned immediately. Unless then the intention to appropriate can be presumed from the announcement of the discovery, which the comity of nations will respect,—if the first comer has not taken actual possession, but has passed on, the presumption will be that he never intended to appropriate the territory. Thus a discovery, when it has been concealed from other nations, has never been recognised as a good title: it is an inoperative act.
A case in point may be cited to illustrate the application of this principle. Mr. Greenhow (p. 116) observes, in reference to the voyage of Perez in 1775,—“The Government of Spain perhaps acted wisely in concealing the accounts of this expedition, which reflected little honour on the courage or the science of the navigators: but it has thereby deprived itself of the means of establishing beyond question the claim of Perez to the discovery of the important harbour called Nootka Sound, which is now, by general consent, assigned to Captain Cook.”
Vattel (b. i., l. xviii., § 207) discusses this title at large:—
“All mankind have an equal right to things that have not yet fallen into the possession of any one, and those things belong to the person who first takes possession of them. When therefore a nation finds a country uninhabited, and without an owner, it may lawfully take possession of it, and after it has sufficiently made known its will in this respect, it cannot be deprived of it by another nation. Thus navigators going on voyages of discovery, furnished with a commission from their sovereign, and meeting with islands or other lands in a desert state, have taken possession of them in the name of the nation; and this title has been usually respected, provided it was soon after followed by a real possession.”
According to this statement, the act of discovery must be sanctioned by a commission from the sovereign, and the will of the nation to take possession must be by its agent sufficiently made known. What acts should be respected by the courtesy of nations, and be held sufficient to make known formally the will of a nation to avail itself of a discovery, has been a subject of much dispute. The tendency, however, both of writers and statesmen, has been to limit rather than to extend the title by discovery, ever since the Papal Bulls of the 16th century enlarged it to an inconvenient extent, to the exclusive benefit of two favoured nations.
Thus Vattel:—“The law of nations will, therefore, not acknowledge the property and sovereignty of a nation over any uninhabited countries except those of which it has really taken actual possession, in which it has formed settlements, or of which it makes actual use. In effect, when navigators have met with desert countries in which those of other nations had, in their transient visits, erected some monuments to show their having taken possession of them, they have paid as little regard to that empty ceremony as to the regulation of the Popes, who divided a great part of the world between the crowns of Castile and Portugal.”
To the same purport, Martens, in his Précis du Droit des Gens, § 37:—
“Supposé que l’occupation soit possible, it faut encore qu’elle ait eu lieu effectivement,—que le fait de la prise de possession ait concouru avec la volonté manifeste de s’en approprier l’objet. La simple déclaration de volonté d’une nation ne suffit pas non plus qu’une donation papale, ou une convention entre deux nations pour imposer à d’autres le devoir de s’abstenir de l’usage ou de l’occupation de l’objet en question. Le simple fait d’avoir été le premier à découvrir ou à visiter une île, &c., abandonnée ensuite, semble insuffisant, même de l’aveu des nations, tant qu’on n’a point laissé de traces permanentes de possession et de volonté, et ce n’est pas sans raison qu’on a souvent disputé entre les nations, comme entre les philosophes, si des croix, des poteaux, des inscriptions, &c., suffisent pour acquérir ou pour conserver la propriété exclusive d’un pays qu’on ne cultive pas.”
Kluber, to the same effect, writes thus: (§ 126)—“Pour acquérir une chose par le moyen de l’occupation, il ne suffit point d’en avoir seulement l’intention, ou de s’attribuer une possession purement mentale; la déclaration même de vouloir occuper, faite antérieurement à l’occupation effectuée par un autre, ne suffirait pas. Il faut qu’on ait réellement occupé le premier, et c’est par cela seul qu’en acquérant un droit exclusif sur la chose, on impose à tout tiers l’obligation de s’en abstenir. L’occupation d’une partie inhabitée et sans maître du globe de la terre, ne peut donc s’étendre plus loin qu’on ne peut tenir pour constant qu’il y ait eu effectivement prise de possession, dans l’intention de s’attribuer la propriété. Comme preuves d’une pareille prise de possession, ainsi que de la continuation de la possession en propriété, peuvent servir tous les signes extérieurs qui marquent l’occupation et la possession continue.”