The memorandum contended that, in the face of the new liberal constitution granted Cuba, which "has already borne fruits," it was difficult to understand why President McKinley, in his message of Dec. 6, 1897, and General Woodford, in the note of Dec. 20, 1897, should still doubt Spain's loyalty.
The document then spoke at some length of the Maine accident, and asserted that the Americans, under the pretext of the extra territoriality of the vessel, never allowed the Spanish authorities to visit the wreck for purposes of investigation; and it most solemnly asserted the absolute innocence of Spanish officials and of Spanish subjects generally.
The fairness and loyalty of Spain were then shown by a reference to the equitable treatment which American filibusters, more especially those of the Competitor, received at the hands of Spain, and in order to show more fully how pacific and correct have been the attitude of the Spanish government the memorandum enumerated the four clauses of the Spanish proposals. They were:
PROPOSALS OF SPAIN.
1. An offer to submit all questions arising from the Maine affair to arbitration.
2. An order to Governor-General Blanco to retire into the western provinces and to apply 3,000,000 pesetas for the relief of the agricultural population, with an acceptance by the Spanish government of relief for Cubans sent by the United States, provided such relief were sent in merchant vessels.
3. The co-operation of the Cuban parliament in formulating the extent of the powers to be reserved for the central government.
4. In view of the Cuban parliament not meeting before May 4, the proclamation of an immediate armistice.
The memorandum proceeded to declare that the United States had not accepted even these far-reaching concessions, and that the good offices of the pope had been equally unavailing. It asserted that the Maine accident was used by political parties in America as a means of hurling "most gratuitous and intolerable calumnies at the Spanish government," and yet, the document said, Mr. Olney, in an official note dated April 4, 1896, to the Spanish minister in Washington, himself expressed very serious apprehensions lest the only existing bond of union in Cuba should disappear in the event of Spain withdrawing from that island. Mr. Olney, as the memorandum argued, feared at that time that a war of races would ensue, all the more sanguinary in proportion to the experience and discipline acquired during the insurrection, and that two republics would at once be formed—one white, the other black—the upshot being that one of the two would swallow the other.
The grave view thus taken by Mr. Olney of the future of Cuba freed from Spain's rule was then enlarged upon, and inevitable racial wars were foreshadowed, which were "certain to wreck the existence of Cuba as a state, should Spain be deprived of sovereignty" over the island. Thus, being convinced, as Spain was, that right and equity are on her side "she will not and cannot surrender her sovereignty in Cuba."